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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that Cornelius Van Til’s (1895–
1987) presupposition of Reformed dogmatics is largely a presupposition of
Herman Bavinck’s (1854–1921) Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. The argument proceeds
in three steps. First, by situating Van Til’s life and work in the neo-Calvinist
intellectual milieu within which he operated throughout his career, the prevailing
Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s thought is challenged on the grounds of
historical abstraction. Second, his formal, material, and polemical appropriations
of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek are analyzed in order to show not only that Van Til
appropriates Bavinck’s thought pervasively, but also that his apologetics cannot
be properly understood apart from Bavinck’s dogmatics. Third, Van Til’s
criticisms of the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought are analyzed in terms
of their originality and their validity. Regarding the former, it is argued that Van
Til tacitly appropriates Herman Dooyeweerd’s (1894–1977) earlier criticisms of
neo-Calvinist scholasticism. Regarding the latter, it is argued that Van Til’s
criticisms are methodologically unsound and historically untenable insofar as
they proceed upon subjective premises and lead to a subjective conclusion. In
sum, given both his pervasive appropriation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek and his
entrenchment in neo-Calvinist theology and philosophy, Van Til is more
accurately interpreted as a neo-Calvinist rather than a Copernican revolutionary.
ix

PREFACE
Kees Van Til als Nederlandse-Amerikaanse, Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan
apologeticus—such an obtuse title surely calls for an explanation!
Taken together, these words sound two important bass notes that carry along
the melody of my thesis, and since these notes ring out clearly in the relevant
biographical literature,1 I will simply summarize them briefly up front.
In the first place, Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987) is Dutch through and
through. He frankly admits that he was groomed on the Dutch neo-Calvinist
theology of Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920) and Herman Bavinck (1854–1921).
Further, throughout his entire teaching career Van Til interacted extensively with
modern Dutch theologians and philosophers. Nevertheless, his neo-Calvinist
heritage has been significantly underdeveloped in the predominantly AmericanPresbyterian-based Van Til scholarship. Hence the Dutch title is my attempt to
foreground this important, yet neglected, contextual factor.
In the second place, Van Til is complex through and through. Due to his
1. For the most recent and most thorough biography of Van Til, see John R. Muether,
Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman, American Reformed Biographies
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008). The biography by William White Jr., Van Til, Defender of the Faith:
An Authorized Biography (Nashville and New York: Thomas Nelson, 1979), although largely
uncritical, provides useful insights into Van Til’s life nevertheless. Also note the brief biographical
sections within the following works: John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1995), 19-47; Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic: Readings and Analysis
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998), 7-20; Kenneth D. Boa and Robert M. Bowman Jr., Faith Has Its
Reasons: An Integrative Approach to Defending Christianity, 2nd ed. (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster,
2005), 240-43.
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multifarious immigrations (i.e., geographically—from The Netherlands to
America at age 10; institutionally—from Calvin Seminary to Princeton Seminary
to Westminster Seminary; and ecclesiastically—from the Christian Reformed
Church in North America to the Orthodox Presbyterian Church), nearly every
aspect of Van Til’s life defies simple classification. Hence, a broad historicaltheological perspective is necessary for understanding any of the individual
aspects of his colorful thought, including the one that is analyzed in this thesis—
Van Til’s presupposition of Reformed dogmatics.
Considered individually, each of the title words represent a particular
component not only of Van Til’s thought and life, but also of my thesis’ raison
d'être.
First, apologeticus. In 1976 my friend and former seminary professor, Dr. John
M. Frame, wrote the following introduction to an essay on Van Til’s theology:
In 1961, Cornelius Van Til reviewed a book by R. H. Bremmer called
Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus (Herman Bavinck the Theologian). Having
run across this review in a recent perusal of the Van Til corpus, I asked
myself whether someday there might be a book called Cornelius Van Til
als Dogmaticus.2
In part, apologeticus is my humble response to Professor Frame’s rhetorical
question. Based upon (1) Van Til’s expressly stated job description that he is an
apologist and not a dogmatician, (2) his frequent and persistent claims to the
effect that he is building upon the theology of his Reformed predecessors rather
than starting de novo, (3) his extensive interaction with neo-Calvinist Dutch
2. John M. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” in Foundations of Christian
Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, ed. Gary North (Vallecito, CA: Ross House Books,
1976), 295; also published as Van Til: The Theologian (Phillipsburg, NJ: Pilgrim Pub. Co., 1976). Cf.
Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological Journal 24,
no. 1 (1961): 48-64.
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theology and philosophy, and (4) as Frame himself suggests3—and as I intend to
demonstrate below—Van Til’s pervasive appropriations of Bavinck’s dogmatic
formulations, were such a book to be written it would have to be entitled
Cornelius Van Til als apologeticus (or perhaps even als Nederlandse-Amerikaanse,
Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan apologeticus!) rather than als dogmaticus.
Second, Nederlandse-Amerikaanse. Much has happened in the field of Bavinck
scholarship since Frame’s essay in 1976. Most notably, Bavinck’s Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek has “immigrated” from Nederland to Amerika via a four-volume,
unabridged English translation. Although it could be said that Bavinck’s
dogmatic theology appeared in America much earlier by second-hand means
(i.e., via B. B. Warfield’s, Geerhardus Vos’, Louis Berkhof’s, and even Van Til’s
support for and appropriation of Bavinck’s thought) and by abridged
translations, his Dogmatiek has been neither fully nor directly available to
American readers until its recent “immigration.”
Additionally, as more scholars are reading Bavinck in English, international
conferences on his theology have begun to appear on both sides of the Atlantic,
such as, the 28–30 October 2004 “Ontmoeting met Herman Bavinck” conference at
both the Theologische Universiteit te Kampen (Oudestraat) and De Vrije Universiteit te
Amsterdam;4 the 18–20 September 2008 “Pearl and Leaven” Bavinck Conference at
Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, MI, USA; 5 the 16–18 April 2009
3. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 295: “Even when Van Til’s theology sounds
most strange to American ears (for example, his strong emphasis upon the ethical/metaphysical
distinction), he is very often paraphrasing ideas from the Dutch tradition. (In the case of the
ethical/metaphysical distinction, the source is Bavinck.)”
4. Papers from this conference were published in George Harinck and Gerrit Neven, eds.,
Ontmoetingen met Herman Bavinck, Ad Chartas-reeks 9 (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006).
5. Papers from this conference were published in Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (April
2010) and The Bavinck Review, no. 1 (2010), http://bavinck.calvinseminary.edu/review/tbr-1-
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conference sponsored by The Abraham Kuyper Center for Public Theology at
Princeton Theological Seminary in Princeton, NJ, USA, in celebration of the
centenary of Bavinck’s Stone Lectures; the 1–2 September 2010 Edinburgh
Bavinck Conference at The New College School of Divinity, University of
Edinburgh, in Edinburgh, Scotland; 6 and the upcoming 12–14 October 2011
Bavinck Conference at Calvin Seminary. Additionally, the first English-language
biography of Herman Bavinck has been published just this past year. 7 Van Til
scholars, accordingly, have received the opportunity to analyze Van Til’s
Amerikaanse theology in light of the growing body of English-language
scholarship regarding Bavinck’s Nederlandse theology only recently.
Third, Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan. A deep irony pervades Van Til
scholarship, one that is unavoidable due to the nature of his aforementioned
immigrations, namely, whereas Van Til was reared in the Dutch Reformed
tradition, he spent nearly his entire teaching career at a predominantly
Presbyterian institution. Likewise, he spent nearly his entire ecclesiastical career

2010.
6. Papers from the plenary sessions of this conference will be published in The Scottish
Bulletin of Evangelical Theology (Summer 2011), and student papers will be published in The
Bavinck Review, no. 2 (April 2011), http://bavinck.calvinseminary.edu/review.
7. Ron Gleason, Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian (Phillipsburg,
NJ: P&R, 2010). Also note the several introductory articles on Bavinck’s theology by Cornelis P.
Venema: “Bavinck the Dogmatician (I),” The Outlook 58, no. 4 (April 2008): 6-9; idem, “Bavinck the
Dogmatician (II),” The Outlook 58, no. 5 (May 2008): 8-11; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (3),”
The Outlook 58, no. 8 (September 2008): 8-11; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (4),” The Outlook 58,
no. 11 (December 2008): 8-11; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (4),” The Outlook 59, no. 1 (2009): 2931; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (5),” The Outlook 59, no. 2 (February 2009): 27-28; idem,
“Bavinck the Dogmatician (6),” The Outlook 59, no. 3 (March 2009): 22-25; idem, “Bavinck the
Dogmatician (7),” The Outlook 59, no. 5 (May 2009): 26-31; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician: The
Names and Attributes of the Triune God,” The Outlook 59, no. 7 (July 2009): 24-28; idem, “Bavinck
the Dogmatician: The Doctrine of the Trinity,” The Outlook 59, no. 8 (September 2009): 28-31; idem,
“Bavinck the Dogmatician (10),” The Outlook 60, no. 2 (March 2010): 28-31; idem, “Herman
Bavinck: His Life and Theology,” New Horizons, October 2008, http://www.opc.org/nh.html?
article_id=576.
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in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. Yet, as his corpus clearly reveals, Van Til
continued to engage the Dutch Reformed tradition (i.e., both the actual Dutch
tradition in The Netherlands and its American counterparts) from his new
Presbyterian posts. Despite his indefatigably Dutch roots and writings, however,
his foremost interpreters and biographers have been American Presbyterians.
Therefore, the words, Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan, signify both this irony and
the corresponding need for a thick reading of Van Til’s complex historical
context.
Fourth, Kees Van Til. I was five years old when Van Til died, thus I never had
the opportunity to meet him in person. But I have read in biographies of his life
and have been told by those who knew him personally that his friends addressed
him by his Dutch nickname—Kees. Although I will not be able to be his personal
friend until heaven, I can do now what good friends always seek to do, namely,
to listen to what the other is saying within the context in which he or she is
speaking. In this sense I aim to be a good friend of Kees even now in the
presentation of the following thesis.

By way of acknowledgements, first and foremost, I wish to thank the triune
Lord who not only has drawn me out of sin’s darkness and shone his Son’s
saving light into my heart, but also has redirected the course of my life in ways I
never would have expected, including lavishing upon me the gift of
postgraduate theological study. Who am I to deserve such an opportunity?
Second, thank you to my beautiful, gracious, and selfless wife without whose
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enduring patience and loving support I could have neither made it through the
Th.M. program nor finished this thesis.
Third, thank you to my parents and to my in-laws, whose financial support,
ceaseless prayers, and patience with their son’s frenetic and domineering school
schedule and whose visits to Grand Rapids have put fresh wind in my slacking
sails more than a few times.
Fourth, thank you to Professor John Bolt, whose generosity in providing
materials for me to read, whose insightful suggestions and criticisms in countless
office conversations, whose Th.M. courses on Bavinck’s theology, whose Ph.D.
seminar on twentieth-century Dutch theology, and, above all, whose friendship
and encouragement have been a great boon to my studies and to this project in
particular.
Fifth, thank you to Calvin Theological Seminary not only for awarding me
the Louis Berkhof Graduate Scholarship and hence enabling me to move my
family to Grand Rapids in order to complete the Th.M. program, but also for
providing—along with the Herman Bavinck Institute—funding to attend the
2010 Edinburgh Bavinck Conference. The paper I delivered at the conference was
an immense help toward the completion of this thesis.
Sixth, thank you to Mark Hofman, a fellow Th.M. student who generously
donated to me a large collection of Van Til books that he had received from the
personal library of Van Til’s brother-in-law, Dr. Fled Klooster. Having my own
copies of these hard-to-find primary sources proved to be very useful throughout
this project.
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CHAPTER I.
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN ABSTRACTO:
CORNELIUS AS COPERNICUS
The purpose of this essay is to analyze Cornelius Van Til’s preeminent
presupposition—a presupposition upon which the entire structure of his thought
depends, yet a presupposition which has received surprisingly little attention in
the related scholarship—his presupposition of Reformed dogmatics. He states
this presupposition clearly and modestly in the introduction to the first chapter
of The Defense of the Faith, a book that many consider to be his magnum opus: “I
have never been called upon to work out any form of systematic theology,”
writes Van Til. “My business is to teach Apologetics. I therefore presuppose the
Reformed system of doctrine.”1
Several critical questions arise from Van Til’s frank presupposition of
Reformed dogmatics, such as: What is the nature of this presupposition in Van
Til’s thought? Does he treat “the Reformed system of doctrine” as an eternal,
static idea? Or does he view it as an historically-mediated and hence culturallyconditioned and dynamic presupposition? Further, what is the extent of “the
Reformed system” in Van Til’s view? Does it include Reformed confessional
theology? If so, then which confessional traditions does it include? Does it
include Reformed dogmatic theology? If so, then which dogmaticians does he
1. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R, 2008), 27.

2
include, and from which countries and which eras does he make his selections?
Does it include Reformed catechetical theology, Reformed biblical interpretation,
and Reformed preaching? If so, then again, which catechists, commentators, and
preachers does Van Til view as comprising “the Reformed system”? Moreover,
what is the function of this presupposition in Van Til’s thought? Does he use this
presupposition as the terminus a quo from whence all of his polemics proceed?
For example, since in Van Til’s view Reformed apologetics presupposes
Reformed dogmatics, then does it follow necessarily that the Reformed apologist
is always the student of the Reformed dogmatician? If so, then from whom did
Van Til learn his dogmatics before he formulated his apologetics?
Despite the fact that answers to these questions regarding Van Til’s
presupposition of “the Reformed system of doctrine” are vital not only for an
accurate interpretation of his thought, but also for a valid assessment of his
contribution to Reformed theology, this aspect of his thought has received scant
analysis. One of the primary reasons for this want is that, within the current body
of Van Til scholarship, the historical Cornelius has been transformed into an
ahistorical Copernican revolutionary; hence, his presupposition of “the Reformed
system” has been abstracted into an ahistorical Copernican world wherein Van
Til is seen as not only a revolutionary apologist but also a revolutionary
theologian the likes of which have not been seen since Aquinas or Calvin.
Therefore, if we are going to make any progress toward an historically sound
analysis of Van Til’s presupposition, then first we must evaluate the Copernican
line of scholarship with its attempt to present Van Til’s presupposition in

3
abstracto.

A. The Problem: Cornelius as Copernicus
Cornelius Van Til is frequently hailed by his followers as the Copernicus of
modern Christian apologetics.2 He is attributed with the following Copernican
résumé accordingly: (1) “He has done for apologetics,” insists Greg Bahnsen,
what Calvin did for theology. By aiming to bring every thought into
captivity to the obedience of Christ, Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic
has triggered the reformation of Christian apologetics. 3
(2) “So, then,” Bahnsen alleges further,
the distinctive presuppositional method and outlook that Van Til
promoted through his published writings have generated an intellectual
revolution.4
(3) “Any historical survey of Christian apologetics,” K. Scott Oliphint brashly
asserts, “would show that, since Aquinas, the church has done little to develop
the discipline of apologetics until Van Til.”5 (4) John Frame lauds Van Til as “the
2. K. Scott Oliphint, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the Reformation of Christian
Apologetics,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint
and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 280; originally published as “Cornelius Van Til
and the Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” in Die idee van reformasie: Gister en vandag, ed. B. J.
van der Walt (Potchefstroomse: Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys,
1991); also cf. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 295; Edmund P. Clowney,
“Preaching the Word of the Lord: Cornelius Van Til, VDM,” Westminster Theological Journal 46, no.
2 (1984): 242; Gary North, Westminster's Confession: The Abandonment of Van Til's Legacy (Tyler, TX:
Institute for Christian Economics, 1991), 20-22. Though he is not a follower of Van Til but rather a
stiff critic, John W. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth (Jefferson, MD: The Trinity
Foundation, 1986), 1-2, notes that Van Til’s followers have transformed Cornelius into a
mythological Copernican figure.
3. Greg L. Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ: The Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” in
Foundations of Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, ed. Gary North (Vallecito, CA:
Ross House Books, 1976), 239; also cf. ibid., 233-34; idem, “The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception
in Presuppositional Apologetics,” Westminster Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 1n2; idem, Van
Til's Apologetic, 7.
4. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 16.
5. Oliphint, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the Reformation of Christian Apologetics,”
280. Incidentally, one standard history of apologetics textbook, Avery Cardinal Dulles, A History
of Apologetics, 1st ed., Theological Resources (New York: Corpus Instrumentorum, 1971), contains
no references to Van Til; furthermore, the revised edition includes only three passing references to
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most important Christian thinker since John Calvin”6 and lavishes him with the
following praise:
“[W]hen one considers the uniqueness of his apologetic position and
then further considers the implications of that apologetic for theology,
one searches for superlatives to describe the significance of Van Til’s
overall approach.”7
(5) Frame further extols Van Til’s Copernican revolution in apologetics as equal
to that of Kant’s in philosophy:
If (as may well be said) Van Til has done for Christian thought what Kant
accomplished for non-Christian thought, giving it a revolutionary
awareness of the uniqueness and comprehensiveness of its distinctive
principles, then as with Kant the “Copernican” radicalism of his
contribution must be appreciated in all areas of human thought and life. 8
(6) Van Til’s “revolutionary” apologetic, exclaims Charles Dennison, was
“virtually turning the study of apologetics head over heels.” 9 (7) “Van Tilian
him (idem, A History of Apologetics, 2nd ed., Modern Apologetics Library (San Francisco, CA:
Ignatius Press, 2002), 266, 322, 357). Oliphint’s brash overstatement is based upon his own
Copernican-like “Van Tilian” revolution as recounted in K. Scott Oliphint, “Desert Bloom in
Amarillo,” New Horizons (July 2010), http://opc.org/nh.html?article_id=666; and idem,
“Forward,” in The Defense of the Faith, xi-xiii, rather than upon objective historical analysis. Also,
note idem, “Van Til the Evangelist,” Ordained Servant 17 (2008): 54: “My initial introduction to him
[i.e., Van Til] came through his many writings. I immersed myself in those writings, seeing, for
the first time in my Christian life, a man whose method (based, as it, was on Reformed theology)
was able to decimate all pretensions and permutations of unbelief, including those residing in my
own heart.” Additionally, see idem, Reasons for Faith: Philosophy in the Service of Theology
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2006), x, wherein Oliphint claims that he has imbibed Van Til’s teachings
to such an extent that they are “between every line of the pages that follow” and that he “could
not have written anything here had his [i.e., Van Til’s] influence not been profoundly present. . . .”
6. John M. Frame, “Backgrounds to My Thought,” in Speaking the Truth in Love: The Theology
of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 14; also cf. idem, Salvation
Belongs to the Lord: An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing,
2006), 352; idem, The Doctrine of God, A Theology of Lordship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2002), 762.
7. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 295. Idem, Cornelius Van Til, 3, writes the
following in a similar context: “I have been criticized for using such superlatives to describe Van
Til, but I intend to use them again, and to defend that use, in the present volume.” At the same
time, however, Frame admits that there is a need for a “sympathetic, comprehensive, critical
analysis” of Van Til (p. 3).
8. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 297.
9. Charles G. Dennison, History for a Pilgrim People: The Historical Writings of Charles G.
Dennison, ed. Danny E. Olinger and David K. Thompson (Willow Grove, PA: The Committee for
the Historian of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 2002), 120.
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presuppositionalism” has provided, according to the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church’s recommended curriculum for the training of ministers, “the most
biblically faithful expression of Reformed apologetics,” and hence it is to be
taught first and foremost before the presentation of a mere “survey of positions
held by other Reformed apologists.”10
These gushing scholarly and ecclesiastical interpretations of Van Til’s
significance give the impression that the entire history of Christian thought
begins and ends with Van Til.11 However, such ahistorical interpretations of Van
Til’s work that transform Cornelius into a Copernican revolutionary appear
oddly hyperbolic when contrasted against Van Til’s conspicuous modesty, his
sonorous aversion to theological novelty, and his explicit appropriation of
Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision.
1. Van Til’s Modest Self-Assessments
Van Til described his own work as intentionally unoriginal in the classic

10. The full statement in Stated Clerk of the General Assembly, The Book of Church Order of the
Orthodox Presbyterian Church, rev. ed. (Willow Grove, PA: The Committee on Christian Education
of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 2011), 216, regarding the guideline for what should be
taught with respect to apologetics is as follows: “Introduction to Apologetic Methodology and
Practice including (1) the school of Van Tilian presuppositionalism as the most biblically faithful
expression of Reformed apologetics, and (2) a survey of positions held by other Reformed
apologists.” The language in the 2005 edition of the Book of Church Order is exactly the same. This
statement is odd due to its idiosyncrasy: None of the other topics of study (e.g., systematic
theology, church history, etc.) contain prescriptions for one person’s thought as the “most
biblically faithful” expressions of that topic.
11. Regarding Van Til’s followers, Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 16, writes, “Some of them have
made extravagant claims about Van Til and his legacy that would have embarrassed him.
Disciples have lauded him as the most creative mind since Immanuel Kant and the greatest
Christian thinker since John Calvin. The allegedly innovative features of his apologetic approach
have been applauded for their proto-postmodernism and either credited or blamed for distancing
both Westminster Theological Seminary and the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from their
American Presbyterian past.” William Edgar, “Introduction,” in Christian Apologetics, ed. William
Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 14, likewise asserts: “Cornelius Van Til is not the last
word on apologetics, nor would he ever have claimed to be.”
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Protestant sense of the term—historical, orthodox, non-revolutionary. 12 Like the
seventeenth-century Reformed polemicist, Francis Turretin (1623–1687), who
ardently eschewed “novelty” as a descriptor of his Institutio Theologiae
Elencticae,13 and like Charles Hodge (1797–1878), the nineteenth-century
Reformed theologian who famously asserted that during his tenure at Princeton
no new doctrines had appeared either at Princeton Seminary or in the Biblical
Repertory and Princeton Review,14 Van Til intentionally describes himself as
standing squarely on the shoulders of his Reformed predecessors. 15 Regarding
12. For a classic statement of Protestant “unoriginality,” see John Calvin, “Prefatory Address
to King Francis I of France,” in Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, 2 vols.,
Library of Christian Classics (Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 9-31. E.g., in response to the
allegation of theological novelty leveled against the French Protestants, Calvin replies as follows:
“First, by calling it ‘new’ they do great wrong to God, whose Sacred word does not deserve to be
accused of novelty. Indeed, I do not at all doubt that it is new to them, since to them both Christ
himself and his gospel are new. But he who knows that this preaching of Paul is ancient, that
‘Jesus Christ died for our sins and rose again for our justification’ [Rom. 4:25 p.], will find nothing
new among us” (pp. 15-16). Cf. William S. Barker, “The Historical Context of the Institutes as a
Work in Theology,” in A Theological Guide to Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis, ed. David W.
Hall and Peter A., Lillback (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 4-7.
13. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George
Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992), I:xlii, writes: “Let other books, then, be
commended by their novelty. I do not want this statement to justify mine. I avoided it most
diligently lest it should contain anything new, a stranger from the word of God and from the
public forms received in our churches, and nothing is built up there that is not confirmed by the
vote of our most proven theologians of highest reputation.”
14. D. G. Hart, “Systematic Theology at Old Princeton Seminary: Unoriginal Calvinism,” in
The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of
Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 3-4.
15. E.g., referring to his book on Christian epistemology, Cornelius Van Til, A Christian
Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 23, writes: “The greater
part of what is presented here is due to the fact that the writer stands on the shoulders of the
great Reformed thinkers mentioned above. He is merely gathering together the thoughts found
over a widely diversified body of their writings in order to present briefly that which basically
they have taught.” The theologians “mentioned above” include “the great Reformed
dogmaticians of modern times, such as Charles Hodge, Thornwell, Dabney, Shedd, Kuyper and
especially Herman Bavinck. Back of all of them stands that master theologian and exegete of
Scripture, John Calvin, whose writings have been constantly consulted” (see “Introduction,”
n.p.). “It is to this basic approach,” Van Til similarly remarks, “of Kuyper and Bavinck, of Charles
Hodge and B. B. Warfield and Geerhardus Vos (ignoring or setting aside the remnants of the
traditional method that is found in their works) that appeal is made in this work” (ibid., 20).
Additionally, cf. idem, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,
2003), 57n4, 101, 107n33, 115; idem, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the
Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,
2007), 5-7, 13, 29n8, 70, 89, 89n1, 112n15, 320n4; idem, The Defense of the Faith, 2, 23, 27, 27n1, 103,
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his own contributions to Reformed apologetics, for example, Van Til insists that
he did not start de novo:
Seeing, therefore, the failure of even Reformed theologians and
apologists in their efforts to defend consistently the self-attesting Christ
of Scripture, it became clear to me that new ground work needed to be
done. I did not, however, undertake this task de novo. I learned much
from other men, just as I did in theology from Kuyper and Bavinck. 16
In another work Van Til carefully emphasizes his continuity with “historic
Calvinism” and downplays his differences with Warfield and Kuyper on
apologetics:
In all this I think I am only presenting generic or historic Calvinism. If I
have proposed variations, they are certainly not of basic import. Even the
apologetic methodology I have proposed rests upon Calvin and upon the
classical Reformed theologians. To the extent that these differ among one
another I have been compelled to choose between them. Even so these
differences have not been of such a basic nature that I could not appeal to
a common view held by both parties. I have tried to use elements both of
Kuyper’s and of Warfield’s thinking. If the construction that has resulted
differs somewhat from both and is in that sense “original,” its soundness
may be judged on its merits.17
In yet another place Van Til nuances his own apologetic formulations
circumspectly. Referring to himself, he writes:
It is only in a subordinate way that he differs from the great theologians
of the preceding generation. The greater part of what is presented here is
due to the fact that the writer stands on the shoulders of the great
Reformed thinkers mentioned above [i.e., Kuyper, Bavinck, Charles
Hodge, B. B. Warfield, and Geerhardus Vos, p. 20]. He is merely
gathering together the thoughts found over a widely diversified body of
their writings in order to present briefly that which basically they have
113, 143n43, 237, 264, 276, 284, 382, 395; Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ,” 234; White, Van Til,
Defender of the Faith, 34-36; Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56.
16. Cornelius Van Til, “My Credo,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology
and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 11.
17. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 23-24. In contradistinction to his “Copernican”
assessment of Van Til noted above, Oliphint comments on this passage as follows: “This
confession of Van Till’s should not be passed over lightly. He confesses here that the thrust of his
approach to apologetics is the application of Reformed systematic theology to the Christian
defense of the faith. He did not see himself as developing anything new in that sense” (23n101).
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taught.18
Likewise, Van Til introduces his own contribution to the Reformed debate over
the doctrine of common grace as follows:
We now make bold to submit a few remarks by way of suggesting the
direction in which we may possibly hope for profitable discussion on the
common grace question in the future. It is with hesitation and diffidence
that we do so. And it is with the greatest of appreciation for the labors of
such men as Kuyper, Bavinck, Hepp, Schilder, Hoeksema, Zwier, and
others, that we say what we say.19
Van Til elsewhere admits his indebtedness to his Reformed predecessors as
follows:
With grateful acknowledgment of indebtedness to both Kuyper and
Warfield, to Herman Bavinck and other associates and followers of
Kuyper, to the various associates and followers of Warfield, to J.
Gresham Machen in particular, we would take their common basic
contribution to the idea of the full Christian faith and the self-attesting
Scripture and build as best as we can upon it. 20
In terms of his self-assessments, therefore, Van Til consistently viewed himself
simply as “Cornelius,” a self-conscious inheritor of the classic Reformed
tradition, not as “Copernicus,” a revolutionary seeking to begin his work de novo.
2. Van Til’s Polemics against Novelty
In addition to cautiously resisting the perception of novelty in his self18. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 23.
19. Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and
Reformed Pub. Co., 1972), 33-34. “Of course,” writes Van Til in a similar passage, “it was with
great diffidence and hesitation that I sought a solution for the apologetic problem and for the
problem of common grace by the means of thus sorting out, rejecting the weaknesses in both
positions, and building upon the solid foundation in both, derived from Calvin and ultimately
from St. Paul” (p. 186); Also cf. Van Til’s analysis of the differences between Old Princeton and
Old Amsterdam on the nature of Reformed apologetics (pp. 183-87). “It is, in short,” Van Til
writes further, “because I hold the appeal to reason as autonomous to be both illegitimate and
destructive from the point of view of Reformed faith that I am bound to reject Hepp’s position as
well as that of Old Princeton apologetics. But happily I can do so in view of the theology that I
have learned from Old Princeton and Amsterdam” (p. 194).
20. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 254.
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assessments, Van Til also polemicizes vehemently against the heterodox
“newness” that was appearing all around him. His self-named theological
opponents include, for example: the “new theology” of the 1967 revision to the
Presbyterian confessional standards; 21 the “new modernism” at his Alma Mater,
Princeton, and in the thought of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner; 22 the “new
hermeneutic” of Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling; 23 the “new evangelicalism”
and “new Protestantism” both of which rejected the infallibility of the Bible and
asserted a “new Christ”;24 and the “new synthesis theology” overtaking the
Gereformeerde Kerken van Nederland.25 It is clearly evident, then, that rather than
21. Cornelius Van Til, The Confession of 1967: Its Theological Background and Ecumenical
Significance (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1967), 1, declares the
following: “Should the Confession of 1967 be adopted by that church [i.e., the United
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America], an entirely new phase in its life will be
ushered in. This is true because this proposed Confession gives expression to and is based upon a
new theology. Our concern in this booklet, therefore, is with the nature of this new theology
which will be given creedal status if this proposed Confession is adopted by the United
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.” Additionally, cf. idem, An Introduction to
Systematic Theology, 11-12.
22. In a characteristic statement regarding the rise of heterodoxy at his Alma Mater,
Cornelius Van Til, “More New Modernism at Old Princeton,” Presbyterian Guardian 18, no. 9
(September 1949): 166, exclaims: “Charles Hodge was one of the greatest systematic theologians
of modern times. The man about to occupy the chair named after him does not believe in
systematic theology at all.” Idem, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 181, moreover, describes Karl
Barth’s theology as “the ‘new’ Protestantism rather than historic Protestantism.” See also idem,
The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner, 3rd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1972); idem, Christianity and Barthianism (Philadelphia, PA:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962); idem, “Has Karl Barth Become Orthodox?,” Westminster
Theological Journal 16, no. 2 (1954): 135-181.
23. Cornelius Van Til, The New Hermeneutic (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed
Pub. Co., 1974).
24. Cornelius Van Til, “The New Evangelicalism: Address of Welcome to Students Entering
Westminster Seminary,” Presbyterian Guardian 26, no. 9 (October 1957): 131-132; idem, Karl Barth
and Evangelicalism (Nutley, NJ and Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1964); See the
following addresses within the book entitled “The Pamphlets, Tracts, and Offprints of Cornelius
Van Til” in Cornelius Van Til, The Works of Cornelius Van Til (40 Vols.) (Logos Bible Software, n.d.),
http://www.logos.com/products/details/3993: “The New Protestantism—1962” and “The New
Christ—1958.” NB: Hereafter, this electronic collection of Van Til’s works will be referenced as
follows: The Works of Cornelius Van Til (Software).
25. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 10, describes this book as follows: “The thesis of this
essay is that the change of direction in Holland is one which is marked by a turning away from
the traditional Reformed Faith, and toward the reinterpretation (Umdeutung) of it in terms of the
post-Kantian freedom-nature scheme of thought, and, in particular, of neo-orthodox theology. We
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promoting theological revolutions, Van Til frequently employs the adjective
“new” in a pejorative sense in order to characterize his opponents’ views as
heterodox.
In light of Van Til’s careful avoidance of novelty in his self-assessments and
his voluminous polemics against “new” theologies, it is therefore doubly ironic
that some of Van Til’s interpreters have been quick to extol their “Copernicus” in
terms of the very critique he leveled against his theological opponents—novelty.
3. Van Til’s Neo-Calvinist Vision
Abraham Kuyper’s 1898 Stone Lectures at Princeton Seminary 26 had a
profound influence upon Van Til. He not only writes about Kuyper 27 and his
Stone Lectures fondly,28 but also views himself as carrying on the neo-Calvinist
vision that Kuyper propounded. For example, speaking with autobiographical
undertones, Van Til concludes a 1969 speech with a clarion call for others to take
up Kuyper’s vision:
The wisdom of this world has been made foolishness with God. It is thus
that Kuyper’s vision expanded and clarified by Vollenhoven and
Dooyeweerd may help us in our task in undertaking the cultural
mandate for ourselves today. Would that more of those who have seen
shall be concerned chiefly with the new direction so far as it affects theology and, in particular,
hermeneutics. But the new direction in theology and hermeneutics involves and presupposes the
post-Kantian methodology of science and philosophy as well. Finally, the new direction in
theology is, apparently, effecting a new direction in the ecclesiastical situation of the Gereformeerde
Kerken.”
26. These lectures were published in Abraham Kuyper, Calvinism: Six Lectures Delivered in the
Theological Seminary at Princeton (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1899).
27. Cornelius Van Til, “Reflections on Dr. A. Kuyper,” The Banner 72, no. 21 (December 16,
1937): 1187; idem, “Kuyper en Amerika,” De Reformatie 18, no. 14 (December 31, 1937): 150; also cf.
the extensive analysis of Kuyper's thought throughout idem, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed
Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974).
28. E.g., see Van Til’s address entitled, “Pro Rege”—a title based upon the three-volume
work by Kuyper with the same name—which address Van Til delivered once in 1933 and twice in
1965; cf. Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van Til 1895–1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree
Communications, 1995), s.vv., 1933.K, 1965.B.
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something of Kuyper’s vision as he set it forth in the chapel at Princeton
Seminary, might be willing to follow through with Vollenhoven and
Dooyeweerd. If they did, they would say, without hesitation, that it is
only on the presupposition of the truth of what is taught in Scripture
about man and his world, that it is possible for science to understand
itself, for philosophy to attain a totality vision that is not mirage, and for
theology to challenge the new Protestant synthesis between Christianity
and existentialism and the still newer synthesis of the Aristotle-ChristKant axis now functioning in the International Council of Churches of
Christ in the World.29
Furthermore, since he names two Dutch neo-Calvinist philosophers, Herman
Dooyeweerd (1894–1977) and Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven (1892–1987),
as co-laborers, it is clear that Van Til did not consider himself to be a lone ranger
in the fight to uphold Kuyper’s banner in the twentieth century. Rather, he places
himself side-by-side in the same trench with these fellow crusaders.
Additionally, as a self-styled champion of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision, Van
Til took upon himself the role of guardian of Kuyper’s antithesis in America.
Thus, from his post in Philadelphia, he frequently looked across the Atlantic in
order to survey the various permutations of “synthesis” thinking (i.e., the
opposite of Kuyper’s “antithesis” thinking30) that were corrupting not only the
theological landscape of his home country, but also the wider European
theological landscape. Then, in order to stave off an infiltration of such heterodox
synthesis thinking into American Reformed theology, Van Til vehemently
polemicized against the work of the modern European theologian who was,
according to Van Til, the paragon of synthesis thinking—Karl Barth (1886–1968).31
29. “Appendix 2” in White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 233; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1968.I,
1979.B2.
30. As will be demonstrated in chapter 6 below, Van Til appropriated the concept of
“synthesis thinking” from Herman Dooyeweerd.
31. Van Til's polemics against Barth’s theology are as voluminous as they are vehement. His
major polemic is Christianity and Barthianism. For a representative sample of his shorter polemics,
see: idem, Karl Barth and Evangelicalism; idem, “Has Karl Barth Become Orthodox?” For a complete
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Van Til was especially frustrated by the fact that Barth’s synthesis theology took
hold at his Alma Mater, Princeton Seminary. Likewise, he leveled polemics
against the alleged synthesis thinking of several modern Dutch Reformed
theologians, such as, Hendrik Kraemer (1888–1965),32 Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer
(1903–1996),33 Hendrikus Berkhof (1914–1995),34 and Harry Kuitert (1924–
present).35
Therefore, based upon the fact that Van Til (1) frankly appropriates Kuyper’s
neo-Calvinist vision as his own—especially the “antithesis” of Kuyper’s Stone
catalog of Van Til’s writings contra Barth, cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1931.A, 1932.D, 1934.D2, 1935.C,
1935.J, 1936.G, H, 1937.B1-B4, 1937.I, 1938.B, D-F, K, P, 1940.A, 1946.B, G, 1947.A, 1948.B1, D,
1950.A, 1954.A, B, L, 1955.B, 1958.A, D, 1959.A, D, E, F, J, 1960.B, 1961.I, 1962.D, G, H, N, 1964.A,
B1, C, 1966.C, E, 1969.B, E, 1972.G, 1974.D, 1978.A.
32. Cornelius Van Til, “Review of Communication of the Christian Faith by Hendrik
Kraemer (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956),” Westminster Theological Journal 19, no. 2
(May 1957): 208-212.
33. Van Til critically appreciated Berkouwer’s earlier writings, but he vehemently
polemicized against Berkouwer’s later writings. His voluminous analyses include: Cornelius Van
Til, “Review of Karl Barth en de Kinderdoop (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1947) and E. Smilde, Een Eeuw van
Strijd over Verbond en Doop (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1946), by G. C. Berkouwer,” Westminster
Theological Journal 11, no. 1 (1948): 77-80; idem, “Review of Geloof en Rechtvaardiging, Dogmatische
Studien (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1949) and Geloof en Heiliging, Dogmatische Studien (Kampen: J. H. Kok,
1949), by G. C. Berkouwer,” Westminster Theological Journal 12, no. 1 (1949): 74-76; idem, “Review
of De Triomf der Genade in de Theologie van Karl Barth (Kampen: J. H. Kok, N.V, 1954), by G. C.
Berkouwer,” Westminster Theological Journal 18, no. 1 (1955): 58-59; idem, The Triumph of Grace: The
Heidelberg Catechism, Vol. 1, Introduction, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Theological
Seminary, 1958), esp. chs. 4, 6, 7, and 9; idem, “Westminster Professor Replies to Criticism of His
Theological Views,” The Banner 96, no. 2 (January 13, 1961): 18; idem, Christianity and Barthianism,
117-71; idem, “Review of The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholicism, trans. Lewis B.
Smedes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1965), by G. C. Berkouwer,” Interpretation 20, no. 4
(October 1966): 493-94; “Appendix II” in idem, The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, In Defense of
Biblical Christianity 1 (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1967); idem, The Sovereignty
of Grace: An Appraisal of G. C. Berkouwer’s View of Dordt (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed
Pub. Co., 1969); “Appendix 5” in idem,The New Modernism; idem, “The Umkehr at Amsterdam,” in
The Law and the Prophets: Old Testament Studies Prepared in Honor of Oswald Thompson Allis, ed. John
H. Skilton (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1974); idem, The New Synthesis, 44-76; also see
Van Til's response to Berkouwer in E. R. Geehan, ed., Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on
the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971),
197-204; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1948.B1, 1949.A1 and A2, 1955.B, 1958.D, 1959.J, 1961.K, 1961.O,
1962.H, 1964.C, 1966.K, 1967.B, 1969.E, 1971.O, 1972.G, 1974.B1, 1974.G, 1975.B, 1975.E.
34. Van Til, The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, 140-41; idem, The Sovereignty of Grace, 64-76.
35. Van Til, The New Hermeneutic, 109-80; idem, “The Umkehr at Amsterdam”; idem, The New
Synthesis, 10-12, 17-19, 77-99; also cf. the few passing references to Kuitert throughout idem,
Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.
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Lectures—and (2) levels “synthesis thinking” polemics against modern Dutch
and European theologians accordingly, there is abundant warrant for classifying
him as a neo-Calvinist theologian who was deeply engaged in modern Dutch
Reformed thought.

B. The Question: “Van Tilian” or Neo-Calvinist?
Given the dissonance between Van Til’s modest self-identification as a
“generic Calvinist,” his polemics against theological novelty, and his
identification with Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision on the one hand, and the
Copernican identity purported by several of his interpreters on the other hand,
the following question arises: Did Van Til view himself as a “Van Tilian” (i.e., a
Copernicus)?36 Or, is it possible that some of his interpreters have abstracted Van
Til from his self-styled historic, Reformed context—“Christianity as interpreted
in the Reformed creeds, as championed by Kuyper, Bavinck, Hodge, Warfield
and Machen”37—and have created an adjective that Van Til himself never
intended to exist?38
36. Michael S. Horton, “Consistently Reformed: The Inheritance and Legacy of Van Til's
Apologetic,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and
Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 134, raises a similar question, though in a more
narrow context regarding the principia of traditional Reformed scholastic theology: “Cartesian
epistemologies have produced ‘rational apologetics,’ while Lockean versions have generated ‘
evidential apologetics.’ Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositionalism was consequently regarded in its
time as a novum in the history of apologetics, a conclusion that Van Til himself perhaps
insufficiently challenged. But was it really new?”
37. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 276. Similar self-descriptions by which Van Til aligns
himself behind the classic modern Reformed theologians abound in his writings. E.g., idem, The
Defense of the Faith, 103, asserts the following: “It is on the basis of the work of such men as
Charles Hodge, Herman Bavinck, and B. B. Warfield, to mention no others, that we have
formulated the broad outline of the Reformed life-and-world view. It is only by the help of such
men that we have been enabled to attain to anything like a consistent Protestantism.”
38. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 17, highlights the fact that Van Til “referred to his system
unpretentiously as ‘Reformed apologetics’,” and he notes that Van Til used the term “Van Tilian
apologetics” only in private correspondence with confidants (cf. pp. 113-14; quote at p. 114).
Nevertheless, Muether employs the adjective “Van Tilian” in a few places, e.g., pp. 15, 18, 268,
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This essay seeks to answer one aspect of this question by analyzing Van Til’s
appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s Dutch neo-Calvinist theology. I write begin
circumspectly; for, as Van Til himself admits, a panoply of philosophical and
theological tributaries flow into his thought,39 and many of these streams remain
uncharted waters in the scholarly literature. 40 Yet, notwithstanding this caveat,
there are four reasons why it is worthwhile to focus on the Bavinck tributary
within the larger neo-Calvinist stream clearly evident in Van Til’s thought.
First, Van Til explicitly identifies two prominent neo-Calvinist theologians—
Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck—as main theological influences.
Reflecting upon his long academic career in a letter, for example, Van Til begins
as follows: “In my days at Calvin College and Seminary I read Kuyper and
Bavinck assiduously and followed them through thick and thin.” 41 Further, in
“My Credo,” Van Til’s own non-technical summary of his thought, he writes:
277. NB: This neologism appears in the secondary literature in two forms, i.e., “Van Tilian” and
“Van Tillian.” For simplicity’s sake, the former will be used throughout this thesis.
39. E.g., in the “Introduction” to his A Christian Theory of Knowledge, n.p., Van Til presents the
following long list of theological and philosophical influences: Charles Hodge, James Henly
Thornwell, Robert L. Dabney, William G. T. Shedd, Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, D. H. Th.
Vollenhoven, Herman Dooyeweerd, and G. H. Stoker. Later on Van Til adds B. B. Warfield and
Geerhardus Vos to the list (p. 20). On Van Til’s appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s
interpretation of the history of philosophy, see pp. 50-51. Also cf. idem, An Introduction to
Systematic Theology, 13.
40. William Edgar, e.g, in Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 57n4, makes the following editorial
comment: “The full story of Van Til’s relationship to the Amsterdam philosophy, and especially to
Herman Dooyeweerd, has not yet been told.” (On Van Til’s complicated relationship with
Dooyeweerd, see Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 18-19, 48-52; John M. Frame, The Amsterdam
Philosophy: A Preliminary Critique (Pilgrim Press, 1972), 37-39). Likewise, Charles G. Dennison
notes that Van Til’s relationship to Kuyper needs more study (History for a Pilgrim People, 136n54).
Furthermore, as will become evident in the survey of scholarship below, few studies attempt to
analyze Van Til’s appropriation of his self-named Reformed predecessors at any length. Owen
Anderson, however, devotes a chapter to Van Til’s critiques of B. B. Warfield (see ch. 4 in Benjamin
B. Warfield and Right Reason: The Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 2005)), and Brian G. Mattson evaluates Van Til’s critiques of
Bavinck (“Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,” Westminster Theological Journal 70, no. 1 (2008):
111-127).
41. Cornelius Van Til, “The Development of My Thinking,” an unpublished letter to John
Vander Stelt, 1968; Reproduced in Bristley, Guide, 14-17; quote at p. 14.
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Wanting to follow the Reformers, it was natural that I read and
appreciated the works of those who before me likewise attempted to do
so. I first used the works of Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck. How
basic and how broad was their view! The idea of Scripture, they said,
must never be separated from its message. . . .
. . . As Bavinck truly said, the nature of the message of salvation and
the nature of Scripture are always involved in one another. 42
Additionally, referring to his book, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Van Til admits
that “what has been advocated in this work has in large measure been suggested
by Kuyper’s thinking.”43 Similarly, thinking of his own apologetic method, Van
Til asks:
And have I, following such a method, departed radically from the
tradition of Kuyper and Bavinck? On the contrary I have learned all this
primarily from them. It is Kuyper’s Encyclopedie that has, more than any
other work in modern times, brought out the fact of the difference
between the approach of the believer and of the unbeliever. It is
Bavinck’s monumental work which set a “natural theology” frankly
oriented to Scripture squarely over against that of Romanism which is
based on neutral reason. It is Bavinck who taught me that the proofs for
God as usually formulated on the traditional method prove a finite god. I
have indeed had the temerity to maintain that these great Reformed
theologians have in some points not been quite true to their own
principles. But when I have done so I have tried to point out that when
they did so they had departed from Calvin. 44
At the beginning of An Introduction to Systematic Theology, moreover, Van Til
comments: “My indebtedness to such former Reformed theologians as Louis
Berkhof and, back of him, Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper, is apparent
throughout.”45 Contra the theological subjectivism infiltrating Holland,
furthermore, Van Til lauds Kuyper and Bavinck for instigating a “revival of

42. Van Til, “My Credo,” 8-9; also cf. ibid., 11; White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 34-36.
43. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 233-34.
44. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 301; cf. idem, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155-56;
idem, “Westminster Professor Replies to Criticism of His Theological Views.”
45. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 13.
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genuine Reformed theology.”46 In terms of dogmatic influences, therefore, the Dutch
neo-Calvinist stream is the most prominent tributary flowing into Van Til’s
thought.47
Second, within this neo-Calvinist dogmatic stream Van Til considers Bavinck
to be the greatest modern Reformed theologian. He lauds Bavinck’s Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek accordingly as “the greatest and most comprehensive statement of
Reformed systematic theology in modern times.” 48 Moreover, in the introduction
to A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Van Til admits that he is “greatly indebted to
46. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 20. Throughout the book Van Til uses “Kuyper and Bavinck”
as the representatives of orthodox Reformed orthodoxy contra the allegedly heterodox “new
synthesis” Reformed theologians (e.g., pp. 29-30, 32-33, 35, 55, 59, 64, 69, 71, 87); See also the
section entitled, “Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck: Orthodox Reaction to the Christ-Kant
Synthesis of Nineteenth Century Theology” (pp. 28-43). Cf. Van Til’s use of Bavinck contra Barth
in Common Grace and the Gospel, 135.
47. K. Scott Oliphint, “Forward,” in The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed.
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), ix-x, asserts the following: “To understand Van Til’s contribution to
Reformed apologetics, one needs to see not simply his criticisms of Kuyper, Bavinck, and
Warfield, but, more importantly, the ways in which he was able to take the best of these Reformed
theological giants and incorporate their theological insights into his own apologetic
methodology.” Idem, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the Reformation of Christian
Apologetics,” 295n45, similarly asserts: “The Dutch influence of Van Til could arguably be the
most significant influence that has contributed to his Reformed apologetic.” William Edgar,
moreover, in editorial comments throughout Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology,
observes the following: Kuyper was Van Til’s “mentor” (320n4; cf. 17n7); Van Til pervasively
appropriated Bavinck’s doctrine of God (5, 29n8, 89n1, 319n1, 323n8, 335n33, 341n53, 353nn12, 14,
354n20, 369n1).
48. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89; cf. ibid., 29; idem, Common Grace and the
Gospel, 44; idem, The New Synthesis, 37; idem, Appendix 2 in White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith,
225; idem, The Sovereignty of Grace, 27; idem, The Theology of James Daane (Philadelphia, PA:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1959), 92; idem, The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, 29; idem, “As I
Think of Bavinck,” International Reformed Bulletin 9, no. 27 (1966): 19-26; idem, “Bavinck the
Theologian,” 48-49. Commenting on Van Til’s statement, William Edgar notes, “Herman Bavinck
(1854–1921) was a major influence on Van Til. He was perhaps the most significant force in
evangelical Reformed theology in the twentieth century” (An Introduction to Systematic Theology,
89n1). For more on Van Til’s assessment of Bavinck, see Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck”; Muether,
Cornelius Van Til, 56, 115-16. Benjamin B. Warfield, who Van Til counts among his predecessors,
provides a similar commendation: “He [i.e., Bavinck] has given us the most valuable treatise on
Dogmatics written during the last quarter of a century—a thoroughly wrought out treatise which
we never consult without the keenest satisfaction and abundant profit” (Benjamin B. Warfield,
“Review of De Zekerheid des Geloofs (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1901), by Herman Bavinck,” The Princeton
Theological Review 1, no. 1 (January 1903): 148). James Hutton Mackay, Religious Thought in Holland
during the Nineteenth Century, The Hastie Lectures 1909-1911 (London, New York, Toronto:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1911), x-xi, similarly describes Bavinck as “the ablest living writer on
Dogmatics in Holland.”
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the great Reformed dogmaticians of modern times, such as Charles Hodge,
Thornwell, Dabney, Shedd, Kuyper and especially Herman Bavinck.”49 Finally,
toward the end of his career Van Til contrasts Bavinck with Kuyper and insists
that the former, not the latter, provides the paragon of modern Reformed
dogmatics:
He [i.e., Bavinck] will give us great help in our construction of a truly
Reformed theology along the lines of the Reformation principle and
specifically along the lines of Calvin and of Dordt.50
Van Til thus accords Bavinck the place of preeminence among his modern
Reformed predecessors. 51
Third, Van Til knows Bavinck’s works well, and he frequently references
them. His introduction to the Dutch dogmatician came early on in his academic
training, likely from two of Van Til’s most influential seminary professors—Louis
Berkhof and Geerhardus Vos—both of whom, as will be noted below, had
important theological and personal ties to Bavinck.52 Furthermore, his scholarly
49. See "Introduction" in Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, n.p.; emphasis added.
50. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
51. “Back of them all,” continues Van Til in reference to his preeminent pre-modern
theological influence, “stands that master theologian and exegete of Scripture, John Calvin,
whose writings have been constantly consulted” ("Introduction" in A Christian Theory of
Knowledge, n.p.). Thus, for Van Til, Calvin provides the classical paragon of Reformed theology.
See also idem, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:17.
52. On the mutual scholarly affinities between Berkhof and Van Til, including an offer by
Calvin Seminary for Van Til to succeed Berkhof as professor of dogmatics, see Muether, Cornelius
Van Til, 44, 51, 99, 124, 153, 160; idem, “The Whole Counsel of God: Westminster and the OPC,” in
The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of
Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 227; White, Van Til,
Defender of the Faith, 38. On the similar scholarly affinities and strong personal relationship
between Van Til and his favorite professor—Geerhardus Vos—see Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 51,
72; Clowney, “Preaching the Word of the Lord,” 235, 246; idem, “Professor John Murray at
Westminster Theological Seminary,” in The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the
Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg,
NJ: P&R, 2004), 38-39; William D. Dennison, “Analytic Philosophy and Van Til's Epistemology,”
Westminster Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 51-56; William Edgar, “Introduction,” in Christian
Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 12; John M. Frame,
“Systematic Theology and Apologetics at the Westminster Seminaries,” in The Pattern of Sound
Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B. Strimple, ed.
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interaction with Bavinck’s thought began early on in Van Til’s academic career
and continued throughout;53 accordingly, references to Bavinck’s name pervade
Van Til’s publications.54
Fourth, Bavinck’s major dogmatic work has been recently translated into
English. With the language barrier thus removed Van Til scholars have begun to
re-read Van Til in light of his most profound dogmatic influence, and hence the
most recent scholarship evinces an incipient reassessment of Van Til’s thought
vis-á-vis Bavinck.

David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 96; Richard B. Gaffin Jr., “Some Epistemological
Reflections on 1 Cor 2:6-16,” Westminster Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 103; White, Van Til,
Defender of the Faith, 35-36, 45, 48; David VanDrunen, “A System of Theology? The Centrality of
Covenant for Westminster Systematics,” in The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the
Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg,
NJ: P&R, 2004), 204; William D. Dennison, Paul's Two-Age Construction and Apologetics (Lanham,
MD, London: University Press of America, Inc., 1985), 92-94; cf. idem, “The Eschatological
Implications of Genesis 2:15 for Apologetics,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed
Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 203; Frame,
“The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 319-20; idem, “Cornelius Van Til,” in Handbook of
Evangelical Theologians, ed. Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1993), 157; Dennison, History
for a Pilgrim People, 73-77, 121n25, 217-18; Richard B. Gaffin Jr., “Geerhardus Vos and the
Interpretation of Paul,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics
of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 228.
53. Van Til’s second academic publication is the following: “Review of Paedagogische
Beginselen and De Nieuwe Opvoeding, by Herman Bavinck,” Princeton Theological Review 27 (Jan
1929): 135–36; cf. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 10; White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 77-78.
54. In terms of raw tabulation (i.e., no differentiation between text and footnotes, etc.) Van Til
refers to Bavinck ~1,193 times throughout his collected works, third only to Calvin (~3,413
references) and Kuyper (~1,685 references). His most frequent references to Bavinck occur in the
following books: Common Grace and the Gospel, 109 references; idem, An Introduction to Systematic
Theology, 105 references; idem, The New Synthesis, 103 references. In light of our thesis (see §D
below) it is worth noting that Van Til references neo-Calvinist theologians (i.e., Kuyper and
Bavinck) much more frequently than he does Presbyterian theologians, such as B. B. Warfield,
~652 references; J. Gresham Machen, ~354 references; the “Princeton Hodges” (i.e., C. W. Hodge,
A. A. Hodge, and Charles Hodge), ~312 references; John Murray, ~42 references; and William G.
T. Shedd, ~40 references. (NB: All tabulations are based on searches performed within the
electronic collection of Van Til’s works (Van Til, The Works of Cornelius Van Til (Software)). Attempt
was made to avoid duplicate entries by omitting references in the abridged edition of The Defense
of the Faith when there were corresponding references in the unabridged edition. Likewise, all
references in Eric Bristley’s A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van Til were omitted.)
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C. The State of the Question: Van Til vis-à-vis Bavinck
Herman Bavinck’s monumental Gereformeerde Dogmatiek was not available in
an unabridged English translation until 2008.55 Thus the full extent of Bavinck’s
neo-Calvinist influence upon subsequent European and American Reformed
theology is just beginning to be properly assessed in English-speaking
scholarship.56 For example, although Louis Berkhof’s (1873–1957) pervasive
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought was noted a quarter-century ago, 57 Karl
Barth’s appropriations of Bavinck’s thought,58 the mutually influencing
relationship between Bavinck and Geerhardus Vos (1862–1949),59 and Bavinck’s
55. The unabridged English translation of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek was completed
between 2003 and 2008. For a brief history of abridged and unabridged English translations, see
John Bolt, “Herman Bavinck Speaks English: A Bibliographic Essay,” Mid-America Journal of
Theology 19 (2008): 117n1.
56. That Bavinck’s profound influence has been appreciated in European Reformed
scholarship long before the English translation of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics is evident, e.g., in
G. C. Berkouwer’s extensive references to Bavinck in A Half Century of Theology: Movements and
Motives, ed. Lewis B. Smedes, trans. Lewis B. Smedes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977),
originally published as Een halve eeuw theologie: motieven en stromingen van 1920 tot heden (Kampen:
J. H. Kok, 1974).“Bavinck died in 1920,” notes Berkouwer, “but the theological issues he raised
kept stirring the minds of others” (p. 11). (NB: Berkouwer’s year is a typo; Bavinck died in 1921.)
Regarding Bavinck’s transatlantic influence, moreover, John Bolt remarks that “the history of
twentieth century Dutch Reformed theology in The Netherlands and in North America is in
significant measure a story of conflicting appeals to Bavinck” (“Grand Rapids Between Kampen
and Amsterdam: Herman Bavinck's Reception and Influence in North America,” Calvin
Theological Journal 38 (2003): 270).
57. Henry Zwaanstra, “Louis Berkhof,” in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its
Modern Development, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1997), 135-156;
originally published as part of a previous book with the same title (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1985); cf. Richard A. Muller, “Preface to the New Edition of Louis Berkhof's Systematic Theology,”
in Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996), v-viii; Bolt,
“Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 277; Oliphint, “Forward,” 29n10; Malcolm B.
Yarnell, III, The Formation of Christian Doctrine (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2007), 49.
58. On Barth’s critical appropriation of Bavinck’s theology, see John Vissers, “Karl Barth's
Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1
(2010): 79-86; Cornelis Van der Kooi, “Herman Bavinck and Karl Barth on Christian Faith and
Culture,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 75-76.
59. On the striking similarities between the lives and thought of Vos and Bavinck, see George
Harinck, “Herman Bavinck and Geerhardus Vos,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (April 2010):
18-31; cf. Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 273n50; Edgar, “Introduction,”
3, 12; Ron Gleason, Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian (Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R, 2010), 2-3, 148-49, 173.
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influence upon the treatment of various theological topics, such as, the negative
reception of geological evidence for an old earth view in the Dutch-Reformed
tradition,60 have been studied only recently. For scholars operating on the
Western shore of the Atlantic, therefore, the translation of Bavinck’s magnum opus
has provided a new vista for analyzing the Dutch dogmatician’s transatlantic
influence upon modern Reformed theology.
Van Til is one such American Reformed theologian whose work is being reread in light of the Bavinck’s newly-translated Dogmatiek. A chronological survey
of Van Til scholarship before and after the translation reveals that, whereas prior
to the translation many scholars made passing observations regarding Bavinck’s
influence upon Van Til’s thought, only studies performed subsequent to the
translation attempt to analyze Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought in
any meaningful way.
1. Scholarship before the Reformed Dogmatics Translation (1950–2002)
Bernard Ramm’s 1953 introduction to apologetics, Types of Apologetic Systems,
devotes a chapter to Van Til’s system.61 Regarding Van Til’s theological
predecessors, Ramm remarks:
Van Til has made a sustained effort to have an apologetic system that
60. D. A. Young, “The reception of geology in the Dutch Reformed tradition: the case of
Herman Bavinck (1854–1921),” in Geology and Religion: A History of Harmony and Hostility, ed.
Martina Kölbl-Ebert, Geological Society Special Publication 310 (London: The Geological Society,
2009), 290, lists the English translation of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics as one of the motivating
factors for his study.
61. See ch. 9 in Bernard Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems: An Introductory Study to the
Christian Philosophy of Religion (Wheaton, Ill: Van Kampen Press, 1953), 184-209. In the preface
Ramm points out that Van Til himself critiqued the chapter (p. x). In the revised edition Ramm
replaced the chapter on Van Til with one on Kuyper, arguing that the latter is more of a classic
example than the former. See ch. 10 in idem, Varieties of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Book House, 1961), 179-195; Ramm's note regarding Van Til's replacement by Kuyper is
found in the preface at p. 7.
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grows naturally out of the Reformed system of theology. The god-father
of his system is certainly John Calvin, although he admits that Augustine
was the first Christian theologian to try to work out a Christian
metaphysics and epistemology. His more immediate apologetic relatives
are the great Dutch thinkers as Kuyper and Bavinck and such
outstanding American Calvinists as Hodge and Warfield. He has great
sympathy with the Calvinistic philosophy as recently developed at the
Free University of Amsterdam by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. 62
Ramm provides one example where “Van Til agrees heartily with Bavinck and
Kuyper” against Warfield, namely, the priority of theology to apologetics.63
Additionally, Ramm makes a few passing comments regarding Van Til’s
appropriation of (1) Calvin’s thought on the proofs for God’s existence, (2)
Vollenhoven’s thought on probability, and (3) Kuyper’s thought on miracle and
prophecy.64 Ramm’s analysis, therefore, clearly emphasizes Van Til’s neoCalvinist heritage, yet without elaboration.
The first book-length treatment of Van Til’s thought is James Daane’s 1954
analysis of Van Til’s formulation of common grace in which Daane claims that
Van Til’s view contradicts the traditional Reformed views found in “Calvin,
Kuyper, Bavinck, Hepp, Warfield, Machen and Berkhof.” 65 Insofar as his work is
a polemic, Daane does not attempt to show any similarities between Van Til and
these classical Reformed theologians. Neither does Daane seek to show Van Til’s
background in the Christian Reformed Church aside from a passing reference to
his one-year teaching term at Calvin Seminary. 66 Thus Daane paints Van Til as an
62. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 184-85.
63. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 185.
64. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 202, 207, and 208, respectively.
65. James Daane, A Theology of Grace: An Inquiry Into and Evaluation of Dr. C. Van Til's Doctrine
of Common Grace (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1954), 16 cf. 53-58,
91, 100.
66. Daane, A Theology of Grace, 16n1. In the same note Daane recalls that Van Til was actually
offered a lifetime teaching appointment at the Seminary, which Van Til declined.
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idiosyncratic outsider in relation to the Dutch Reformed tradition.
In 1959 and 1960 Rousas Rushdoony published the first book-length analyses
of Van Til’s apologetics.67 Rushdoony describes Van Til as a formulator of
“epistemologically self-conscious Calvinism,”68 but he does not give much
attention to Van Til’s Calvinist theological precedents other than an occasional
reference to Van Til’s affinities with Dooyeweerd, the Westminster Standards,
Augustine, and Calvin.69 Rushdoony does make one significant comment,
however, regarding the sources of Van Til’s Calvinist apologetics. Speaking of the
Princeton apologetic tradition, he writes:
Abraham Kuyper, however, challenged this traditional approach as
faulty Calvinism in that it assumes that the natural man has the ability to
reason his way to salvation, and that the presuppositions of the natural
man can lead to God. Van Til’s development of this Amsterdam tradition
is regarded by many as his greatest contribution to the Reformed faith. 70
Rushdoony elaborates upon Van Til’s critical appropriation of the so-called
Amsterdam apologetic in an appendix, 71 even briefly mentioning Bavinck in this
regard.72 Rushdoony makes a second passing reference to Bavinck in the context
of disputing Barth’s alleged rejection of God’s aseity. “With regard to the being of
God,” he writes, “we can speak, as Van Til, following Bavinck and Berkhof,
points out, of the independence or aseity of God. . . .”73 This brief reference is
67. Rousas John Rushdoony, By What Standard? An Analysis of the Philosophy of Cornelius Van
Til (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1959); Van Til, International Library of
Philosophy and Theology: Modern Thinkers Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1960).
These works are better seen as general introductions or popularizations rather than critical
analyses.
68. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 6.
69. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 13, 15, 32-33, and 40-44, respectively.
70. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 100.
71. See appendix 2, “Van Til and Amsterdam,” in Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 180-83.
72. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 181.
73. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 157-58. Compare Rushdoony’s similar passing reference
to Bavinck as “Kuyper’s successor” in Van Til, 14. Note Rushdoony’s comments that “not all
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significant for our purposes since it occurs in a passage relating to Van Til’s NeoCalvinist roots. Yet, although Rushdoony is aware of Bavinck’s influence upon
Van Til, he links Van Til’s “epistemologically self-conscious Calvinism” mostly to
Kuyper.
In another appendix Rushdoony further describes Van Til’s relation to
Kuyper. “Van Til’s great love and abiding interest in Kuyper and his works,”
writes Rushdoony, “are a notable aspect of the man and date back to his youth;
he delights in reading him and warms to the mention of his name.” 74 In his
shorter work, moreover, Rushdoony describes Van Til as a “prominent and
leading member of the Kuyperian school,” 75 a modern “son of Abraham”—
Abraham Kuyper, that is.76 Rushdoony, therefore, clearly interprets Van Til’s
“greatest contribution” as developing the Neo-Calvinist tradition à la Kuyper
into a more “epistemologically self-conscious Calvinism” vis-á-vis both Princeton
and Amsterdam.
Gordon Lewis’ 1976 introduction to various views of Christian epistemology
includes a chapter on Van Til.77 Regarding Van Til’s theological context, Lewis
briefly recalls Van Til’s educational history in Dutch Reformed and Presbyterian
schools and his resolute agreement with B. B. Warfield on the evaluation of
Calvinism as “Christianity come into its own.”78 “And he [i.e., Van Til] belittles,”
Kuyperian thinkers . . . are known to Americans” and that only the following three works by
Bavinck are available in English translation (as of 1960): The Philosophy of Revelation, The Doctrine
of God, and Our Reasonable Faith (Van Til, 14).
74. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 206.
75. Rushdoony, Van Til, 15.
76. Rushdoony, Van Til, 12.
77. See ch. 5 in Gordon R. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims: Approaches to Christian
Apologetics (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), 125-150.
78. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, 125.
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Lewis writes later,
the Reformed brethren who adopt a less consistent Calvinism. Indeed,
the primary purpose of his apologetic is to set forth a method of
defending Christianity which is consistent with his theology. 79
Lewis provides only passing references, however, to Van Til’s appropriations of
various Reformed theologians, such as, Kuyper’s thought on the antithesis
between believers and non-believers, Charles Hodge’s view on cognition vs. true
knowledge, and Warfield’s defense of Scripture’s inspiration. 80
“It has been my experience,” writes Jim Halsey in his 1978 introduction to
Van Til’s apologetics, “that some people who read Van Til seem to forget (or
never realize) that his apologetic is a Reformed apologetic. It is based upon
Reformed doctrine.”81 Halsey notes, furthermore, that “apologetics and
systematic theology are directly interrelated” and that, “systematics and
apologetics cannot be divorced.”82 Halsey asserts that “Van Til’s apologetic is first
and last a Reformed defense of the Christian faith.” 83 Clearly, then, Halsey
grounds Van Til’s Reformed apologetics in Reformed dogmatics.
Halsey, however, provides little explanation of Van Til’s dogmatic sources.
The most direct, albeit brief, statement relating to Van Til’s appropriation of
Reformed theology appears at the end of the book. “Van Til’s apologetic,” writes
Halsey, “calls the Christian back to Kuyper’s stand—a stand involving an all-out
battle between two absolutely incompatible world systems.” 84 Halsey’s sole
79. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, 146.
80. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, 127, 138, and 140, respectively.
81. Jim S. Halsey, For a Time Such As This: An Introduction to the Reformed Apologetic of
Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1978), xiv.
82. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 7.
83. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 13.
84. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 146.
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mention of Bavinck appears in the epilogue,85 but this brief reference relates only
to Van Til’s general lament over the decline of Reformed theology.
Other sources Van Til’s Calvinism may be inferred from Halsey’s research.
For example, in his survey of Van Til’s Calvinism86 Halsey references Louis
Berkhof four times87 and B. B. Warfield once.88 However, for the most part Halsey
limits the scope of his survey to general statements, and throughout the
remainder of the book he nowhere explicates Van Til’s specific Neo-Calvinist
heritage. Nevertheless, for our purposes it is noteworthy that Halsey mentions
both Kuyper and Bavinck as Van Til’s theological predecessors.
David Diehl makes a strong assertion regarding Van Til’s appropriation of
Bavinck’s doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God: “The theologian who has
probably influenced Van Til the most, next to John Calvin,” he writes in his 1978
dissertation comparing Charles Hartshorne and Van Til, “is the prominent Dutch
Reformed theologian of the turn of the century, Herman Bavinck.” 89 Diehl further
remarks that Van Til follows Calvin and Bavinck on the doctrines of revelation
and analogical reasoning.90 Diehl briefly mentions, moreover, Van Til’s
appropriation of Kuyper’s archetype-ectype distinction. 91 Therefore, even though
Diehl does not elaborate on Van Til’s appropriations from Calvin, Bavinck, or
85. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 156.
86. See ch. 1, “the theological basis of Van Til's apologetic,” in Halsey, For a Time Such As This,
13-39.
87. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 16n3, 17n8, 25n15, 34n25.
88. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 35n28.
89. David Waring Diehl, “Divine Omniscience in the Thought of Charles Hartshorne and
Cornelius Van Til: A Systemic Comparative Study” (Ph.D. diss., Yorktown Heights, N. Y.: The
Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1978), 48. Regarding Van Til’s background, Diehl names Calvin
as Van Til’s theological “mentor” (p. 69) and asserts that Van Til follows standard Protestant
theological methodology (p. 63).
90. Diehl, “Divine Omniscience,” 50.
91. Diehl, “Divine Omniscience,” 52.
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Kuyper, it is noteworthy for our purposes that he lists Bavinck among Van Til’s
preeminent theological influences.
“It was while he was a student at the Grand Rapids school [i.e., Calvin
College], recalls White in his 1979 “authorized biography” of Van Til, “that Kees
began to read extensively the writings of the great Abraham Kuyper. Cornelius
Van Til freely admits,” continues White, “that when it comes to the background
for some of his formulations he stands on the shoulders of Abraham Kuyper.”92
White briefly mentions several of Van Til’s professors as influences: Louis
Berkhof, Samuel Volbeda, William Heyns, Professor Ten Hoor, W. H. Jellema. Yet
Van Til’s most influential professor by far, according to White, is Geerhardus Vos.
The two became such close friends at Princeton that Van Til was asked to officiate
at Vos’ funeral.93 White makes a couple of passing references to Bavinck, 94 but,
overall, White views Kuyper and Vos as the predominant influences in Van Til’s
thought.95
John Robbins’ scathing critique of Van Til, published in 1986, does not
mention any of Van Til’s theological predecessors.96 Robbins intentionally paints
Van Til as a wholly “distinctive” (i.e., heterodox) and concludes that Van Til’s
formulations “must be totally rejected by Christians,” else Christianity’s future
will be in jeopardy.97 Robbins is thus intentionally inattentive to Van Til’s
92. White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 34, 35, respectively.
93. White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 38-48.
94. White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 77-78, 190.
95. For more references to Kuyper’s influence, see White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 60-62,
74. Additionally, as noted in §A, 3, above, the 1969 lecture by Van Til that is reproduced in
“Appendix 2” of White’s biography further reveals the permeating influence of Kuyper upon Van
Til’s thought (see especially pp. 213-225). Also cf. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 276.
96. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth.
97. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth, 38.
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theological context.
Bradley Swygard’s 1991 thesis on Van Til’s debate with Gordon Clark briefly
notes (1) Van Til’s agreement with Bavinck on the relation between mystery and
dogma and (2) Van Til’s disagreement with Kuyper over the uselessness of
reasoning with non-Christians;98 yet, Swygard does not analyze Van Til’s relation
to these two neo-Calvinists.
In 1994 James Emery White published a chapter-length analysis of Van Til’s
apologetics. Although his assertion that Van Til was “the main exponent of Dutch
Reformed theology in America” is an overstatement, White appropriately
categorizes Van Til as “an Evangelical scholar in the Dutch Reformed tradition.” 99
“Van Til's Princeton education,” notes White, “was also strongly influenced by B.
B. Warfield, Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck.” 100 White further
comments that “Van Til has often been criticized for taking his systematic
theology too uncritically from both Warfield and Bavinck.”101 This latter
assertion, however, is based merely on a passing comment in a secondary
source.102 Nevertheless, for our purposes it is significant that White mentions
Bavinck and Kuyper as important influences on Van Til’s thought despite the
98. Bradley J. Swygard, “The Basis for the Doctrine of the Incomprehensibility of God in
Gordon Clark and Cornelius Van Til” (Th.M. Thesis, Dallas, TX: Dallas Theological Seminary,
1991), 63 and 55, respectively.
99. James Emery White, What Is Truth? A Comparative Study of the Positions of Cornelius Van
Til, Francis Schaeffer, Carl F. H. Henry, Donald Bloesch, Millard Erickson (Nashville, TN: Broadman &
Holman, 1994), 36n1 and 36, respectively.
100. White, What Is Truth?, 38.
101. White, What Is Truth?, 38.
102. White refers to Clowney, “Preaching the Word of the Lord,” 249, wherein Clowney
writes the following: “Van Til has been accused of being too traditional in theology, of taking his
systematic structure too uncritically from the Reformed confessions, and from Bavinck and
Warfield. Certainly Van Til’s labors have been directed to showing the implications of Reformed
theology for the defense of the faith rather than to developing theological formulations. But Van
Til's staunch defense of Reformed orthodoxy reveals his commitment to the coherence and
harmony of God's revelation.”
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lack of explication on either score.
In 1995 John M. Frame, a former student of Van Til’s, published the first
major critical analysis of his teacher’s apologetics.103 Frame is clearly mindful of
Van Til’s “rich appreciation of the Dutch Reformed tradition,” noting especially
Van Til’s esteem for Abraham Kuyper.104 Frame offers only one sentence about
Bavinck’s direct influence upon Van Til, but this brief remark is significant for
our thesis: “In systematic theology more narrowly understood, Van Til’s chief
resource was Herman Bavinck. . . .”105 In his footnotes, moreover, Frame remarks
that Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics has not yet been fully translated into
103. Frame, Cornelius Van Til. This is not, however, Frame’s earliest publication on Van Til. In
1976 Frame published an essay which summarized the theological contribution of his teacher
(idem, “The Problem of Theological Paradox”; also published separately as a booklet entitled Van
Til: The Theologian). In the essay Frame laments the lack of serious, critical interaction with Van
Til’s thought to date (297-98n10); yet, given that this comment follows Frame’s three pages’s
worth of near hagiography (i.e., 295-97), it seems difficult to take both his lament and his
concluding sentiment seriously—“If I am right, then I have furnished herein the best and only
justification for further research into this extremely important thinker” (330).
104. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 20. Similarly, Frame asserts elsewhere that Van Til “was
steeped in the Dutch theological and philosophical literature” (idem, “Systematic Theology and
Apologetics,” 91). In his 1976 essay, moreover, Frame noted Van Til’s appropriation of Dutch
theology, including Bavinck’s: “Where Van Til does discuss theological issues, furthermore, he
includes little exegesis. . . . What exegesis he does present is usually borrowed from other sources.
His dogmatic formulations, too, are often simple repetitions or paraphrases of the creeds and of
the great Reformed theologians from Calvin onward. Even when Van Til's theology sounds most
strange to American ears (for example, his strong emphasis upon the ethical/metaphysical
distinction), he is very often paraphrasing ideas from the Dutch tradition. (In the case of the
ethical/metaphysical distinction, the source is Bavinck)” (idem, “The Problem of Theological
Paradox,” 295; also cf. ibid., 316). In the same essay Frame further notes that Van Til appropriated
the “archetypal-ectypal” terminology from Kuyper (312n75).
105. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 20. Additionally, Frame offers a related comment in his earlier
dictionary article on Van Til: “During his years in the Dutch Reformed community, Van Til
became very impressed with the great Dutch church leaders Abraham Kuyper and Herman
Bavinck. Kuyper was a Renaissance man: scholar, university founder, politician (briefly prime
minister of the Netherlands), newspaper editor. With boundless energy and intellectual creativity,
he sought to claim all areas of human life for the lordship of Christ. Bavinck, his colleague and
follower, focused more narrowly on the discipline of systematic theology and produced a
monumental four-volume Reformed Dogmatics. The work of Klaas Schilder, a more recent Dutch
thinker, also commanded Van Til's deep respect and interest” (idem, “Cornelius Van Til,” 156-57).
However, Frame’s later dictionary article on Van Til mentions only Kuyper as an influence:
“Major influences on Van Til’s thought were the Dutch Reformed theologians, particularly
Abraham Kuyper. . .” (idem, “Cornelius Van Til,” in New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 739).
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English,106 and throughout his analysis Frame makes passing references to Van
Til’s reliance upon Bavinck for specific theological points.107 Beyond stating a
general caveat108 regarding Van Til’s critically-appreciative stance toward his
theological predecessors, however, Frame does not attempt to analyze the
relationship between Van Til and Van Til’s “chief resource.” 109
Philip Thorne’s dissertation on the Evangelical reception of Karl Barth in
North America, published in 1995, includes some important remarks concerning
Van Til’s neo-Calvinist context.110 After noting Van Til’s general definition of
Christianity as “the Reformed faith as revealed in Scripture and accurately
interpreted by the Reformed creeds and classic Reformed theologians,” Thorne
comments more specifically that “Van Til, following Herman Bavinck, endeavors
to acknowledge God as the Principium Essendi of knowledge.”111 Thorne further
notes that Van Til’s apologetic method “extends, in a particular direction, the
‘principial’ thinking of Abraham Kuyper.”112 In terms of theological
prolegomena, therefore, Thorne finds significant appropriation of neo-Calvinist
theology in Van Til’s apologetics.
106. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 20n5; cf. Frame, “Cornelius Van Til,” 157n3.
107. See Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 54, 115, 124, 220.
108. Frame’s caveat is as follows: “Influenced as he was by such Reformed theological giants
as B. B. Warfield, Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck, Van Til nevertheless sought to warn us
against elements in their thinking that he deemed unscriptural” (Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 11).
109. Frame follows a similar approach in his 2007 essay, “Divine Aseity and Apologetics,” in
Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 115-130, wherein he notes that Van Til quotes approvingly one of
Bavinck’s statements regarding aseity. Frame, however, fails to note that Van Til’s appropriation
of Bavinck is not limited to one statement regarding aseity; rather, Van Til’s discussion of God’s
attributes is largely a summary of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. See chapter 3 below.
110. Phillip R. Thorne, Evangelicalism and Karl Barth: His Reception and Influence in North
American Evangelical Theology, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Allison Park, PA:
Pickwick Publications, 1995).
111. Thorne, Evangelicalism and Karl Barth, 34.
112. Thorne, Evangelicalism and Karl Barth, 34.
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In his 1997 theological-biographical essay on Van Til, Wesley A. Roberts
describes Van Til as “a student of both the old Princeton school of theologians
and the great Dutch Reformed thinkers,” and he names Charles Hodge, B. B.
Warfield, Francis L. Patton, William Brenton Greene Jr., J. Gresham Machen,
Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck as representatives of both traditions. 113
Van Til's “pioneering insight,” which, according to Roberts, was confirmed by his
readings in Kuyper and Bavinck, is “that in apologetics the presuppositions and
not merely attendant arguments have to be biblical.” “He [i.e., Van Til] admits,”
continues Roberts, “his indebtedness to the classic Reformed theologians and
quotes freely from them. He is willing to go beyond them, however, in areas
where he thinks they are weak.”114 The sole example Roberts provides is that Van
Til follows Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s insights regarding Holy Scripture as the
principium cognoscendi externum.115 Therefore, despite the lack of elaboration,
Roberts clearly notices the dual neo-Calvinist influence of Kuyper and Bavinck
upon Van Til.
“He [i.e., Van Til] was Dutch through and through, from wearing wooden
shoes (“klompen”) to being raised on the Heidelberg Catechism,” recalls a
former student and protege of Van Til’s, Greg Bahnsen, in his systematic analysis

113. Wesley A. Roberts, “Cornelius Van Til,” in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its
Modern Development, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 173. NB: The
essays in this book were originally published in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its
Modern Development (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1985) and in the following three
volumes published by Baker Book House (Grand Rapids, MI) in 1989: (1) The Princeton Theology:
Reformed Theology in America; (2) Dutch Reformed Theology: Reformed Theology in America; (3)
Southern Reformed Theology: Reformed Theology in America.
114. Roberts, “Cornelius Van Til,” 174.
115. Roberts, “Cornelius Van Til,” 178; Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek
Theological Terms: Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Baker Books, 2006), s.v., principium cognoscendi externum.
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of Van Til’s apologetics.116 Bahnsen notes that Van Til had become familiar with
the works of Kuyper and Bavinck during college and that during his year at
Calvin Seminary he studied theology under Louis Berkhof and philosophy under
W. H. Jellema.117 Van Til’s interest in Bavinck, comments Bahnsen, continued on
into his academic career as evidenced by the fact that his second academic
publication is a review of two works by Bavinck.118 Therefore, Bahnsen is well
aware of Bavinck’s influence on Van Til,119 but he sees Kuyper and Warfield as
Van Til’s predominant theological influences.120 Much like Frame’s analysis,
moreover, Bahnsen’s study provides only scant comments about Van Til’s
published criticisms of Bavinck without attempting to analyze Bavinck’s
influence upon Van Til’s thought.121 Likewise, in his 2010 posthumous
publication Bahnsen interprets Van Til’s apologetic as a critical appropriation and
marked advancement of both B. B. Warfield’s and Abraham Kuyper’s apologetics
formulations.122
Norman Geisler’s 1999 analysis of Van Til’s apologetics wholly ignores the

116. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 7.
117. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 8; cf. idem, “Machen, Van Til, and the Apologetical
Tradition of the OPC,” in Pressing Toward the Mark: Essays Commemorating Fifty Years of the
Orthodox Presbyterian Church, ed. Charles G. Dennison and Richard C. Gamble (Philadelphia, PA:
The Committee for the Historian of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 1986), 264.
118. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 10; cf. idem, “Machen, Van Til, and the Apologetical
Tradition of the OPC,” 265.
119. Cf. Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ,” 234: “The incisive and decisive analysis of apologetics
which was lacking in Warfield’s day was being supplied a generation later by a young scholar
who realized that he was standing on the shoulders of his Reformed fathers: Calvin, Hodge,
Warfield, Kuyper, Bavinck.“
120. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 596.
121. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 14-15; Van Til's primary critiques of Bavinck are listed at
14n42. Despite his lack of elaboration on Bavinck, Bahnsen analyzes Van Til’s critiques of
Warfield and Kuyper at length (pp. 596-600).
122. Greg L. Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended (Powder Springs, GA
and Nacogdoches, TX: American Vision Press and Covenant Media Press, 2008), 21-22.
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theological and ecclesiastical contexts of Van Til’s thought.123
A somewhat different story emerges when we turn to survey Van Til
scholarship that has appeared since the inception of the Bavinck translation,
namely, Bavinck’s influence upon Van Til’s thought is more apparent.
2. Scholarship after the Reformed Dogmatics Translation (2003–Present)
In his 2003 introduction to the second edition of Van Til’s Christian
Apologetics William Edgar presents Van Til’s apologetics as “a third way”
between Karl Barth and Abraham Kuyper. 124 Edgar further notes Van Til’s
general “Dutch and Presbyterian” theological context, but he mentions only one
theological influence—Geerhardus Vos. 125 However, in an editorial note
regarding Van Til's relation to Dutch neo-Calvinist philosophers, Edgar remarks,
“The full story of Van Til's relationship to the Amsterdam philosophy, and
especially to Herman Dooyeweerd, has not yet been told.” 126 Moreover, in his
2007 introduction to Van Til’s An Introduction to Systematic Theology, Edgar notes
the following: (1) Van Til closely follows Bavinck’s doctrine of God;127 (2) Van Til
123. Norman L. Geisler, “Cornelius Van Til,” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1999), 751-758. Compare idem, Christian Apologetics (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1976), 56-58, wherein Geisler briefly describes Van Til as speaking
“from a strong Reformed, Biblical perspective theologically and yet in an absolute revelational
presuppositionalism apologetically,” without any elaboration regarding Van Til’s Reformed
predecessors or theological context. Thus abstracting Van Til’s methodology from his theology,
Geisler classifies Van Til (along with Blaise Pascal, Sören Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth) as a
“methodological fideist” (see ch. 3, pp. 47-64).
124. Edgar, “Introduction,” 1-3.
125. Edgar, “Introduction,” 3, 12.
126. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 57n4. Compare the earlier classification by Robert D.
Knudsen, “Crosscurrents,” Westminster Theological Journal 35, no. 3 (1973): 313: “My own
interpretation of Van Til's position, as I have said, places him squarely within the camp of those
who hold to this general philosophical position [i.e., ‘the so-called Calvinistic philosophy’]. There
is a broad unity of the major proponents of this school, namely, Herman Dooyeweerd, D. H, Th.
Vollenhoven, C. Van Til, and Hendrik Stoker, in their attempt to erect a philosophy on the
foundation of a Reformed world-and-life-view.”
127. William Edgar, “Introduction,” in An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and
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considers Hepp’s view of reason to be an improvement over Bavinck’s alleged
neutrality;128 (3) Van Til insists on “subtle difference with Bavinck, whom he
otherwise admires [to] no end”; and (4) on the doctrine of the Trinity Van Til
builds his idiosyncratic insights upon Bavinck’s Reformed orthodox presentation
of the doctrine.129 Therefore, whereas Edgar only hints at Van Til’s neo-Calvinist
heritage in Christian Apologetics, he clearly elucidates Bavinck’s influence upon
Van Til’s thought in An Introduction to Systematic Theology.130
Lane Tipton’s 2004 dissertation on Van Til’s trinitarian formulations omits
Van Til’s neo-Calvinist predecessors altogether.131 Although Tipton mentions in
passing that Van Til’s robust view of the Trinity echoes Herman Bavinck’s, 132
Tipton limits his study to Van Til’s appropriation of the trinitarian “categories
given to him from earlier theologians, notably John Calvin, Charles and A. A.
Hodge.”133 Whether or not this limited scope is appropriate for Tipton’s purpose,
such a limited purview truncates the full picture of Van Til’s trinitarian theology.
In his critique of James Daane’s theology, for example, Van Til writes explicitly of
his dependence upon Bavinck’s trinitarian theology:
Actually there is nothing appreciably different in what I have said about
the ontological trinity from what Berkhof and Bavinck have previously
stated nor has Daane sought to prove that there is. In fact, I have not
the Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,
2007), 5.
128. Edgar, “Introduction,” 6.
129. Edgar, “Introduction,” 7.
130. See Edgar's editorial notes in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 29n8, 89n1,
319n1, 323n8, 335n33, 341n53, 353nn12, 14, 354n20, 369n1. Edgar discusses Van Til’s relation to
Warfield and Kuyper in William Edgar, “Frame the Apologist,” in Speaking the Truth in Love: The
Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 408-13.
131. Lane G. Tipton, “The Triune Personal God: Trinitarian Theology in the Thought of
Cornelius Van Til” (Ph.D. diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 2004).
132. Tipton, “The Triune Personal God,” 2.
133. Tipton, “The Triune Personal God,” 7.

34
dealt with the subject other than to use what was already ascertained
and established, especially by Bavinck, for apologetic purposes. 134
Elsewhere he writes:
No one has better than he [i.e., Bavinck] set forth the struggle in the early
church to attain a truly biblical view of the immanent or ontological
trinity as the presupposition of the intelligibility of human experience.
. . . Moreover, no one brought out more forcibly than did Bavinck that
God as self-sufficient is not fully comprehensible to man, not even to
regenerate man.135
Furthermore, in the primary work in which he explicates his idiosyncratic
trinitarian formulations, Van Til himself notes his neo-Calvinist theological
heritage. “My indebtedness to such former Reformed theologians” writes Van
Til, “as Louis Berkhof and, back of him, Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper,
is apparent throughout [this work].”136 Additionally, Van Til appeals to Bavinck
for confirmation of his interpretation of The Nicene Council.137 Therefore, by
focusing primarily on Van Til’s American Presbyterian predecessors and
excluding his neo-Calvinist predecessors, Tipton oddly omits perhaps the most
significant influence upon Van Til’s trinitarian theology—Herman Bavinck. 138
A similar omission occurs in Tipton’s 2007 essay wherein he asserts that Van
Til “relied on the exegesis of theologians such as Charles Hodge, B. B. Warfield,
Herman Bavinck, and John Murray.”139 However, instead of substantiating this
134. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 33.
135. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
136. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 13.
137. Van Til, “My Credo,” 11.
138. In a 2002 article Tipton makes one passing, enigmatic reference to Bavinck’s affirmation
of God’s unity vis-à-vis allegedly similar affirmations by Hodge and Van Til (see Lane G. Tipton,
“The Function of Perichoresis and the Divine Incomprehensibility,” Westminster Theological
Journal 64, no. 2 (2002): 293n18).
139. Lane G. Tipton, “Paul's Christological Interpretation of Creation and Presuppositional
Apologetics,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint
and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 95, writes: “Van Til understood that his
uniquely Reformed approach to apologetics lacked a full-fledged line of exegetical
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point with references either to the exegetical work of these theologians 140 or to
Van Til’s citations of these theologians’ exegetical works, Tipton instead provides
a redemptive-historical reading of Colossians 1:15–2:8 à la Herman Ridderbos,
M. G. Kline, and Geerhardus Vos.141 Thus, not only is the assertion
unsubstantiated, but also, insofar as the essay does not substantiate Van Til’s
relation to any Reformed theologians, the generalized conclusion regarding
“Reformed apologetics in the tradition of Van Til” is a non sequitur.142
Nevertheless, Tipton’s essay provides a second passing reference to Bavinck as a
theological predecessor of Van Til.
Kenneth Boa and Robert Bowman’s 2005 survey of apologetics provides an
extensive historical analysis of Van Til’s apologetic in relation to (1) the history of
apologetics in general and (2) the history of Reformed apologetics in particular. 143
They summarize Van Til’s relation to his Reformed predecessors as follows:
Van Til is by far the most controversial of the major Reformed apologists
of the twentieth century. He combined the apologetic tradition of Old
Princeton (which drew from both classical and evidentialist approaches)
with the anti-apologetic theology of Kuyper. He used the concept of a
transcendental argument, which was at the heart of Dooyeweerd’s
philosophy, but employed it as an overtly apologetic argument. The
result is a theory of apologetics that has been both highly influential and
severely disputed. 144
argumentation. Instead, his method developed along dogmatic and theological lines, and he
relied on the exegesis of theologians such as Charles Hodge, B. B. Warfield, Herman Bavinck, and
John Murray.”
140. E.g., with regard to Colossians 1:15–2:8, cf. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols.
(New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., 1873), 1:515-16.
141. Tipton, “Paul's Christological Interpretation,” nn. 3-9, 12-16, 19, 23-27, 35, devotes the
bulk of the essay to representing Ridderbos’ exegetical views.
142. Tipton, “Paul's Christological Interpretation,” 111.
143. On the former, see Boa and Bowman, Faith Has Its Reasons, 23-32; on the latter, see ibid.,
pp. 221-334.
144. Boa and Bowman, Faith Has Its Reasons, 256. These various streams of influence upon
Van Til are developed at length throughout the book. On the relation between Old Princeton, Van
Til, and Van Til’s successors, see pp. 26, 51-54, 68, 229-232, 241-42, 256, 264-65, 447-48; on the
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Boa and Bowman’s sole reference to Bavinck is a brief comment regarding Van
Til's ambivalent appropriation of Bavinck's teaching on natural theology.145 These
writers, therefore, find in Van Til’s apologetic a predominant neo-Calvinist
influence (i.e., Kuyper and Dooyeweerd) nuanced by Van Til’s sensibilities for
the old Princeton tradition.
“. . . Van Til has represented a distinctive and specific theologicalphilosophical position,“ writes Juha Ahvio in his 2005 dissertation on
contemporary Reformed apologetics in America, “which has endeavored to
synthesize the best elements from the Old Princeton tradition and from
Amsterdam Theology into a consistent and definitive Reformed thought.” 146
Ahvio views Van Til as an inheritor of the theology of Archibald Alexander,
Charles Hodge, A. A. Hodge, B. B. Warfield, J. Gresham Machen, Abraham
Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and Herman Dooyeweerd. 147 Further, he summarizes
the theological influences of Van Til’s graduate and post-graduate education as
follows:
relation between “the father of the Reformed apologetic tradition” (i.e., Kuyper, p. 330) and Van
Til, see pp. 25-26, 29, 232-43, 248, 251, 256, 264-65, 268-84, 457, 494, 528; On the relation between
Dooyeweerd and Van Til, see pp. 25-26, 28-29, 238-40, 261-62, 251, 256-57, 261-62, 268, 299, 447,
494, 496. Regarding the controversial nature of Van Til’s apologetic in the twentieth century,
compare p. 240.
145. Boa and Bowman, Faith Has Its Reasons, 302.
146. Juha Ahvio, Theological Epistemology of Contemporary American Confessional Reformed
Apologetics, Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft 59 (Helsinki, Finland: Luther-AgricolaSeura, 2005), 21.
147. Ahvio, Theological Epistemology, 19-22, 30-31n33. On Van Til as a member of the
“Kuyperian neo-Calvinist tradition,” see p. 236. Regarding Dooyeweerd, Ahvio remarks that
although he was “the most significant representative of the so-called Amsterdam School of
thought and its neo-Calvinist philosophical tradition in the twentieth century,” Van Til developed
his own “more confessionally theological form of presuppositionalism” at the same time as
Dooyeweerd yet without being directly dependent upon Dooyeweerd’s thought (30-31n33). Van
Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 50-51, however, explicitly admits his reliance upon
Dooyeweerd’s interpretation of the history of philosophy. Van Til also briefly approbates
Dooyeweerd’s epistemology contra modern philosophy (A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 340).
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Both Calvin Theological Seminary and Princeton Theological Seminary
were at that time committed to the Reformed confessional orthodoxy
thereby making it possible for Van Til to familiarize himself thoroughly
with the Kuyper-Bavinck Dutch tradition and the Hodge-Warfield
Princeton tradition.148
Throughout his extensive analysis of Van Til’s apologetics, Ahvio twice mentions
Van Til’s critiques of Bavinck’s alleged inconsistencies regarding the
epistemological implications of theological principia.149 Ahvio, however, does not
attempt to analyze these criticisms. In sum, although Ahvio provides scant
primary source substantiation of Van Til’s neo-Calvinist dogmatic moorings, his
analyses of secondary sources clearly show Van Til to be an inheritor of the Old
Amsterdam and Old Princeton traditions.
Donald Macleod begins his 2006 essay on Bavinck’s Prolegomena in light of
the old-Amsterdam-vs.-old-Princeton apologetics debate by admitting that the
new English translation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek is the raison d'être for his study.150
Additionally, he asserts that a direct theological link exists between Bavinck and
Van Til:
There are two distinct questions concerning Amsterdam and Old
Princeton. One is the relationship between Bavinck and his Princeton
contemporaries, most notably B. B. Warfield. The other is the link
between Bavinck and Cornelius Van Til, who, by taking his
presuppositional theism into Westminster Seminary, effectively took
Amsterdam into Old Princeton.151
After noting that Van Til frankly acknowledges his indebtedness to Bavinck and
Kuyper, Macleod remarks further:
148. Ahvio, Theological Epistemology, 37. In a footnote Ahvio further lists James Orr as “an
essential influence on Van Til” (37-38n52).
149. Ahvio, Theological Epistemology, 297, 322, 322-23n198.
150. Donald Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena: Fresh Light on Amsterdam, Old Princeton,
and Cornelius Van Til,” Westminster Theological Journal 68, no. 2 (2006): 261.
151. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 263.
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What Van Til learned from his Dutch mentors was, above all, the
principle that the existence of God is not the conclusion of an elaborate
argument, but the presupposition of all thought.152
Moreover, Macleod acknowledges that Van Til emphasizes the need to assert the
fact of God at the very outset of all epistemological discussion more forcefully
than Bavinck; nevertheless, he interprets this point as a “difference in emphasis”
that “is due mainly to their differing vocations [i.e., apologist and dogmatician]”
rather than as a difference in principle. 153 He concludes therefore that Bavinck’s
and Van Til’s formulations of presuppositional theism are basically the same.
Given the fact that Macleod omits any reference to Van Til’s criticisms of
Bavinck’s thought—criticisms of the very points that Macleod lauds as
similarities between the two, such as, Thomism, a proper response to Kant, and
innate knowledge of God154—his conclusion may require further nuancing.
Nevertheless, his essay is a clear example of the fact that, thanks to the
translation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, scholars are beginning to re-read Van Til in
light of his neo-Calvinist predecessor.
Jeffrey Waddington, in a 2008 essay on Van Til and foundationalism, argues
that Van Til appropriated and expanded the Reformed orthodox distinction
between theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa in his epistemological
formulations.155 “The tradition of the archetype/ectype distinction,” suggests
152. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 264.
153. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 264.
154. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 264-68.
155. Jeffrey C. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or
Foundationalist?,” in Reforming or Conforming: Post-Conservative Evangelicals and the Emerging
Church, ed. Gary L. W. Johnson and Ronald N. Gleason (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2008),
154-165; cf. Muller, Dictionary, s.v., theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa. A nearly identical thesis,
namely, that Van Til (unknowingly?) appropriated the traditional Reformed orthodox distinction
between theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa, can be found in the following two essays: R. Scott
Clark, “Janus, The Well-Meant Offer of the Gospel, and Westminster Theology,” in The Pattern of

39
Waddington, “would most likely have come down to Van Til through Dutch
Reformed theologians such as Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck.” 156
Waddington makes two more references to Bavinck’s discussion of theological
principa, but he provides no substantiating argumentation regarding whether or
not Van Til actually appropriated Bavinck’s formulations; thus, it is unclear
whether Waddington attempts to adduce further evidence for a connection
between the two.157 His passing note, furthermore, regarding Van Til’s
appropriation of Kuyper’s theological principia formulations adds further
unclarity.158 This ambiguity notwithstanding, we find in Waddington’s essay yet
another reference to the twin neo-Calvinist theological influences upon Van Til’s
thought—Kuyper and Bavinck.
K. Scott Oliphint, in his 2008 forward to Van Til’s The Defense of the Faith,
echoes Greg Bahnsen’s earlier sentiment regarding the crux of Van Til’s thought.
“To understand Van Til’s contribution to Reformed apologetics,” avers Oliphint,
one needs to see not simply his criticisms of Kuyper, Bavinck, and
Warfield, but, more importantly, the ways in which he was able to take
the best of these Reformed theological giants and incorporate their
theological insights into his own apologetic methodology.159
Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B.
Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 149-179; Horton, “Consistently
Reformed.” Waddington notes the Clark essay (see 159-60n30) but omits the Horton essay; he
further cites two books by Horton which provide no substantiation for his archetypa-ectypa thesis.
156. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or Foundationalist?,” 160.
157. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or Foundationalist?,” 162,
163n45.
158. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or Foundationalist?,” 163n44.
159. Oliphint, “Forward,” ix-x; cf. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 597: “A person who can
explain the ways in which Van Til agreed and disagreed with both Warfield and Kuyper, is a
person who understands presuppositional apologetics.” For Van Til’s own assessment of
Warfield’s and Kuyper’s apologetic methodologies, see A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 229-54;
idem, The Defense of the Faith, 345-82; idem, The New Synthesis, 11, 42-43. Oliphint’s historical
assessment here seems to be in tension with his earlier revolutionary interpretation of Van Til
noted above. Nevertheless, Oliphint continues to insist on the novelty of Van Til, remarking, “The
need of the hour, it seems to me, is not to move beyond Van Til, but rather, perhaps for the first
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In passing Oliphint further asserts that “’presupposition’ for Van Til is just
another way of saying what Kuyper, Bavinck, and behind them the Reformed
scholastics had always said with regard to the principia of theology.”160 Other
than providing brief editorial notes regarding Van Til’s Dutch heritage in
general161 and Van Til’s critical appropriation of Bavinck’s theology in
particular,162 Oliphint nowhere explicates the relationship between Van Til and
his Dutch neo-Calvinist predecessor at any length. The lack of elaboration
notwithstanding, Oliphint clearly notes that “Van Til . . . himself claims Bavinck
as one of his primary spiritual and intellectual influences.” 163
In contradistinction to previous biographies and analyses, John Muether’s
2008 biography of Van Til164 evinces a marked attempt to interpret Van Til in light
of Bavinck’s recently translated Reformed Dogmatics. This nuance can be seen in
two ways. First, Muether’s study contains a deeper appreciation of Bavinck’s
profound influence on Van Til’s thought. Muether writes, for example:
Although interpreters often portray him as a hybrid of Kuyper and
Warfield, Van Til himself generally included Bavinck in his list of
interlocutors. Indeed, Bavinck is arguably the greatest of all of these
influences, the evidence for which grows as Bavinck’s dogmatics is
translated into English. As this survey of Van Til’s seminary scholarship
time, to grasp the depth and breadth of his approach” (p. x). “Once Van Til’s thought is grasped,”
insists Oliphint, “the implications for the work of the church are most profound” (xi).
160. Oliphint, “Forward,” x-xi. Cf. Oliphint’s editorial note in Van Til, The Defense of the Faith,
348n17. Regarding Oliphint’s equation of “presupposition” in Van Til’s thought with the
Reformed scholastic principa terminology, note the similarity with Waddington’s thesis surveyed
immediately above.
161. In an essay published in 2007 Oliphint, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the
Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” 295n45, makes the following comment: “The Dutch
influence of Van Til could arguably be the most significant influence that has contributed to his
Reformed apologetic.”
162. See Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 2n6, 9-10n37, 29n10, 33n17, 374-78nn42-51.
163. K. Scott Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck,” in Speaking the
Truth in Love: The Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 206.
164. Muether, Cornelius Van Til.
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indicates, he was less concerned with distinguishing himself from these
antecedents than with applying their best insights with a rigorous
consistency.165
Muether argues, furthermore, that one reason Van Til received sharp criticism
within Presbyterian circles was a lack of familiarity with Bavinck:
American Presbyterian disquiet over Van Til’s employment of
presuppositional reasoning owed, as previously noted, to its
unfamiliarity with the Reformed tradition, and especially unfamiliarity
with Bavinck. Van Til imported many of his ideas from Bavinck, whose
four-volume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek was largely inaccessible to the
English-speaking world.166
Most notably, after citing two passages in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics which
allegedly adumbrate Van Til’s apologetic methodology, Muether avers: “Van Til
did not so much create a new apologetic as he refined Bavinck’s approach,
applying it to modernism, old and new.”167
Second, Muether’s study offers a more nuanced interpretation of Van Til’s
criticisms of Bavinck and Kuyper. Whereas Frame, Bahnsen, and Oliphint, for
example, give brief, general statements regarding Van Til’s unabashed criticisms
of Bavinck and other Dutch Neo-Calvinist theologians, Muether argues for a
more complex and positive relationship between Van Til and his theological
predecessors. Referring to Van Til’s criticisms of Warfield, Bavinck, and Kuyper,
Muether remarks:
The Reformed epistemology that was latent in all three theologians
ultimately permitted no zone of neutrality, no epistemological common
ground. In bringing the Reformed tradition to more consistent
epistemological expression, Van Til could state with truthfulness that
with respect to the ‘inimitable trio of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Warfield,’ he
165. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56.
166. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 115.
167. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 116.
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stood on the shoulders of giants.168
Therefore, compared to earlier studies, Muether’s interpretation of Van Til’s life
and work is much more attuned to Bavinck’s theological influence upon Van Til.
In a 2008 journal article Brian Mattson examines Van Til’s criticisms of
Bavinck “with the added advantage of having Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics in
English.”169 After analyzing Van Til’s allegations, Mattson concludes notably as
follows:
Van Til’s superficial and at-times uncharitable reading of Bavinck is
unfortunate, but not nearly so unfortunate as the impression he gives
that Bavinck has more in common with a “traditional” approach to
epistemology and apologetics than he has in common with Van Til. If
this article establishes anything it is the deep affinity in their theological
instincts. Van Til never had an intellectual “friend” like Herman Bavinck.
The fact that he sometimes failed to realize it is no reason for
contemporary readers of Bavinck to do likewise. One hopes that those
whose apologetic sympathies lie with Van Til, yet have new opportunity
to study Herman Bavinck in English, might do so without Van Til's often
needless and excessive reservations. . . . 170
Similar to Muether’s interpretation of Bavinck’s influence on Van Til, Mattson
finds “deep affinity in their theological instincts.” He likewise avers, moreover,
that the new English translation of Bavinck’s works provides English readers a
fresh perspective on the dogmatic affinity between the two thinkers, Van Til’s
criticisms notwithstanding. The two studies from Muether and Mattson,
therefore, provide the clearest examples of a nascent reassessment of Van Til’s
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought.
In his 2008 bibliographic guide to Herman Bavinck’s writings, Eric D.
168. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56.
169. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 111. Although Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck were noted
much earlier (e.g., Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 14n42), Mattson is the first scholar to analyze
them.
170. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 127.
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Bristley remarks in passing that Bavinck’s philosophical and apologetical
views exerted a formative influence on the reformational philosophy of
D. H. Th. Vollenhoven (1891–1979), the presuppositional apologetics of
Cornelius Van Til (1895–1979), and the reformed epistemology of Alvin
Plantinga.171
Not every recent analysis of Van Til, however, follows the lead of Muether and
Mattson in noting Bavinck as Van Til’s preeminent predecessor. For example,
relying heavily on Thorne’s 1995 study (noted above), John P. Lewis’ 2009
publication on the reception of Karl Barth’s theology in North America classifies
Van Til in the genus of American fundamentalism 172 and the species of “North
American fundamentalist Calvinism.”173
Insofar as Lewis’ main goal is to paint Van Til as a fundamentalist, he fails to see
any connections to Van Til’s theological predecessors outside of American
Evangelical fundamentalism.
Additionally, in his 2010 publication on the history of the Reformed two
kingdoms doctrine David VanDrunen devotes a chapter to Van Til in which he
interprets him as a developer of “another stream in the Kuyperian tradition” in
distinction from Herman Dooyeweerd.174 Van Til offered “one of the most
ambitious attempts to apply classic Reformed and Kuyperian theology in the
twentieth century,” claims VanDrunen. 175 The only reference to Bavinck appears

171. Eric D. Bristley, Guide to the Writings of Herman Bavinck (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation
Heritage Books, 2008), 24.
172. John P. Lewis, Karl Barth in North America: The Influence of Karl Barth in the Making of a
New North American Evangelicalism (Resource Publications (OR), 2009), 33-49, 213
173. Lewis, Karl Barth in North America, 44.
174. See ch. 10, “The Kuyperian Legacy (II): Cornelius Van Til and the Van Tillians,” in David
VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social
Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 386-422; quotation at p. 386.
175. VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 387.
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in a footnote which lists Van Til’s Dutch Reformed interlocutors in his debates
over the doctrine of common grace.176 Thus VanDrunen’s analysis of Van Til is
mostly silent regarding Bavinck’s influence. 177 Nevertheless, it is significant to
note that VanDrunen interprets Van Til primarily in terms of Neo-Calvinism,
specifically in relation to Kuyper.178
3. Summary
This survey of Van Til scholarship yields several salient insights into the
scholarly perception of Van Til’s theological heritage. First, scholars following the
“Copernican” line of interpretation have tended to produce little by way of
historically contextualized analysis. The largest and most robust analyses of Van
Til’s thought (i.e., the works by Bahnsen and Frame) are devoted primarily to
exposition of Van Til’s allegedly unique views. Hence these works provide little
by way of historical contextualization. The Copernican line of Van Til scholarship
tends to read the entire history of Christian thought in light of Van Til—as if he
appeared ex nihilo—rather than reading Van Til in light of the history of Christian
thought, especially in light of the neo-Calvinist context within which he lived,
moved, and had his being. Nevertheless, despite the hyperbole and lack of
historical criticism evident in this line of scholarship, several of the studies
therein have noted, albeit briefly, Bavinck’s profound influence upon their
176. VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 397n55.
177. VanDrunen does reference Muether’s biography and the two analyses by Frame and
Bahnsen, all of which take note of Bavinck’s influence (VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two
Kingdoms, 386-387n1).
178. In an earlier essay, VanDrunen, “A System of Theology?,” 213, remarks that “Van Til
consciously grounded his understanding of apologetics in the broader truths of Reformed
doctrine. . . .” The context of VanDrunen’s citation at 213n26 refers to John Murray (1898–1975),
who was professor of systematic theology at Westminster Seminary during Van Til’s tenure.
VanDrunen thus implicitly includes Murray as an influence upon Van Til’s thought.
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“Copernicus.”
Second, before the 2003–2008 translation of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek, many scholars noted Bavinck’s significant influence upon Van Til’s
thought, but not a single study elaborated upon this relationship based on
primary sources. As the four volumes of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek began to appear in
English translation, however, Van Til scholars started to notice more and more
correlations between the two thinkers. By 2008 a nascent reassessment of Van Til
vis-á-vis Bavinck is evident, most notably in the studies by Muether and Mattson
and in the editorial notes by Edgar and Oliphint that accompany the new
editions of Van Til’s works. Therefore, although we cannot draw a hard-and-fast
rule, there does appear to be an incipient trend in Van Til scholarship—the more
that Bavinck’s works are published in English, the more Van Til scholars are rereading Van Til in light of the work that Van Til himself lauded as “the greatest
and most comprehensive statement of Reformed systematic theology in modern
times.”179 However, even though a nascent reassessment of Van Til’s
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought is evident in studies published subsequent to
the translation of Bavinck’s magnum opus, a robust theological analysis of Van
Til’s Reformed apologetics vis-á-vis Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics
remains outstanding.
Third, in the scholarly literature Bavinck’s influence upon Van Til is largely
overshadowed by Kuyper’s. Several Van Til biographers and interpreters
highlight
“Father Abraham’s” influence while virtually neglecting Bavinck’s. Yet, oddly,
179. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89.
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despite the scholarly hubbub over Kuyper, there are no extant historical or
theological studies which elaborate this relationship in any depth using primary
source materials. Therefore, similar to the scant treatment of Bavinck’s influence
in Van Til scholarship, Kuyper’s dominant neo-Calvinist influence upon Van Til’s
thought remains underdeveloped.

D. The Thesis: Neo-Calvinist à la Bavinck
In light of the predominant Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s thought, I
raised the question as to whether such ahistorical, abstract, revolutionary
readings of Van Til’s work can be sustained vis-à-vis his modest self-assessments,
his polemics against theological novelty, and his appropriation of Kuyper’s neoCalvinist vision. Then, focusing upon one aspect of this question—Van Til’s
appropriations of Bavinck’s thought—I surveyed the current scholarship on Van
Til and found that, although recent scholars have begun to notice Bavinck’s
pervasive influence upon Van Til’s thought, a thorough analysis of Van Til’s
specific appropriations of Bavinck’s theological formulations remains
outstanding.
Therefore, in order to shed light upon this underdeveloped area in Van Til
scholarship I will argue the following thesis in response to the aforementioned
question: Considered in concreto, Van Til’s theological formulations are neither
revolutionary nor de novo; rather, his presupposition of “the Reformed system of
doctrine” is largely an appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek. If it can be demonstrated that Van Til pervasively appropriates
theological formulations from his preeminent Dutch neo-Calvinist predecessor,

47
then the use of the following two adjectives in Van Til scholarship will need to be
reassessed accordingly: “Copernican” and “Van Tilian.”

E. The Argument: A Précis
My argument proceeds in three steps. Step one—which we have already
completed in chapter 1—is to set our thesis within the context of Van Til
scholarship. We have seen that, contrary to the Copernican interpretation of Van
Til’s thought which abstracts his basic presupposition of “the Reformed system”
out of his neo-Calvinist context, a more concrete, historically-contextualized
analysis is needed in order to account for Van Til’s own interpretation of his
work.
Accordingly, in step two I will examine three concrete aspects of Van Til’s
presupposition. First, I will argue in chapter 2 that a major formal element of Van
Til’s presupposition derives from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, namely, the priority of
dogmatics over apologetics in theological encyclopedia. Second, based upon a
survey of Van Til’s presentation of Reformed dogmatics in his book, An
Introduction to Systematic Theology, I will demonstrate in chapter 3 that,
considered materially, the bulk of Van Til’s presupposition comprises
voluminous appropriations—both explicit and tacit—from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
Third, based on several of his polemical writings, I will demonstrate in chapter 4
that Van Til frequently employs Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the paragon of Reformed
orthodoxy contra the work of several modern Reformed theologians whom Van
Til repudiates as promulgators of heterodoxy. In sum, then, step two of my
argument seeks to demonstrate that, formally, materially, and polemically, Van
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Til’s presupposition is not Copernican but neo-Calvinist à la Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
In step three I will confront what at first glance appears to be the Achilles’
heel of my thesis, namely, the fact that Van Til levels totalizing critiques against
the patent scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought. After surveying his catalog of
criticisms in chapter 5, I will then analyze Van Til’s overall critique in two ways
in chapter 6. First, concerning its source, I will demonstrate that Van Til’s critique
is an appropriation of Herman Dooyeweerd’s prior criticisms of the scholasticism
in neo-Calvinist theology. Second, concerning its validity, I will argue that, since
Van Til’s critique is based upon (1) an ahistorical, idiosyncratic definition of
“scholasticism” that is imposed upon Bavinck’s thought from without and (2) an
unsound, bipolar, dialectical interpretation of Bavinck’s thought, it is both
methodologically unsound and historically untenable.

CHAPTER II.
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN CONCRETO (PART 1):
FORMAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
The relationship between apologetics and dogmatics is a key structural
aspect of Van Til’s thought; for, the question inherent in this relationship is
whether apologetics is grounded upon a foundation independent of theology’s
principia. If so, then apologetics takes on an autonomous nature, and its task is to
provide philosophical foundations for theology independent of divine revelation.
If not, then apologetics is a fully dogmatic in nature, and its task is to vindicate
both theology’s principia and the content of her dogmas, not autonomously but in
full dependence upon dogmatics. Thus the relationship between the two is no
mere theological nicety; rather, a host of implications follow upon how Van Til
views the nature of this relationship.
As indicated by his basic presupposition, Van Til clearly takes the latter
position, namely, that Reformed apologetics presupposes Reformed dogmatics
rather than vice versa. Thus the question we are pursuing in this chapter is not
concerning which position Van Til takes, but, given the claims of the Copernican
line of scholarship, we will ask: Is Van Til’s position regarding the relationship of
dogmatics and apologetics revolutionary? Does he formulate this position de
novo, or is he appropriating insights from his neo-Calvinist tradition, and, in
particular, from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek?
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I will argue that this formal feature of Van Til’s thought is not a Copernican
revolution but an appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s formulation of the
relationship between dogmatics and apologetics. At first glance this argument
may seem unlikely since Van Til couches the debate on this point mostly in terms
of “old Amsterdam” (i.e., Kuyper) vs. “old Princeton” (i.e, Warfield). Yet, a closer
look will reveal that Van Til’s position is closer to Bavinck’s than to Kuyper’s.
In order to make this case Bavinck’s position will be presented first, then Van
Til’s view will be compared with Bavinck’s.

A. Dogmatics and Apologetics in Bavinck’s Dogmatiek
Apologetics makes its first appearance in the Reformed Dogmatics only
tangentially, yet the context within which it appears is highly significant, namely,
a discussion on the place of dogmatics in theological encyclopedia. 1 Following
Kuyper’s fourfold schema,2 Bavinck lists apologetics as a member of the third
group of theological sciences (i.e., the dogmatological group) which also includes
1. Two formal differences between the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek and the Reformed Dogmatics
are important to note for the following discussion. First, in the Dogmatiek Bavinck’s discussion of
theological encyclopedia is its own paragraph (i.e., § 2, “Encyclopaedische Plaats der
Dogmatiek,” in Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 7th ed., 4 vols. (Kampen: Kok, 1998), 1:23-36), which
includes subparagraphs ##9–12. The English translation inserts many sub-headings not present
in the Dutch, thus creating a more complex hierarchy than exists in the original. If we are to
follow Bavinck’s original organization, therefore, ##9–12 should be read as its own paragraph
rather than as the seventh sub-section of ch. 1 as it appears in the English translation. Second, in
the Dogmatiek each of the paragraphs begins with a list of sources which Bavinck interacts with
throughout the paragraph. This structural feature is absent from the English translation. Keeping
this feature in mind helps make better structural sense of Bavinck’s seemingly long excursus on
Schleiermacher and Bavinck’s interaction with Kuyper’s Encyclopaedie throughout ##9–12.
2. Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles, trans. J. Hendrik De Vries
(New York: Charles Scribnerʼs Sons, 1898), 630, classifies the theological sciences into four groups:
(1) Bibliological, (2) Ecclesiological, (3) Dogmatological, and (4) Diaconiological. Idem,
Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Kampen: Kok, 1909), 3:365-66, organizes
the dogmatological group into three sub-groups: (1) diathetic, (2) thetic, and (3) antithetic.
Polemics, elenctics, and apologetics comprise the antithetic sub-group. Kuyper’s two-tiered
schema is therefore more elaborate than Bavinck’s.
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dogmatics, ethics, symbolics, and the history of dogma.3 He then turns abruptly
to a lengthy critical analysis of Schleiermacher’s singular deviation whereby
dogmatics is classified as an historical rather than a dogmatological discipline.
Bavinck’s critique of this seemingly pedantic point reveals the tip of what he
takes to be a deadly iceberg for dogmatics—the rejection of the scientific nature
of theology.4 Therefore, insofar as Bavinck considers both apologetics and
dogmatics to be dogmatological sciences, before we can understand Bavinck’s
placement of apologetics within the theological encyclopedia we must first
survey his view of the scientific nature of theology.
1. The Nature of Theology as a Science
Bavinck views theology as the science of the knowledge of God. In modern
theology, however, man had replaced God as the proper object of theology, and
dogmatics had been redefined as the science of faith, according to Bavinck.
Positivism slowly swallowed metaphysics, he reasons, objectivity gave way to
subjectivity, and theology as knowledge degenerated into theology as faith.
Accordingly, dogmatics devolved from a normative, objective science into a
systematic historical account of subjective religious belief; therefore, Bavinck
remarks that theology’s scientific nature came to be seen in merely formal terms. 5
This monumental shift, argues Bavinck, began early in the history of
3. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1, Prolegomena
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 47; also cf. pp. 54, 54n57. At the head of § 2 in his
Dogmatiek Bavinck references Kuyper’s Encyclopaedie, vol. 3, pp. 346–467.
4. Bavinck gives extended attention to Schleiermacher in #9 (Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47-50),
but his discussion of the underlying issue relating to Schleiermacher’s reinterpretation of the
nature of dogmatics extents throughout ##4–12 (Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34-58).
5. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34-37; also cf. idem, Essays on Religion, Science, and Society,
ed. John Bolt, trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2008), 49-51, 61-62.
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dogmatics. He finds evidence for the shift already in the thought of Lombard,
Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Hugo St. Victor, and even in some Lutheran
and Reformed theologians—all of these theologians made religion (i.e., man)
instead of revelation (i.e., God) theology’s object. “Thus, step by step, the
subjective practical notion of theology began increasingly to find acceptance.” 6
The result of this shift, asserts Bavinck, was that, after Kant and Schleiermacher,
dogmatics became the account of the historic phenomenon that is called
the Christian religion and manifests itself in a unique faith and doctrine.
Now when dogmatics is understood in this sense, it ceases to be
dogmatics and simply becomes the account of what in a certain specific
circle is held to be true in the sphere of religion. 7
Bavinck eschews this Kantian, subjective, positivistic revision of theology’s
scientific nature and insists upon the classical objective view with God, not man,
as theology’s object. “For God to be knowable,” argues Bavinck,
he must have revealed himself not only in deeds but also in words.
Contained in that revelation is the knowledge of God in the objective
sense, and as such it is the object of theology, more specifically of
dogmatics.8
Thus he avers the following ultimatum:
A choice has to be made: either there is room in science for metaphysics
and then positivism is in principle false, or positivism is the true view of
science and metaphysics must be radically banished from its entire
domain. One who specifically devotes his energies to the restoration of
metaphysics in the science of religion has in principle broken with the
6. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34-35; quote at p. 35.
7. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:36-37. Also note Bavinck’s comment that the Higher
Education Act of 1876 in Holland embodies this shift (p. 36).
8. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42; also cf. pp. 53-54. Throughout his Prolegomena Bavinck
follows standard Reformed scholastic distinctions regarding the principia of theology
distinguished as follows: God is the princpium essendi; Revelation is the principium cognoscendi
externum; Faith is the princpium cognoscendi internum; Cf. Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and
Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.
Baker Books, 2006), s.vv., princpium essendi, principium cognoscendi externum, and princpium
cognoscendi internum; idem, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, Prolegomena to Theology,
2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 430-50.
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basic idea from which the science of religion took its rise and is, again in
principle, returning to the old view of theology.9
Echoing his earlier citation of Thomas’ classic definition,10 Bavinck defines
dogmatics in unabashedly metaphysical terms as “the knowledge that God has
revealed in his Word to the church concerning himself and all creatures as they
stand in relation to him.”11 Thus he clearly supports the “old view.”
For Bavinck dogmatics is a science because dogmatics deals with objective,
revealed truth.12 He insists that “if the revelation contains such a knowledge of
God [i.e., an objective, revealed knowledge], it can also be thought through
scientifically and gathered up in a system.” 13 Accordingly, he insists that “a
theologian’s sole responsibility is to think God’s thoughts after him and to
reproduce the unity that is objectively present in the thoughts of God and has
been recorded for the eye of faith in Scripture.” 14 “Like every other departmental
discipline,” argues Bavinck, “theology too has its own object and principle,
method and aim.”15 According to Bavinck, the normative nature of dogmatics is
therefore a concomitant of its metaphysical object. “[D]ogmatics is a normative
science,” he insists, “that prescribes what we must believe.” 16
Bavinck uses Julius Kaftan’s position as a foil to defend the scientific nature

9. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:37. Bavinck frequently recapitulates this ultimatum (i.e., “a
choice has to be made”); cf. pp. 75, 218, 231, 276, 340, 458.
10. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34, 36.
11. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:38. Cf. Bavinck’s explication of the normative, ecclesial,
and catholic dimensions of his definition of dogmatics at p. 46.
12. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:37.
13. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42.
14. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:44; also cf. p. 588.
15. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:43.
16. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:46.
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of dogmatics.17 Kaftan, according to Bavinck, accepted a faith-knowledge of God
but rejected a scientific knowledge of God. Thus by denying the existence of an
objective, scientific knowledge of God, argues Bavinck, Kaftan falls prey to the
same problem as Schleiermacher—subjectivity—despite Kaftan’s own critiques
of Schleiermacher’s subjectivity. 18 Bavinck rejoins against Kaftan’s attempt to
ground dogmatics in a quasi-objective faith-knowledge as follows:
This, however, is a dead-end road. For if strictly speaking there is no
science of God, then neither can there be a faith-knowledge of God.
Conversely, if indeed there exists a true and trustworthy knowledge of
God, even though it is acquired in a special way that corresponds to the
nature of its object, then one can certainly speak properly of a science of
God. Correctly assuming a faith-knowledge of God, therefore, Kaftan
should have pushed consistently forward along that line, broken with
Kant’s dualism, reviewed the modern concept of science, and made a
simple and decisive assertion: Precisely because a true faith-knowledge
of God exists, dogmatics has the knowledge of God as part of its content
and can rightly claim to be a science. 19
To embrace the Kantian shift of theology’s object from revelation to religion, as
evidenced in the views of Schleiermacher and Kaftan, requires the relegation of
dogmatics to the realm of subjective faith, a move which Bavinck sees as selfcontradictory; for, without an objective grounding in God’s revelation, dogmatics
could not even produce true subjective knowledge of God. Such a shift would
further create a dichotomy between knowledge and faith, a move which Bavinck
also rejects. “Faith (religion, the knowledge of faith) and theology,” insists
Bavinck, “are not related as pistis and gnosis but differ only in degrees.”20
17. Bavinck treats Kaftan’s view of dogmatics in ##6–8 (Reformed Dogmatics, 1:38-46).
Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian
and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 38, interprets Bavinck’s critique of Kaftan as an exemplar
representing Bavinck’s larger critique of Kantian dualism in modern theology.
18. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42.
19. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:43.
20. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42.
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The only path which maintains an organic unity between faith and
knowledge in dogmatics, according to Bavinck, is the one paved with an
objective, scientific revelation of God. Conversely, a non-scientific dogmatics is as
impossible as a non-dogmatic science.21 The scientific nature of theology
grounded upon a divinely given revelation is therefore an all-important
controlling principle in Bavinck’s thought; indeed, it is the only context for
understanding Bavinck’s assertion that theology is the veritable “queen of
sciences” who selflessly serves all her subjects, blessing each one with her
manifold gifts.22
2. The Place of Dogmatics in Theological Encyclopedia
With Bavinck’s view of dogmatics as a science (in the pre-Kantian, classical
sense) in mind, we can now return to where we left off—Bavinck’s critique of
Schleiermacher’s theological encyclopedia. Schleiermacher rejected theology as a
science, argues Bavinck, and insisted instead upon a rigorous separation between
dogmatics and apologetics: The former deals with the history of religious faith
(i.e., religion), the latter with Christian truth (i.e., science). In principle, therefore,
a dichotomy between faith and knowledge, theology and philosophy,
subjectivity and objectivity, religion and science controls Schleiermacher’s
thought, reasons Bavinck.23 The implication is that apologetics (a philosophical,
objective science) deals with truth, whereas dogmatics (a non-scientific,
subjective discipline) does not. Contra Schleiermacher’s view, Bavinck insists that
21. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:43.
22. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:54; also cf. idem, “Herman Bavinckʼs ‘Common Grace’,”
Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 1 (1989): 65.
23. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47-48.
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dogmatics, no less than apologetics, is a science which deals with objective truth.
“The Christian church cannot be satisfied,” insists Bavinck, “with an objective
account of the content of its faith but wishes that its faith be unfolded and set
forth also as truth.”24
Bavinck observes that Schleiermacher could not practice his own principles;
rather, Schleiermacher’s rigorous dichotomies actually resulted in a complete
fusion of philosophy and theology.25 Nevertheless, notes Bavinck,
Schleiermacher’s influence prevailed in the so-called “mediating theology,” 26 a
school of thought which advocated a dichotomy between the university and the
church, the science of religion and ecclesiastical theology. 27 If theology does not
deal with truth, reasoned the mediating theologians, then it does not belong in
the university and should be relegated to the church instead. 28
“Against this division,” Bavinck rejoins ardently, “there are so many
theoretical and practical objections that it should be viewed as profoundly
inadvisable.”29 The main thrust of his rejoinder is as follows:
The word of God has an objective content that was established before,
and persists apart from, our faith, just as much as the world of colors and
sounds exists independently of the blind and the deaf. In that case,
24. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47.
25. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:48.
26. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:49, 49n49.
27. The separation between the university study of religion and the ecclesiastical study of
theology was an issue that Bavinck fought vehemently throughout his own career, most notably
in his role as mediator between the seminary at Kampen and the Free University of Amsterdam.
Bavinck led several attempts to form a merger between these institutions, but ideological
differences regarding the nature of theology prevented the merger time and again. Furthermore,
Bavinck’s own life story, notably his own transition from Kampen to Amsterdam, reflects this
very tension. Cf. Ron Gleason, Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2010), 225-315.
28. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:49-50.
29. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:50. For Bavinck’s detailed array of arguments against this
dichotomy, see pp. 50–54.
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however, knowledge of the objective content of revelation has
significance of and for itself. This is true of all science.
. . . Truth as such has value. Knowledge as such is a good. To know
God in the face of Christ—by faith here on earth, by sight in the hereafter
—not only results in blessedness but is as such blessedness and eternal
life. It is this knowledge dogmatics strives for in order that God may see
his own image reflected and his own name recorded in the human
consciousness. And for that reason theology and dogmatics do not
belong, by the grace of a positivistic science, in a church seminary, but in
the university of the sciences (universitas scientiarum).30
Therefore, Bavinck insists that, since theology derives from God’s objective
revelation, the proper throne for the queen of sciences is the university, not the
seminary.
3. The Place of Apologetics in Theological Encyclopedia
If theology is a science, and if dogmatics and apologetics both belong to the
third division of theological sciences (i.e., the dogmatological group), then
dogmatics must be distinguished from apologetics by some criterion, reasons
Bavinck. All of the dogmatological sciences deal with dogma, he remarks, but the
specific manner in which each one does so provides its distinguishing feature. He
therefore distinguishes the two as follows: Dogma “set forth thetically and
positively, and at the same scientifically, in a systematic form” is dogmatics;
Dogma “defended and maintained in its truthfulness and legitimacy against its
opponents” is apologetics.31
The place of apologetics among the theological sciences, however, has varied
widely, notes Bavinck. Some have elevated apologetics as the philosophical
presupposition of dogmatics, while others have denigrated apologetics as a mere
30. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:53-54.
31. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:54.
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practical afterthought to theology. “There is no valid reason for either such
overvaluation or such disdain,” retorts Bavinck.32 Those who, like
Schleiermacher, elevate apologetics as the philosophical presupposition of
dogmatics did so because they had rejected theology’s own principia and “were
forced to look elsewhere for a foundation on which the building of theology
could rest.”33 Bavinck, however, rejects such attempts to ground theology upon
philosophy, to separate the principia of dogmatics and apologetics:
If, however, theology is deduced from its own source, i.e., from
revelation, it has its own certainty and does not need the corroboration of
philosophical reasoning. Accordingly, apologetics cannot and may not
precede dogmatics but presupposes dogma and now gets the modest but
still splendid task of maintaining and defending this dogma against all
opposition. It now attempts to do this, not in response to some specific
challenge, but fundamentally in terms of the opposition that dogmas as
the truth of God encounter at all times, be it in ever changing forms,
from the side of the “natural man.”34
The object of theology—revelation—is all-determining for the nature and task of
apologetics, according to Bavinck. All theological sciences receive, rather than
create, their principia. Even the name “apologetics,” notes Bavinck, indicates that
it is not a heuristic science which searches out its own content independent of
dogmatics.35 Apologetics therefore cannot have a separate foundation than
dogmatics:
Apologetics cannot precede faith and does not attempt a priori to argue
the truth of revelation. It assumes the truth and belief in the truth. It does
not, as the introductory part or as the foundational science, precede
theology and dogmatics. It is itself a theological science through and
through, which presupposes the faith and dogmatics and now maintains
32. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55.
33. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55.
34. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55-56; also cf. pp. 515-17.
35. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55.
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and defends the dogma against the opposition to which it is exposed. 36
For Bavinck the science of apologetics is in no sense pre-dogmatic; rather, it
presupposes dogmatics and is built upon the same principia. If theology is the
“queen of sciences,” then apologetics is her steady and skillful handmaiden. Both
belong to the dogmatological sciences, yet in terms of proper logical order the
handmaiden serves the queen, not vice versa. Therefore, Bavinck’s view of the
relation between apologetics and dogmatics follows the traditional Protestant
scholastic view of the relationship between prolegomena and dogmatics, namely,
that theological prolegomena (including the principia of theology) are not
vordogmatisch but fully dogmatisch.37
4. The Task of Apologetics
Bavinck assigns this handmaiden three specific tasks within her overall
responsibility to defend and vindicate the truthfulness of dogma. First,
apologetics forces theology to account for its principia and its content, its
foundation and its superstructure. “It brings Christian theology out of the
shadows of the mysticism of the human heart,” writes Bavinck, “into the full
light of day. Apologetics, after all, was the first Christian science.” 38 Second,
apologetics emboldens Christians and keeps them from embarrassed silence in
the face of critics. Bavinck boldly asserts, “The Christian worldview alone is one
36. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515; cf. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic
Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed.
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 90-91.
37. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:121, writes the following regarding the
relation between prolegomena and dogmatics in Protestant scholasticism: “We note, again, that
theological prolegomena are never vordogmatisch: they are an integral part of dogmatic system
that develops in dialog with basic dogmatic conclusions after the system as a whole has been set
forth.”
38. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515.
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that fits the reality of the world and of life.”39 Third, apologetics is a mighty tool
in God’s hands by which “will very definitely succeed in impressing opponents
with the truth of Christian revelation, refuting and silencing them.” As such,
“apologetics, like the ministry of the Word, can be a source of consummate
blessing.”40 In each of her tasks, therefore, the handmaiden willingly serves the
queen.

B. Dogmatics and Apologetics in Van Til’s Thought
Van Til frequently repeated materials throughout his writings, and he often
provides further explication in his later writings of points he made earlier. In
order to get the full picture, therefore, we need to collate his various
presentations of the relationship between dogmatics and apologetics in
theological encyclopedia. We begin with his introductory syllabus on apologetics.
1. Theological Encyclopedia in Christian Apologetics
“Apologetics,” writes Van Til in the opening lines of Christian Apologetics, “is
the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of
the non-Christian philosophy of life.”41 Just like Bavinck’s assertion that
apologetics must vindicate both Christianity’s principia and its content, so Van Til
asserts that vindication has two components: facts and philosophy of fact,
Christianity and theism, history and philosophy. “It is impossible and useless,”
he claims, “to seek to vindicate Christianity as a historical religion by a
39. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515.
40. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515.
41. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R, 2003), 17.
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discussion of facts only.”42 “To interpret a fact of history,” reasons Van Til,
“involves a philosophy of history.” Thus he concludes: “In short, there is a
historical and there is a philosophical aspect to the defense of Christian theism.” 43
Van Til uses martial imagery to explain the nature of apologetics. The
historical aspect of apologetics is like ground troops who march about doing the
detailed work of war, and the philosophical aspect is like the big guns which
clear the way for the ground troops. The troops and the guns are mutually
interdependent, and they both are fighting the same war. 44
Van Til continues to use the martial metaphor in his explication of the place
of apologetics in the theological encyclopedia. His argument had two parts. First,
he divides up the theological disciplines into three groups: (1) Biblical studies, (2)
systematic theology, and (3) church history. Second, he claims that each of the
three disciplines must vindicate the truth in its own field. Yet, if each discipline
must defend its own turf, reasons Van Til, it would appear that there is no place
left for apologetics. However, in order to show that this is not the case, Van Til
introduces another martial image—apologetics as “messenger boy.” 45
The messenger boy has two basic tasks, according to Van Til. First, he goes
back and forth between divisions carrying messages from general to general. For
example, Van Til describes the messenger boy bringing a map to someone on the
front lines in order to remind that soldier of the big picture as an analogy of the
42. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 18.
43. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 19.
44. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 18.
45. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 20-21. William Edgar, at p. 21n1, notes the following: “Here,
Van Til sets forth a comprehensive view of apologetics. It ought to function acros the disciplines,
showing in each field of knowledge, however specialized, that a defense and commendation of
the whole of Christian faith should constantly be kept in view.”
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exegetical scholar who needs to be reminded by the apologist of Christianity’s
big theological picture. Second, the messenger boy serves as a scout who
stealthily detects the enemies advances and as a nightwatchman who guards the
fort.46 “The net result, then,” remarks Van Til, “seems to be that in apologetics we
have the whole field to cover.”47 Thus even though each discipline must perform
its own apologetic task, apologetics finds an indispensable place as the
messenger boy in Van Til’s theological army.
Combining his various metaphors yields the following picture. Van Til
explicates theological encyclopedia in terms of warfare. Each discipline must
defend its own turf. The vindicatory task of apologetics therefore differs only in
degree from that of biblical studies, systematic theology, and church history.
More than the practitioners of the three main disciplines, the apologist stands
guard, scouts, and moves in and out between disciplines, always defending and
vindicating the whole in light of the parts and vice versa. The others do their
own share of vindicating, but not to the extent of the apologist.48
Unlike Bavinck, Van Til only explicitly describes the relationship between
systematic theology and apologetics in passing:
It is apparent from our discussion so far that systematic theology is more
closely related to apologetics than are any of the other disciplines. In it
we have the system of truth that we are to defend. 49
Yet if we extend Van Til’s martial imagery to include what is implicit in his
statement, the relationship he describes is very similar to Bavinck’s formulation:
46. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 21-23.
47. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 22.
48. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 22-23.
49. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 23.
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Dogmatics, as chief commander, defines the battle field and draws up the battle
plans. Apologetics, as messenger boy, receives his maps and his missions from
the commander. The nature and task of apologetics is therefore governed by
dogmatics.
2. Theological Encyclopedia in An Introduction to Systematic Theology
In contrast to Bavinck’s strong insistence that theology is the scientia de Deo,
Van Til provides scant reflection on the scientific nature of theology. At one point
he seems to dismiss the attempt to claim that theology is a science on the ground
that such an attempt overvalues the use of reason, but he does not elaborate this
point.50 Whether or not he views theology as a science, Van Til clearly affirms the
ground upon which Bavinck makes this claim, namely, that theology is grounded
upon objective truth. Like Bavinck, Van Til notes that in modern theology
“religion” has been redefined in subjective terms. “But since Christianity claims
to be the true religion,” objects Van Til, “it follows that for it the objective
reference is of prime importance.” 51 He asserts accordingly that theology should
no longer be defined as “the science of religion” due to this definition’s subjective
connotation in modern times.52 Apart from these two brief assertions, however,
Van Til does not elaborate on whether theology is a science.
Van Til’s explication of theological encyclopedia is brief. Similar to the
threefold schema he presents in Christian Apologetics, Van Til arranges the
theological disciplines into the following three groups: (1) exegesis and biblical
50. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 56-57.
51. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 16.
52. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 15-16.
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theology, (2) systematic theology, (3) practical theology. The only major change
he makes here is that practical theology has replaced church history in this
arrangement. Van Til then relates systematic theology to apologetics as follows:
Systematics arranges the fruits of exegesis and biblical theology “into a
concatenated system,”53 and apologetics defends and vindicates this system
“against false philosophy and false science.”54 Thus Van Til recapitulates the
commander and messenger boy relationship between dogmatics and apologetics,
albeit without the martial motif.
Like Bavinck, Van Til notes that the relationship of apologetics and
systematics is a disputed point in the Reformed tradition. “The point of
difference,” he asserts, “concerns chiefly the nature of apologetics.” 55 He
summarizes the debate as follows: On the one hand, B. B. Warfield and the
Princeton school of apologetics maintains that apologetics must establish the
presuppositions of systematics; On the other hand, Kuyper, Bavinck, and the
Amsterdam school of apologetics maintains that apologetics defends the system
of theology it receives from systematics. According to Van Til, Warfield insists
that the Amsterdam method begs the truth question, whereas Kuyper insists that
the Princeton method inappropriately places the Christian position before a nonChristian bar of reason.56
Reticent to disagree with either, Van Til attempts to incorporate Warfield’s
53. Thanks to my student colleague Andrew M. McGinnis for noting that on this point Van
Til has clearly appropriated B. B. Warfield’s formulation of the task of systematic theology in
terms of a systematic “concatenation” of the knowledge of God. Cf. Benjamin B. Warfield, The
Works of Benjamin B. Warfield (1932; repr., Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2000), IX:51, 93.
54. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 17.
55. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 17.
56. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 17-18.
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concerns within Kuyper’s position.57 He reasons that even on Kuyper’s terms
apologetics can come first in practice, provided it presupposes the truth of the
Christian system. Along with Kuyper, however, Van Til rejects Warfield’s
insistence that apologetics must employ a different method than all of the other
theological disciplines. “All the disciplines must presuppose God,” argues Van Til,
“but, at the same time, presupposition is the best proof. Apologetics takes particular
pains to show that such is the case. This is its chief task.” Van Til concludes
accordingly, recapitulating his messenger boy metaphor in the following terms:
Apologetics defends the outer edge of systematics’ circle of truth. 58
3. Theological Encyclopedia in The Defense of the Faith
In The Defense of the Faith Van Til presents a similar picture of apologetics’
place within the theological encyclopedia, yet he deals with the topic only
implicitly. Before one can defend the faith, he argues, one must first know the
faith that is to be defended. Therefore, with respect to theological encyclopedia,
Van Til reasons that apologetics must receive its statement of faith from the other
theological disciplines, especially systematic theology, before it can defend that
faith.59 He cites the work of his former professor, Louis Berkhof, as an example of
the Reformed system of faith which apologetics first receives and then defends.
57. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R, 2008), 310, displays similar reticence toward disagreeing with either Warfield or Kuyper in
the following statement: “Are we to be reprimanded in advance for not agreeing with Kuyper?
Or for not agreeing with Warfield? Let us rather seek to listen to both Warfield and Kuyper and
also to Calvin, and then do the best we can as we ask just what the genius of the Reformed Faith
requires of us. Is there anything else that anyone today can do?”
58. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 18-19; quotes at p. 19.
59. Johannes Heinrich August Ebrard, Apologetics; Or The Scientific Vindication of Christianity,
trans. William Stuart and John Macpherson, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886), 2-3, presents a
similar argument: Christian apologetics is not the science of defense in abstracto, but the defense
of its concrete object, namely, Christianity.
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Drawing out what is implicit in Van Til’s view, therefore, insofar as faith must
have content before it can be defended, the what of apologetics must precede the
how, the commander must precede and govern the messenger boy. 60
Van Til takes up the Princeton-Amsterdam debate again, this time devoting
the entirety of chapter 13 to the topic in contrast with his shorter treatment in An
Introduction to Systematic Theology.61 Van Til anticipates chapter 13 with the
following rhetorical question in chapter 12:
Have not certain Reformed theologians been willing in some measure to
cooperate with Romanists in defending theism and with evangelicals in
defending evangelicalism, in order, after that, to defend the specific
doctrines of Calvinism? Are they all wrong and are you alone right? 62
“The answer to this objection is not easy,” answers Van Til. “It would require
separate and extensive discussion to do it justice.” 63 After noting that the nature
and task of apologetics is a disputed point among Reformed theologians in
general, he comments specifically, “The difference between Warfield and Kuyper
on the question of apologetics is well known.”64 The “extensive discussion” in
chapter 13, therefore, appears to be Van Til’s attempt (1) to deal with the
objection that he thinks his apologetic alone is true and (2) “to listen to both
Warfield and Kuyper and also to Calvin. . . .”65
Throughout chapter 13 Van Til analyzes the issues in the Princeton60. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 28-29.
61. Cf. ch. 13 in Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 345-382. At p. 345n1 Van Til notes that most
of this chapter recapitulates material from ch. 8 in idem, A Christian Theory of Knowledge
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 221-54. In this latter work Van Til further
remarks that his argument presupposes the material found in idem, “Nature and Scripture,” in
The Infallible Word: A Symposium by the Members of the Faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary,
2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1967), 263-301.
62. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 309.
63. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 309.
64. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 310.
65. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 310.
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Amsterdam debate, critiques representatives from both schools of thought (i.e.,
Warfield, Kuyper, William Brenton Greene Jr., Floyd E. Hamilton, and Bavinck),
and presents his own view as a via media between Warfield and Kuyper which he
sees as more faithful to Calvin and to Paul. We will limit our attention to the
following two points apropos of theological encyclopedia specifically.66
First, Van Til views the underlying issue between Warfield and Kuyper to be
differing evaluations of natural theology. Using Kuyper’s epistemological
terminology of the “natural [i.e., non-Christian] principle” and the “special [i.e.,
Christian] principle,” Van Til summarizes the debate as follows: Warfield insists
that the natural principle can interpret general revelation correctly whereas
Kuyper maintains the opposite.67 Thus Van Til finds the two positions to be
mutually exclusive. “It is impossible,” he insists, “to hold with Kuyper that the
Christian and the non-Christian principles are destructive of one another and to
hold with Warfield that they differ only in degree.” 68
Second, contra K. Scott Oliphint’s assertion to the contrary,69 Van Til
intentionally sides with Kuyper’s antithetical “natural principle” and “special
principle” over against Warfield’s view of “right reason,” but he does so with a
caveat on Kuyper’s allegedly negative view of apologetics. He writes:
For myself I have chosen the position of Kuyper.70 But I am unable to
66. For an analysis of Van Til’s critiques of Bavinck in this chapter (i.e., The Defense of the
Faith, 374-79), see Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,” Westminster Theological
Journal 70, no. 1 (2008): 116-23; Also, we will examine Van Til’s critiques further in chapters 5–6
below.
67. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 346-51.
68. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 351; also cf. p. 360.
69. Cf. K. Scott Oliphint’s editorial note in Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 352n27: “To put
the matter more succinctly, it is not the case that Van Til has chosen Kuyper over Warfield.”
70. With respect to Van Til’s choice of Kuyper’s position over Warfield’s, cf. Van Til, The
Defense of the Faith, 284: “If Masselink wants to remain true to the basic commitment of Kuyper, he
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follow him when from the fact of the mutually destructive character of
the two principles he concludes to the uselessness of reasoning with the
natural man.71
Van Til presents his caveat only indirectly; for, instead of arguing his point from
Kuyper’s works directly, he employs the analogy of Reformed vs. Arminian
preaching. The unsubstantiated implication of Van Til’s caveat is that Kuyper
should have viewed apologetics to be as valuable and as necessary as
preaching.72 However, despite this caveat, Van Til explicitly chooses Kuyper’s
view over Warfield’s. Accordingly, in the following sections Van Til criticizes the
views of Greene and Hamilton using Kuyper’s view as his explicit criterion. 73
Therefore, it is evident that Van Til sought to appropriate Kuyper’s
epistemological antithesis while at the same time emphasizing rather than
diminishing the value of apologetics. He attempted to incorporate the main
encyclopedic concerns of both Warfield and Kuyper, notwithstanding his
rejection of Warfield’s epistemology.
4. The Task of Apologetics
Van Til’s view of the task of apologetics may be deduced from his three
presentations of the relationship between apologetics and systematics in
theological encyclopedia. The task of apologetics is twofold: (1) Apologetics first
will need to admit that the Old Princeton apologetics, with its conception of natural theology and
with its appeal to ‘neutral’ reason in apologetics, is untenable. Masselink will have to choose
between Kuyper and Warfield.” Also compare Van Til’s explicit siding with Kuyper in idem,
Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Theological
Seminary, 1974), 1:10: “Surely then we must follow Kuyper as over against Warfield at this point.”
71. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 351; cf. Henk Van den Belt, “Herman Bavinck and
Benjamin B. Warfield on Apologetics and the Autopistia of Scripture,” Calvin Theological Journal
45, no. 1 (2010): 32.
72. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 351-52.
73. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 360, 368.
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receives its statement of faith primarily from systematic theology just as a
messenger boy receives his commands from the general; (2) Apologetics then
defends and vindicates this faith against the non-Christian philosophy of life in a
similar manner that a night watchman patrols the edge of the fortress.
Additionally, apologetics assists the other theological disciplines in their own
vindicatory tasks just as a messenger boy relays messages between the command
post and the front lines.74
In Van Til’s view the twofold task of apologetics derives from the fact that
apologetics is fully dogmatisch rather than vordogmatisch. In this respect he clearly
sides with Kuyper over against Warfield. Therefore, according to Van Til
apologetics does not provide an independent foundation for theology; rather,
apologetics is based on the same foundation as theology—divine revelation.

C. Analysis
Van Til’s formulation of the relationship between dogmatics and apologetics
is a composition of elements from both the Amsterdam (i.e., Kuyper and
Bavinck) and the Princeton (i.e., Warfield) traditions. He not only expressly states
that he is attempting to build upon how this relationship has been formulated
within these two traditions, but also his formulations are obviously
simplifications of Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Warfield’s more detailed
formulations, notwithstanding the fact that Van Til alleges that he is purifying

74. I am summarizing Van Til’s own martial metaphors—the messenger boy, the scout, the
big guns and little guns, etc.—which he uses to describe the relationship between apologetics and
systematics. Cf. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 18-23; idem, An Introduction to Systematic Theology,
18-19.
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the scholasticism inherent in these earlier formulations. 75
Nevertheless, Van Til clearly sides with the Amsterdam tradition over
against the Princeton position insofar as he explicitly sides with Kuyper’s
formulation of the relationship between dogmatics and apologetics over against
Warfield’s. However, Van Til qualifies his preference for Kuyper’s view by
stating that apologetics should not be disdained as a useless tool but esteemed
and applied in every theological discipline. Whether or not Van Til’s
interpretation of Kuyper’s alleged undervaluation of apologetics is correct, his
caveat places his view in very close proximity to Bavinck’s formulation of the
relationship between dogmatics and apologetics in theological encyclopedia. For
example, consider the following similarities between Bavinck’s and Van Til’s
views:
In the first place, both note that the place of apologetics is disputed in
Reformed theology, and both opt for a via media between extreme formulations.
Bavinck explicitly rejects both the overvaluing and the undervaluing of
apologetics. Similarly, Van Til rejects the alleged extremes of Kuyper’s and
Warfield’s views while at the same time insisting upon Kuyper’s emphasis upon
the antithesis in over against Warfield’s non-antithetical approach.
In the second place, both share the neo-Calvinist conviction that not only is
Christianity an entire “worldview,” but also that the task of apologetics is to
vindicate the Christian worldview as the only worldview that can truly make
sense of the world.
In the third place, both hold that apologetics, as defender of the entire
75. See chapters 5–6 below on Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck.
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Christian worldview, must vindicate both the foundation and the content of
Christianity. Bavinck describes this apologetic necessity in terms of principia and
dogma, whereas Van Til describes it in terms of (1) philosophy and evidences or
(2) philosophy of fact and facts themselves.
In the fourth place, both use Kuyper’s Encyclopedia as a starting point for
their own presentations of theological encyclopedia. Bavinck explicitly uses
Kuyper’s fourfold schema, though he does not employ Kuyper’s second- or
third-level sub-categories. Although Van Til does not employ Kuyper’s fourfold
schema, he does explicitly side with Kuyper’s more general point in the
Encyclopedia regarding the priority of dogmatics over apologetics.
In the fifth place, both assert that dogmatics precedes apologetics. Bavinck
rejects Schleiermacher’s separation of dogmatics and apologetics. He insists
upon the metaphysical nature of theology and the objectivity of revelation as
theology’s foundation. Apologetics, therefore, neither grounds theology nor
builds upon a separate foundation than theology; rather, apologetics is itself
founded upon the same principia as theology. Hence apologetics serves the
“queen of sciences” as a handmaiden. Likewise, Van Til rejects Warfield’s alleged
separation of apologetics and theology. Instead, he insists that apologetics
receives its statement of faith from systematic theology, including its
foundational principles. Therefore, Van Til asserts that apologetics serves its chief
commander—systematic theology—as a “messenger boy.”
In addition to these several significant similarities between Bavinck’s and
Van Til’s formulations, the following nuanced discontinuities should be noted.

72
In the first place, Bavinck asserts that within theological encyclopedia
dogmatics is most closely related to ethics,76 whereas Van Til avers that
apologetics is most similar to systematic theology.77
In the second place, whereas Bavinck explicitly insists upon the scientific
nature of dogmatics and the role of theology as the queen of sciences, Van Til
does not comment on whether theology is a science. He does, however, share the
same view as Bavinck regarding the objective nature of theology. Furthermore,
based on Van Til’s assertions (1) that the Bible speaks of everything in the
universe either directly or indirectly 78 and (2) that Christianity provides the only
valid presuppositions upon which science can operate, 79 it is valid to infer that,
materially, Van Til held a similar view to Bavinck’s regarding the nature of
theology as the queen of the sciences. 80
In the third place, related to the nature of theology as the queen of sciences,
Bavinck explicates theological encyclopedia in the context of a university, 81
whereas Van Til defines theological encyclopedia in relation to a seminary
curriculum.82

D. Summary
In light of the several significant continuities and few nuanced
discontinuities between the two, it is clear that Van Til’s position is essentially the
76. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:56.
77. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 23.
78. See, e.g., Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 19-20.
79. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 57-58.
80. Cf. Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 282-83.
81. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47-54.
82. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 20.
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same as Bavinck’s with respect to the relationship between dogmatics and
apologetics in theological encyclopedia. “According to Bavinck,” writes Van Til,
“apologetics cannot precede systematics. A true apologetics, he says,
presupposes dogma.”83 Van Til’s summation of Bavinck’s formulation accurately
summarizes his own view as well. Hence on this point Van Til undoubtedly
follows Bavinck and the neo-Calvinist tradition.
Although at first glance the fact that Van Til takes the same position as
Bavinck with respect to the relation between dogmatics and apologetics may
appear to be banal, it is in fact highly significant for our thesis in two respects.
In the first place, the relationship between dogmatic and apologetics is a key
formal aspect not only of Van Til’s first presupposition, but also of the entire
structure of his thought; for, when he asserts that he presupposes Reformed
dogmatics for his Reformed apologetics, Van Til is intentionally placing his work
in a neo-Calvinist theological context. Specifically, albeit not exclusively, his
presupposition is an appropriation of the position articulated within Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek. For this reason alone the Copernican approach to Van Til’s thought is
manifestly misdirected since it goes directly against Van Til’s first presupposition
—a presupposition that itself presupposes a neo-Calvinist dogmatic context for
its own intelligibility—by insisting that Van Til is doing something revolutionary.
In the second place, Van Til’s presupposition implies that his formulation of
apologetics cannot exist without Reformed dogmatics; for, in his view the
function of apologetics is directly dependent upon the material—the dogma—of
dogmatics. This material aspect of Van Til’s presupposition thus raises a further
83. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 90.
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question that will be examined in the next chapter: If Van Til insists that he has
never formulated a Reformed dogmatics and that he instead presupposes
Reformed dogmatics, then from whom does Van Til receive his statement of “the
Reformed system of doctrine” upon which he then builds his Reformed
apologetics?

CHAPTER III.
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN CONCRETO (PART 2):
MATERIAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
In the previous chapter we analyzed a primarily formal question regarding
the relationship between apologetics and dogmatics in Van Til’s thought. We
found that Van Til’s presupposition with respect to this relationship is an
appropriation of the neo-Calvinist position clearly articulated in Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek, namely, that dogmatics precedes apologetics and provides the
dogmas that apologetics defends and vindicates. Hence, considered formally,
Van Til’s position on the relationship between dogmatic and apologetics is
identical to Herman Bavinck’s.
In the present chapter we now turn our attention to a concomitant material
question regarding Van Til’s presupposition: (1) Since in Van Til’s thought
dogmatics supplies apologetics its material content—its dogma—and (2) since
Van Til explicitly asserts that he does not formulate his own dogmatics but insists
instead that he presupposes “the Reformed system of doctrine,” then from whom
does he appropriate the dogmatic system that undergirds his apologetics?
It would be incorrect to assert that the answer to this question could be
limited to just one dogmatician; for, we have already noted in chapter 1 that Van
Til considers himself to be standing on the shoulders of a host of classic
Reformed theologians (e.g., Calvin, Kuyper, Bavinck, Warfield, Machen, Berkhof,
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Vos, et al.). Nevertheless, we also noted in chapter 1 that Van Til lauds Herman
Bavinck as the greatest of the modern Reformed dogmaticians. Given his
preeminent esteem for Bavinck, it is fitting to suspect that Van Til frequently
appropriates theological formulations from his most highly esteemed neoCalvinist predecessor. Thus we will ask specifically in this chapter: Does Van Til
appropriate his dogmatics from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek? And if so, then to what
extent does he do so?
We will focus our investigation upon Van Til’s most explicitly
dogmatological work.

A. Appropriations in An Introduction to Systematic Theology
In the preface to An Introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til makes a
modest statement regarding his reliance upon earlier theologians. “My
indebtedness,” he writes, ”to such former Reformed theologians as Louis
Berkhof and, back of him, Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper, is apparent
throughout.”1 Likewise, in the editorial introduction to this book, William Edgar
writes unassumingly, “The last chapters on the doctrine of God follow Bavinck’s
Reformed Dogmatics rather closely.”2
However, a comparison of Van Til’s book with Bavinck’s and with Berkhof’s
writings reveals that both Van Til’s and Edgar’s passing remarks are too modest;
1. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of
Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 13. I am
choosing to omit Kuyper in the following analysis since Van Til only references Kuyper and does
not appropriate his writings to the same extent as he does Berkhof’s and Bavinck’s. For Van Til’s
explicit references to Kuyper, see pp. 17-18, 50-55, 349n3. Additionally, pp. 379-85 are possibly an
implicit appropriation of Kuyper’s thought; cf. William Edgar’s editorial note at 379n36.
2. See William Edgar’s Introduction in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 5.
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for, not just in the latter chapters, but throughout the entire book Van Til
appropriates extensive amounts of material from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.3
Furthermore, Berkhof himself has pervasively appropriated extensive amounts
of material from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek; thus, in the places where Van Til might
appear to be indebted to Berkhof, Bavinck’s Dogmatiek is the true source, albeit
indirectly.4 Therefore, a less modest description of Van Til’s explicit and tacit
appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek is not only warranted, but also necessary
according to a close comparison of select passages throughout An Introduction to
Systematic Theology with Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
1. Explicit Appropriations
In An Introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til explicitly appropriates large
amounts of Bavinck’s dogmatic formulations, hence Bavinck’s name appears
nearly 100 times throughout the book. In chapters two and three, for example,
Van Til admits that his thoughts on Christian epistemology are a summary of
Berkhof’s and Bavinck’s more detailed presentations of theological principia.5 In
chapter five, Van Til cites approvingly Bavinck’s formulations regarding
theological principia, even translating two lengthy passages from Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek into English before then turning around and alleging that “Bavinck
has himself not been fully consistent in the application of the principle here laid
before us.”6 Similarly, Van Til begins chapter 6 by summarizing Bavinck’s
3. Van Til’s first explicit appropriation of Bavinck’s thought, e.g., is found in ch. 2 (An
Introduction to Systematic Theology, 29ff.), which Edgar himself notes (pp. 29n8, 70n32).
4. On Berkhof’s pervasive appropriation of Bavinck’s thought, see chapter 1, §§A–B, above.
5. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 29-30, 70.
6. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89-91; quote at p. 91. For an analysis of Van
Til’s criticisms herein and elsewhere, see Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,”
Westminster Theological Journal 70, no. 1 (2008): 111-127. Additionally, Van Til’s criticisms of
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historical analysis of conceptions of revelation.7 In chapter 15, moreover, Van Til’s
discussions of innate and acquired knowledge of God are prefaced with the
assertion that if we begin with Bavinck’s view then “we cannot go far wrong,” 8
and his entire treatment of both topics comprises a critical discussion of
Bavinck’s formulations. Additionally, in chapters 16 and 18 Van Til’s explications
of God’s incommunicable9 and communicable10 attributes are largely summaries
of Bavinck’s formulations.11 Even in Van Til’s discussion of the trinity in chapter
17,12 which discussion incorporates a wider compendium of theologians than his
other chapters,13 Van Til nevertheless gives Bavinck the predominant theological
voice.14
2. Tacit Appropriations
In addition to these extensive explicit appropriations, Van Til tacitly
appropriates vast amounts of Bavinck’s thought, especially in his chapters on the
doctrine of God.
Bavinck will be analyzed in chapters 5–6 below.
7. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 117-18, 118n4. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial
notes regarding Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought at 118nn4–6 and 119n10.
8. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 310, 314.
9. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 323-47. Van Til explicitly
references Bavinck’s Dogmatiek throughout this section at 323n8, 327nn15-16, 333n27, 334nn28-30,
and 335n31. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial notes regarding Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s
thought at 335nn32-33 and 341n53.
10. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 369-97. Van Til explicitly references
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek throughout this section at 370n3; 371nn4-5, nn8-9, n11; 372nn12-13; 373n17;
377n29; 378n32; and 388n50. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial notes at 369n1, 371n10, 374n19, 375n23,
377n28, 378n33, 379n36, 385n40, 386n43, 388n49, 390n54, 391n56, 392n57, 394n63, and 396n66.
11. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 2, God and
Creation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 110-37, 148-255.
12. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 348-68.
13. See Van Til’s references to Kuyper (349n3), Berkhof (350n5), A. A. Hodge (351n7), W. G. T.
Shedd (352n9), Calvin (352n10), B. B. Warfield (352n11, 360n34, 361nn35-38), Charles Hodge
(355n23, 357n27).
14. See Van Til’s references to Bavinck at 353n12, 354nn17-19, 355n21, 362n42, 363n43,
364n46. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial notes at 348n1, 349n4, 353n12, n14, 354n20.
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2.1. Extensive Appropriations in Chapter 10
In the first place, Van Til’s presentation of “the names used to indicate special
revelation” and “the modes of special revelation”—nearly 20 pages of material 15
—is a close synopsis of Bavinck’s longer treatment of the exact same topics
without citation.16 For example, contra William Edgar’s suggestion that Van Til
appropriates B. B. Warfield’s formulation of the biblical terminology for divine
revelation,17 Van Til’s tabulation of three Hebrew verbs and six Greek verbs that
represent the biblical names for special revelation—along with their
corresponding biblical references—is exactly the same as Bavinck’s non-tabular
presentation.18 Edgar fails to note that Warfield himself lists the first volume of
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek among the primary sources for his essay, “The Biblical Idea
of Revelation,”19 hence he misses the fact that both Warfield and Van Til
recapitulate Bavinck’s list of biblical terms for divine revelation.
Additionally, Van Til’s exposition of the meanings of the Greek verbs,
ἀποκαλυπτειν and φανερουν, is a near verbatim appropriation of Bavinck’s
presentation. To see this similarity, first consider Van Til’s explanation:
Etymologically, apokalyptō indicates the removal of a covering under
which something was hidden, while phaneroō signifies the making
known of something that was unknown. The former takes away the
hindrances that kept something from being manifest, while the latter
manifests the matter itself. The former is always used with the objective
aspect of the “special principle,” while the latter applies to both the
15. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 202-22.
16. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1,
Prolegomena (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 324-39; cf. Louis Berkhof, Introduction To
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1979), 133-36.
17. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 202n33.
18. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:324-25; with Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic
Theology, 202-03.
19. Cf. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield, 1:34.
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objetive and the subjective aspect. . . . It has, therefore, an objective and a
subjective aspect.
. . . They speak both of the new light that must be given the sinner
and also of the new power of sight that he needs. These two are
constantly taken in conjunction with one another.20
Then compare Bavinck’s more detailed original:
Etymologically, however, ἀποκαλυπτειν indicates the removal of a cover
by which a given object was hidden, and φανερουν denotes making
known a matter that was hidden or unknown before. In the former, then,
the stress is on the removal of a hindrance that prevented knowledge of
what was hidden, on the mysterious nature of what up until then had
not been understood, and on the divine deed that removed the cover and
caused the mystery to be understood. The latter word generally indicates
that something that was hidden and unknown before has now become
manifest and public. Ἀποκαλυψις takes away the cause by which
something was hidden; φανερωσις makes known the matter itself.
Associated with this distinction is that φανερωσις is always used of
objective revelation, while ἀποκαλυψις is used both of objective and
subjective revelation. Also, φανερωσις repeatedly denotes both general
and special revelation, but ἀποκαλυψις almost always refers to special
and only rarely to general revelation. And these two words are in turn
distinguished from γνωριζειν and δηλουν by the fact that the former two
verbs bring things to light and the latter two, in consequence of this, now
also make these things into the content of our thinking consciousness.21
This comparison clearly shows that Van Til has simply summarized Bavinck’s
more elaborate presentation of the names of special revelation, without citation.
A similar conclusion—though to a much lesser degree—may be drawn from
B. B. Warfield’s and Louis Berkhof’s presentations of the same topic; for both of
their presentations recapitulate aspects of Bavinck’s formulation. 22 However,
contra William Edgar’s various assertions that Van Til has appropriated his
material regarding special revelation from Warfield and Berkhof, 23 Warfield
20. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 203.
21. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:325.
22. Benjamin B. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1932), 1:32-34; Berkhof, Introduction To Systematic Theology, 133-36.
23. See Edgar’s editorial notes in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 202n33,
204n35, 204n37, 205n39, 212n59, 216n69.
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explicitly lists Bavinck’s Dogmatiek among the sources for his presentation.
Furthermore, neither Warfield nor Berkhof appropriate Bavinck’s formulation to
the near-verbatim extent as does Van Til. Without a doubt, therefore, Van Til has
appropriated straight from Bavinck’s formulation rather than from Warfield’s or
Berkhof’s more generalized recapitulations of Bavinck’s formulation.
Just as with his presentation of the names of revelation, so with his
explication of its modes: Van Til tacitly appropriates his formulation from
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. First consider Van Til’s summary of the three modes of
revelation:
In the main, we may speak of three modes of special revelation. In the
first place, there is theophany. In paradise God walked and talked with
man. Man needs God near to himself. Even in the state of sin man has
realized something of the need of a god who is near him. In fact, the
sinner has brought God too near to him; he has identified the creator
with the creature. In idolatry we have an expression on the part of the
sinner which points to his need of a god who is near.
In the second place, there is prophecy. In paradise man knew himself
to be a re-interpreter of God’s interpretation. When sin entered into the
world man sought to be his own ultimate interpreter. Hence in special
revelation God had to reappear to him as his ultimate interpreter and he
himself has constantly felt that there is something lacking in all his
interpretations of the universe. He has felt something of the need of an
ultimate interpreter. Hence, we have false prophecy or divination as a
caricature of true prophecy.
In the third place, if man had not sinned God would have
maintained him in paradise and wrought out for him a future glory.
When sin came in God no longer wrought for but against man. Hence if
man was to be saved God had to reveal to man by way of miracle the fact
that God was working in the universe for the salvation of the universe. 24
Then compare Bavinck’s formulation of the three modes, noting especially his
detailed references:
All the means of revelation can be reduced to three. In the first place,
religious belief desires a God who is near and not far away (Acts 17:27);
24. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 204.
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it was at all times convinced, therefore, that gods appeared in one form
or another, under one sign or another, and at one place or another. In
almost every religion there are holy places, holy times, and holy images.
The gods are not like human beings and do not live with them on equal
terms. The sphere of the sacred is separate from that of the profane. Still,
the gods do live near and among human beings at certain places, in
special objects, and impart their blessing at certain times. Idolatry, taken
in its broadest sense, is born of the human need for a God who is near. 25
Integral to all religions, secondly, is the belief that the gods in some way
make known their thoughts and will, either by human beings as their
mediums, such as fortune-tellers, oracles, dreamers, necromancers,
occult visionaries, etc., or, artificially and externally, by the stars, the
flight of birds, the entrails of sacrificial animals, the play of flames, the
lines of the hand, the chance opening of a book, etc., divination. “No
man ever became great without some kind of divine inspiration.” 26
Present in all religions, finally, is belief in the special intervention and
assistance of the gods in times of distress. Widespread everywhere is
magic: the art by which, using mysterious means, sacred words and
formulas, amulets, liquors, etc., people make the divine power
subservient to themselves and produce marvelous effects. 27 Theophany,
mantic, and magic are the ways by which all revelation comes to human
beings.28
Once again it is clear that Van Til has directly appropriated Bavinck’s
presentation, albeit in a much simplified form and without any references to
Bavinck’s work or to the sources that Bavinck cites. Also, as in the previous
example, Berkhof’s formulation of this point in terms of “theophanies,”
“communications,” and “miracles” is based on a general outline of Bavinck’s
25. On this point Bavinck references P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der
Religionsgeschichte, 2 vols. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1905), I, 54ff., 114ff. Cf. Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326n4.
26. Bavinck’s reference on this point is as follows: Cicero, De natura deorum, II, 66 [modern
English edition, The Nature of the Gods, trans. P. G. Walsh (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997)]; cf.
concerning divination and oracles Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, Histoire de la divination dans
l’antiquité, 4 vols. (Paris: E. Leroux, 1879–82); de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch, I, 93ff. Cf. Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326n5.
27. Bavinck’s reference on this point is as follows: Joseph Ennemoser, Geschichte der Magie, 2d
ed. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1844); in English translation as The History of Magic, trans. William
Howitt (London and New York: George Bell & Sons, 1893); Alfred Wiedeman, Magie und Zauberei
im alten Ägypten (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1905); A. G. L. Lehmann, Aberglaube und Zauberei von den
ältesten Zeiten an bis in die Gegenwart (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1898); de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch, I; Zöckler,
“Magier, Magie,” PRE3, XII, 55–70. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326n6.
28. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326.
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presentation; yet, he does not follow Bavinck’s Dogmatiek to the same nearlythought-for-thought extent as does Van Til.29
For yet another example of Van Til’s tacit appropriations from Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek, consider first Van Til’s explanation of the role that angels play as
means of revelation:
Besides revealing himself symbolically in inanimate things, God
appeared to his people by way of self-conscious creatures. This is
especially the case with angels. Angels have a definite function to
perform in the economy of redemption. According to Acts 7:53 and
Galatians 3:19, they “ordained the law.” Especially after the exile they
came forth as the media of revelation (Dan. 8:13; 9:11; 10:5; Zec. 1:7; 6:5).
In the New Testament they function at nearly every critical point in the
revelation of God to man. It is especially noteworthy that they perform
an important function when Christ is about to become flesh, when the
tabernacle of God is to dwell with men on earth in the person of Christ
himself. Finally they shall also play an important role in connection with
the second coming of Christ, that is, when the tabernacle of God shall
permanently dwell with men.30
Then compare Bavinck’s earlier, more detailed formulation of this point:
God does not appear only in impersonal signs, however, but also visits
his people in personal beings. Surrounded and served by many
thousands of angels (Isa. 6:2, 6), he sends them to the earth in human
form to make known his word and will. They already occur in Genesis
18; 19; 28:12; 32:1, 2; Deuteronomy 33:2; Job 33:23; 1 Kings 13:18; and,
according to Acts 7:53 and Galatians 3:19, serve at the time of the giving
of the law but function as mediators of revelation especially after the
exile (Dan. 8:13; 9:21; 10:5; Zech. 1:7–6:5). They appear even more
frequently in the NT. They are present at the birth of Jesus (Matt. 1:20;
2:13, 19; Luke 1:11; 2:9), repeatedly in his life (John 1:51; Matt. 4:6), at the
time of his suffering (Matt. 26:53; Luke 22:43), and at the resurrection and
ascension (Matt. 28:2, 5; Luke 24:23; John 20:12; Acts 1:10). In the history
of the apostles, they repeatedly make appearances (Acts 5:19; 8:26; 10:3;
11:13; 12:7; 23:9; 27:23; Rev. 22:6, 16). Finally, at his return Christ will be
accompanied by the angels (Matt. 16:27; 25:31; Mark 8:38; Luke 9:26; 1
Thess. 3:13; etc.).31
29. Cf. Berkhof, Introduction To Systematic Theology, 134-36.
30. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 211.
31. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:328-29.
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Once again Van Til’s presentation of this point is simply a scaled down versions
of Bavinck’s formulation, without citation. He lists the same main points, and he
even employs the same dicta probantia as does Bavinck. The appropriation is thus
undeniable.
The same is true for some of Van Til’s comments with respect to the special
nature of the Angel of the Lord. First, consider this remark:
Among these angels there is one who differs from them all. It is the
“angel of the Lord.” He is not a creature. He is identified with God. This
angel appeared unto Hagar: “And she called the name of the Lord that
spake unto her, Thou God seest me: for she said, Have I also here looked
after him that seeth me” (Gen. 16:13)? Here Hagar speaks of the angel of
the Lord and calls him God. Again when the angel of the Lord spake to
Jacob he said, “I am the God of Bethel, where thou anointedst the pillar”
(Gen. 31:13).32
Then, compare Bavinck’s earlier formulation:
Among all these envoys of God the Messenger of the Lord ()מלאך יהוה
occupies a special place. He appears to Hagar (Gen. 16:6–13; 21:17–20); to
Abraham (Gen. 18; 19; 22; 24:7; 40); to Jacob (Gen. 28:13–17; 31:11–13;
32:24–30; cf. Hos. 12:4; Gen. 48:15, 16); to, and at the time of, Moses
(Exod. 3:2f.; 13:21; 14:19; 23:20–23; 32:34; 33:2f.; cf. Num. 20:16; Isa. 63:8, 9;
and further also Josh. 5:13, 14; Judg. 6:11–24; 13:2–23). This Malak YHWH
is not an independent symbol nor a created angel but a true personal
revelation and appearance of God, distinct from him (Exod. 23:20–23;
33:14f.; Isa. 63:8, 9) and still one with him in name (Gen. 16:13; 31:13;
32:28, 30; 48:15, 16; Exod. 3:2f.; 23:20–23; Judg. 13:3), in power (Gen.
16:10, 11; 21:18; 18:14, 18; Exod. 14:19; Judg. 6:21), in redemption and
blessing (Gen. 48:16; Exod. 3:8; 23:20; Isa. 63:8, 9), in adoration and honor
(Gen. 18:3; 22:12; Exod. 23:21). . . .33
Again, Van Til’s appropriation of this point is nearly self-evident. Moreover, his
further explication of this point is an additional appropriation of Bavinck’s work.
First, consider Van Til’s explication:
The Angel of Jehovah can, therefore, be none other than the second
32. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 211.
33. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:329.
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person of the Trinity who will soon come into the flesh. Soon he in whom
the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily (Col. 1:19; 2:9) will dwell with
men on earth.
Of course the incarnation of Christ is the climax as fas as the history
of redemption in the form of theophany is concerned. 34
Then compare Bavinck’s longer remark about the climax of biblical theophanies:
But theophany is incomplete. . . . The angel of the covenant again
appears in prophecy (Zech. 1:8–12:3) and will come to his temple (Mal.
3:1). Theophany reaches its climax, however, in Christ who is the
ἀγγελος, δοξα, εἰκων, λογος, υἱος του θεου, in whom God is fully
revealed and fully given (Matt. 11:27; John 1:14; 14:9; Col. 1:15; 2:19; etc.).
By him and by the Spirit whom he sends forth, the dwelling of God in
and among his people even now becomes a true spiritual reality (John
14:23; Rom. 8:9, 11; 2 Cor. 6:16). The believing community is [now] the
house of God, the temple of the Holy Spirit (Matt. 18:20; 1 Cor. 3:16; 6:19;
Eph. 2:21). . . .35
Once again Van Til’s thought is a condensation, without citation, of Bavinck’s
longer and more nuanced presentation in his Dogmatiek.
Furthermore, Van Til’s explanation of the various modes of prophecy is a
near thought-for-thought synopsis of Bavinck’s longer, more detailed
formulations. First, consider Van Til’s following summary statement:
In the Old Testament times there were several forms in which the
revelation came. God sometimes let his will be known through the lot.
Then again God spoke through the Urim and Thummim. Many times he
spoke through dreams. God even spoke through dreams to some that did
not belong to his people. . . .
A somewhat higher medium of revelation than those just mentioned
was the vision. . . .36
Then, compare the following summary statement by Bavinck:
In communicating his thoughts, however, God frequently adopted those
lower forms by which also among pagans the gods were deemed to
make known their will. . . . Especially to be mentioned in this connection
are the lot, the Urim and Thummim, the dream, and the vision.
34. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 212.
35. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:329.
36. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215.
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Van Til follows Bavinck’s order exactly: lot, Urim and Thummim, dreams, and
visions. Yet Van Til not only follows Bavinck’s order, but also appropriates
Bavinck’s explanations of these types of prophetic revelations. For example, with
respect to prophetic dreams, first consider Van Til’s explication:
God even spoke through dreams to some that did not belong to his
people. In Genesis 20 we have the story of Abimelech who received a
revelation from God through a dream. The baker and the butler of
Pharaoh received true revelations from God through dreams (Gen. 40).
When Gideon came into the camp of the Midianites he found that one
man told another a dream about the destruction that was to come (Judg.
7:3).37
Then compare Bavinck’s earlier explication of dreams:
Also dreams occur in Scripture as means of revelation. . . . [T]hey occur
among Israelites but also repeatedly among non-Israelites (Gen. 20; 31;
40; 41; Judg. 7; Dan. 2 and 4), and convey either a word, a
communication from God (Gen. 20:3; 31:9, 24; Matt. 1:20; 2:12, 19, 22;
27:19), or a representation of the imagination, which then often requires
explanation (Gen. 28; 37:5; 40:5; 41:15; Judg. 7:13; Dan. 2 and 4).38
Van Til has clearly taken Bavinck’s point regarding dreams occurring “repeatedly
among non-Israelites” and has expanded briefly upon two of Bavinck’s dicta
probantia (i.e., Genesis 40 and Judges 7).
Likewise, Van Til’s passing summary of prophetic visions not only follows
Bavinck’s order of topics, but also his content. First, consider Van Til’s brief
remark:
Many times these seers were in a high state of emotional excitement
when they perceived their revelations. It became customary to think of a
prophet as being in a high state of emotion, as the story with respect to
Saul clearly indicates (1 Sam. 10:5ff).39
Then compare Bavinck’s lengthier explication of prophetic ecstasy:
37. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215.
38. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:332.
39. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215.
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Visions were often accompanied by a kind of ecstatic experience. Music,
dance, and ecstasy go together; prophecy and poetry are related (1 Sam.
10:5f.; 19:20–24; 2 Kings 3:15; 1 Chron. 25:1; 2 Chron. 29:30). When the
hand of the Lord comes upon the prophets (Isa. 8:11; Ezek. 3:14; 11:5) or
the Spirit comes upon them, they frequently enter a state of rapture
(Num. 24:3; p 333 2 Kings 9:11; Jer. 29:26) and fall to the earth (Num. 24:3,
15, 16; 1 Sam. 19:24; Ezek. 1:28; 3:23; 43:3; Dan. 10:8–10; Acts 9:4; Rev.
1:17; 11:16; 22:8). In that state they are given to see and hear the thoughts
of God in symbolic form. In images and visions his counsel is revealed to
them (Jer. 1:13f.; 24:1f.; Amos 7–9; Zech. 1–6; Rev.; etc.), especially with
regard to the future (Num. 23f.; 1 Kings 22:17; 2 Kings 5:26; 8:11f.; Jer.
4:23f.; 14:18; Ezek. 8; Amos 7; etc.). In that state they also hear a variety of
voices and sounds (1 Kings 18:41; 2 Kings 6:32; Isa. 6:3, 8; Jer. 21:10; 49:14;
Ezek. 1:24, 28; 2:2; 3:12; Rev. 7:4; 9:16; 14:2; 19:1; 21:3; 22:8; etc.) They are
even taken up in the spirit and translocated (Ezek. 3:12f.; 8:3; 43:1; Dan.
8:2; Matt. 4:5, 8; Acts 9:10, 11; 22:17; 23:11; 27:23; 2 Cor. 12:2; Rev. 1:9; 12;
14:1; 21:10). After the reception of a vision, Daniel was sick for some days
(7:28; 8:27).40
Van Til, again, has truncated Bavinck’s more detailed explication and has simply
expanded briefly upon Bavinck’s first dicta probantia (i.e., 1 Samuel 10:5).
Van Til continues to follow Bavinck’s presentation with respect to the modes
of prophetic revelation when he comments on the final mode—illumination. To
see the similarity once again, first consider Van Til’s remark:
A still higher mode of prophetic revelation was that of direct spiritual
communication by the Spirit to the prophets. This communication must
be clearly distinguished from the illumination that believers are given in
order that they may be able to understand the revelation that comes to
them. Believers today are not given a new revelation; they do not need a
new revelation.41
Then, compare Bavinck’s longer, more detailed, and more nuanced summary of
the Spirit’s role in illumination that begins as follows: “The last form of
revelation to be mentioned is interior illumination. . . . The revelation then occurs
inwardly by the Spirit as the Spirit of revelation. . . .” 42
40. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:332-33.
41. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215-16.
42. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:334-35.
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Contra Edgar, who assumes that Van Til appropriates Warfield’s position
regarding illumination as a mode of prophetic revelation, 43 Van Til clearly follows
Bavinck’s formulation of this point; for, Van Til does not use Warfield’s
terminology for prophetic revelation (i.e., “internal suggestion” 44), but Bavinck’s
(i.e., “illumination”). It is possible, however, that Van Til’s cessationist remark
derives from Warfield’s presentation. 45 Nevertheless, the fact that Van Til follows
Bavinck primarily on this specific point (and pervasively throughout the entirety
of chapter 10) is further evinced by Van Til’s final comment regarding prophetic
revelation, namely, that Christ is its unique climax; for, on this point he clearly
follows Bavinck’s order and appropriates Bavinck’s material, the similarity
between Warfield’s and Bavinck’s formulations notwithstanding. 46 First, consider
Van Til’s remark:
All these modes of prophecy were the beginnings of the work of the
Great Prophet upon whom the Spirit would dwell without measure, who
43. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 216n69.
44. Warfield classifies the modes of revelation into a threefold schema within which
prophetic revelation is classified under the second term: (1) “external manifestation,” (2) “internal
suggestion,” and (3) “concursive operation.” Cf. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge
Warfield, 1:15, 28.
45. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield, 1:28: “Whatever truth men have been
made partakers of by the Spirit of truth is His (for all things whatsoever the Father hath are His)
and is taken by the Spirit of truth and declared to men that He may be glorified. Nevertheless,
though all revelation is thus summed up in Him, we should not fail to note very carefully that it
would also be all sealed up in Him—so little is revelation conveyed by fact alone, without the
word—had it not been thus taken by the Spirit of truth and declared unto men. The entirety of
the New Testament is but the explanatory word accompanying and giving its effect to the fact of
Christ. And when this fact was in all its meaning made the possession of men, revelation was
completed and in that sense ceased. Jesus Christ is no less the end of revelation than He is the end
of the law.” But note also that Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:339, citing Augustine, takes a
cessationist position with respect to the continuation of miracle-revelation; thus, it is inconclusive
whether Van Til’s remark regarding cessationism is an appropriation from Warfield, Bavinck, or
both.
46. Regarding Warfield’s assertion that Christ is the sui generis climax of prophetic revelation,
a comparison of Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield, 1:28, with Bavinck, Reformed
Dogmatics, 1:335, leads this writer to conclude that Warfield’s formulation is a nuanced
recapitulation of Bavinck’s earlier formulation in the same way that, as was noted above,
Warfield’s list of biblical terms for special revelation is a recapitulation of Bavinck’s list.
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was himself the Word become flesh and who declared the Father unto
us.47
Then, compare Bavinck’s formulation:
In the NT the supreme, the unique and true prophet makes his
appearance. As Logos he is the full and complete revelation of God (John
1:1; 18; 14:9; 17:6; Col. 2:9). He does not receive a revelation from above
or from outside of himself but is himself the source of prophecy. The
Holy Spirit does not come upon him and does not fall upon him but
indwells him without measure (John 3:34). . . .48
The similarities are self-evident.
For all of these reasons it is beyond doubt that, regarding the modes of
prophetic revelation, Van Til has tacitly appropriated not only Bavinck’s exact
order of topics but also several of his formulations, even to a thought-for-thought
degree at points.
Additionally, Van Til’s explication of the interrelationship between word and
deed with respect to miracles likely derives from Bavinck’s formulation. The
similarity can be seen by first considering Van Til’s remarks about (1) the
necessity of an actual change in sinful man beyond a mere addition of
information and (2) the intimate connection between God’s redemptive words
and deeds:
When man fell into sin, he not merely needed new information, but he
needed to be changed. Things had to be done for him in the objective
sphere, and things had to be done for him in the subjective sphere. . . . 49
Again and again the Lord shows his people that it is his miraculous
saving power that is alone sufficient to save his people from destruction.
All of this at the same time that it displays the glory of the saving
power of God also corroborates the truth of the salvation that he has
sworn he would give to his people. When God speaks we must accept
47. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 216.
48. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:335.
49. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 219.
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the truth at his word. When God acts, we must see the fact that he acts in
these acts themselves. Yet the words corroborate the deeds and the deeds
corroborate the words. Together they give forth such an eloquent
testimony of the grace, the power and the truth of God, that men should
marvel.50
Then, compare Bavinck’s formulation:
Just as human beings, aside from their appearance and words, also make
themselves known by their deeds, so God not only reveals himself by his
words but also by his works. Word and deed are intimately connected.
God’s Word is an act (Ps. 33:9), and his activity is speech (Ps. 19:2; 29:3;
Isa. 28:26). Word and deed accompany each other, both in creation and
re-creation. Usually the word comes first, as a promise and a threat, but
in principle it already contains within itself a deed. God’s Word does not
return to him empty, but it accomplishes what he wants (Isa. 55:10, 11).
The word demands the deed; miracle accomplishes prophecy; not only
consciousness but being itself must be renewed. 51
In this case it is highly likely that Van Til has simply expanded upon Bavinck’s
formulations regarding (1) the need for “being itself” to be renewed by God’s
miraculous activity and (2) the intimate connection between God’s redemptive
words and deeds.
2.2. Extensive Appropriations in Chapter 16
In the second place, Van Til’s discussion of the names of God in chapter 16 52
is a virtual reproduction of Bavinck’s presentation of this topic, again without
citation.53 Also, it should be noted that, as we saw in chapter 10, Berkhof also
appropriates Bavinck’s general outline of this topic. 54 Unlike Van Til, however,
Berkhof provides an explicit reference to Bavinck in order to indicate that he is
50. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 221.
51. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:336.
52. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 319-22; also cf. William Edgar’s editorial
notes regarding Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought at 319nn1-2.
53. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:137-47; cf. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Edinburgh;
Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 48-51.
54. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 47-51.
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loosely following Bavinck’s threefold classification of God’s names.55
The fact that Van Til appropriates Bavinck’s formulation of God’s names can
be demonstrated in several ways. First, Van Til’s opening assertions regarding (1)
God’s prerogative to name himself, (2) God’s essence being revealed in his
names, and (3) the analogical character of man’s knowledge of God’s names all
derive from Bavinck’s formulations. To see the appropriations, first consider Van
Til’s summary remark:
These names must, in the nature of the case, be given to us by God
himself. It is not man’s idea of God with which we deal, but it is God’s
idea of himself that stands before us in his names.
The names that God gives us of himself are not mere marks of
denotation; there is none other beside himself from whom he need be
distinguished. The names of God reveal to us something of the nature or
essence of God. They cannot reveal this nature fully, but they
nevertheless are expressive of something of that nature. If they were not,
they would have no meaning at all.56
Then, compare the following more detailed remarks by Bavinck. With regard to
God’s prerogative to name himself, Bavinck writes:
There is an intimate link between God and his name. According to
Scripture, this link too is not accidental or arbitrary but forged by God
himself. We do not name God; he names himself. In the foreground here
is the name as a revelation on the part of God, in an active and objective
sense, as revealed name. In this case God’s name is identical with the
attributes or perfections that he exhibits in and to the world: his glory
(Ps. 8:1; 72:19), honor (Lev. 18:21; Ps. 86:10–11; 102:16), his redeeming
power (Exod. 15:3; Isa. 47:4); his service (Isa. 56:6; Jer. 23:27); his holiness
(1 Chron. 16:10; Ps. 105:3). The name is God himself as he reveals himself
in one relationship or another (Lev. 24:11, 16; Deut. 28:58). 57

55. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 48: “Dr. Bavinck bases his division of the names of God on
that broad conception of them, and distinguishes between nomina propria (proper names),
nomina essentialia (essential names, or attributes) and nomina personalia (personal names, as
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). In the present chapter we limit ourselves to the discussion of the
first class.”
56. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 319.
57. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:98.
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With regard to God’s essence being revealed in his names, Bavinck further
writes:
The name of God in Scripture does not describe God as he exists within
himself but God in his revelation and multiple relations to his creatures.
This name, however, is not arbitrary: God reveals himself in the way he
does because he is who he is. Summed up in his name, therefore, is his
honor, his fame, his excellencies, his entire revelation, his very being.
Upon those to whom it is revealed, therefore, the name confers special
privileges and imposes unique obligations. The name of God implies
that, having revealed himself in it, God expects to be called by it. The
“divulged” name becomes the name “called upon.” In Scripture, “to be”
and “to be called” are two sides of the same thing. God is what he calls
himself and calls himself what he is. What God reveals of himself is
expressed and conveyed in specific names. To his creatures he grants the
privilege of naming and addressing him on the basis of, and in keeping
with, his revelation. The one name of God, which is inclusive of his entire
revelation both in nature and in grace, is divisible for us in a great many
names. Only in that way do we obtain a full view of the riches of his
revelation and the profound meaning of his name. We call him and
indeed may call him by all that has become known of his being in
creation and re-creation. But all those names, as designations of God,
impose on us the obligation to consecrate and glorify them. It is the one
name, the full revelation and to that extent the very being of God
himself, with which we are dealing in all those names. By his name God
puts himself in a certain relation to us, and the relation we assume to him
must be congruent with it.58
With regard to the analogical character of man’s knowledge of God’s names,
Bavinck writes:
There is no fully adequate knowledge of God. We cannot name him as he
is within himself. All his names are derived from the world of creatures.
But this does not make them untrue, a product of human imagination.
Just as there is resemblance between various parts of the world, making
comparison between them a possibility, so also there is kinship between
God and his creatures, a kinship that warrants the use of creaturely
language in speaking of him. Furthermore, though temporally the
natural is prior to the spiritual, logically and ideally the spiritual
precedes the natural. The natural could never guide us to the spiritual if
it had not itself proceeded from the spiritual. . . . It is God himself who
made all things, including the material world, subservient to the
manifestation of his perfections. . . . Hence, while it is true that we call
58. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:99.

93
God by names derived from the world of creatures, these names were
first increated in those creatures by God himself. It is true: we first apply
to creatures the names by which we speak of God because we know
them before we know God. But materially they first apply to God and
then to creatures. All perfections are first in God, then in creatures. He
possesses them because they belong to his essence; we possess them only
by participation. . . .59
Regarding this same point Bavinck further asserts:
One must, however, keep in mind that Scripture knows nothing of a
divine essence that can be discovered and known by the powers of the
human intellect apart from revelation. It posits no split, much less a
contrast, between God’s ontological existence and his “economic” selfrevelation. As God reveals himself, so is he; in his names he himself
becomes knowable to us. Though he is indeed infinitely superior to all
his creatures—so that we can possess only an analogical knowledge of
him not an exhaustive (adequated) knowledge—yet his several
attributes, attributes that come through in his revelation, bring to our
mind, each time from a special perspective, the fullness of his being. 60
Van Til’s appropriations of these three points from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek are
undeniable. Just like his tacit appropriations of Bavinck’s thought in chapter 10,
so also at the opening of chapter 16 Van Til simply appropriates and truncates
Bavinck’s more detailed formulations without citation.
Second, Van Til’s use of the technical term, nomina propria,61 to classify the
names of God derives from Bavinck’s threefold classification.62

59. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:106-07; also cf. the overall argument throughout pp. 104110.
60. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:111.
61. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 320.
62. Cf. Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 7th ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1998), 2:81; with
idem, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:111. NB: The Latin technical term did not get carried over as a
technical term in the English translation; rather, as in this case, it was translated as “proper
names.” We note this here to show that the term does not originate with Berkhof. In this regard,
see also Abraham Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek van Dr. A. Kuyper: College-Dictaat van een der
studenten; niet in den handel, 2nd ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1910), 1:162. However, despite the fact that
Berkhof is not the source of the term, it should be noted that in the specific place where Bavinck
asserts his threefold classification of God’s names, he does not use the Latin terms that Berkhof
employs in his summary of Bavinck’s threefold classification cited above; Cf. Bavinck, Reformed
Dogmatics, 2:135; with Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 48.
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Third, not only Van Til’s selection of names, but also the order in which he
treats the names (i.e., El, Adonai, Shaddai, Jehovah, theos, Kyros, Father) and the
philological comments he makes regarding the derivation of the names are direct
appropriations and truncations of Bavinck’s more detailed formulations—all
without citation. To display just one brief example among the many longer ones
that could be demonstrated throughout this section, first, consider Van Til’s
description of the name Adonai:
Adonai indicates God as the Ruler to whom everything is subject and
whom man is therefore bound to obey. In earlier times it was the usual
name by which God was addressed. 63
Then, compare Bavinck’s longer description of the same name:
ʾĒdōnāy ()אֵדֹנָי, used alternately with hā-ʾādôn ()האדון, which is further
intensified in “Lord of lords” ( )אָדוֹן אֲדֹנִיםor “Lord of all the earth” (אָדוֹן
הָאָרֶץ-)כָָל, refers to God as the Ruler to whom all things are subject and
to whom humans are related as servants (Gen. 18:27). In an earlier period
the name Baʿal ( )בַעַלwas used of God with the same meaning (Hos. 2:16
[18MT]), but later this use was discontinued because of its idolatrous
connotations.64 Now these names are not proper names in the restricted
sense. They are used as well of idols, people (Gen. 33:10; Exod. 7:1; 4:16),
and authorities (Exod. 12:12; 21:5–6; 22:7; Lev. 19:32; Num. 33:4; Judg. 5:8;
1 Sam. 2:25; Ps. 58:1 [2 MT]; 82:1) but are nevertheless the usual names by
which God is called and addressed. They are, moreover, common Semitic
names referring to God in his transcendence over all creatures. The
Semites loved to call God “Lord” or “king.” They felt deeply dependent
on him, and as his servants they humbly bowed before him. They did not
use these names to give expression to philosophical theories about God’s
essence but to give prominence to his relation to his creatures, especially
to human beings.65
Once again Van Til has clearly appropriated Bavinck’s formulation without
63. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 321.
64. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:139n144, inserts the following reference: “J. Robertson,
Israel’s oude godsdienst (Culemborg: Blom en Olivierse, 1896), 200ff.; ed. note: Eng. edition: The
Early Religion of Israel, 2d ed. (New York: Westminster Press [Thomas Wittaker], 1903).”
65. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:139n145, inserts the following reference: “W. Robertson
Smith, Die Religion der Semiten (Freiburg: Mohr, 1899), 48.”
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citation of Bavinck’s work or the several references that Bavinck himself cites.
The same is true for Van Til’s entire treatment of God’s names.
Due to Van Til’s high degree of appropriation of Bavinck’s thought
throughout this section, Edgar’s generalized editorial notes regarding (1) Van
Til’s following the traditional order of Reformed theology and (2) Van Til’s
making a similar point as Bavinck regarding anthropomorphism66 are insufficient
at best and misleading at worst; for, there is nothing general to note about these
points. Rather, Van Til has tacitly appropriated all of his formulations of God’s
names directly from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
Ironically, when Van Til turns next to explicate the attributes of God, he
includes an explicit reference to Bavinck’s Dogmatiek!67 The oddity of this
footnote, and the several other explicit references to Bavinck’s Dogmatiek
throughout the remainder of the chapter, 68 is stark considering how much
material Van Til has appropriated from Bavinck already in the first sections of the
chapter without citation. What is more, Van Til’s explicit references to Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek drop off in the last section of the chapter, though his appropriation of
Bavinck’s thought does not. Thus the editor inserts a note in the last section to let
the readers know that “Van Til continues to follow the order in Bavinck. . . .” 69
The pattern of appropriation in this chapter therefore may be summarized as
follows: (1) extensive tacit appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek in the
66. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 319nn1-2, respectively.
67. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 323n8.
68. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 327nn15-16, 333n27, 334nn28-30, 335n31.
69. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 341n53. Additionally, in the same footnote
Edgar incorrectly asserts that Bavinck labels God’s oneness “as the last of his communicable
attributes.” Rather, Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:170, writes: “The last of the incommunicable
attributes is Gods’ oneness, differentiated into the unity of singularity and the unity of
simplicity” (emphasis added).
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beginning section, (2) a extensive explicit appropriations in the middle section,
and (3) more extensive tacit appropriations in the last section.
Whatever the reasons may be for Van Til’s odd omission of references in the
beginning and latter sections, it is nevertheless abundantly evident that the bulk
of Van Til’s presentation of God’s names and incommunicable attributes is an
appropriation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
3. Appropriations of Various Motifs
Beyond explicit citations and tacit appropriations, several of the motifs that
Van Til employs throughout An Introduction to Systematic Theology derive from
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. In the first place, Van Til’s programmatic statement
regarding humanity’s epistemological duty to “think God’s thoughts after him” 70
is rooted in Bavinck’s assertion that
. . . a theologian’s sole responsibility is to think God’s thoughts after him
and to reproduce the unity that is objectively present in the thoughts of
God and has been recorded for the eye of faith in Scripture. 71
In the second place, Van Til’s programmatic insistence that the ontological trinity
is the necessary presupposition of all predication 72 is adumbrated—according to
70. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 292, 364, 376, 387; also cf. idem, A Christian
Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 16; idem, Christian
Apologetics, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 77, 131, 140, 172; idem, The Defense of the Faith,
4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 124, 130, 151, 329.
71. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:44; also cf. p. 588. James Eglinton, “Bavinckʼs Organic
Motif: Questions Seeking Answers,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 51-52, notes that
Bavinck’s dictum reflects the wider organic motif underlying his thought, a motif which posits
Christ as the center of all history. The fact that Van Til praises Bavinck’s dictum but criticizes
Bavinck for being inconsistent with it provides further warrant for viewing Van Til’s formulations
as a recapitulation of Bavinck’s. E.g., see Cornelius Van Til, “Review of Paedagogische Beginselen,
Derde Druk (Kampen:J. H. Kok, 1928) and De Nieuwe Opvoeding, Tweede Druk, (Kampen: J. H.
Kok, 1928), by Herman Bavinck” Princeton Theological Review 27 (1929): 135-36.
72. E.g, Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 59, writes, “Human knowledge
ultimately rests upon the internal coherence within the Godhead; our knowledge rests upon the
ontological Trinity as its presupposition.” Compare pp. 13, 80-81, 124, etc.
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Van Til’s own statements elsewhere—in (1) Bavinck’s critique of “the ethical
theologians (Tethischen)” (which critique Van Til then levels against the followers
of Berkouwer, whom he labels “the Cahiers men”)73 and in (2) Bavinck’s survey of
early trinitarian theology.74
In the third place, given his praise of “the analogical system of Bavinck” in
opposition to Aquinas,75 it is highly likely that Van Til’s incessant insistence that
humans can only know God analogically76 is a recapitulation of Bavinck’s
formulations regarding analogical knowledge of God.77 Horton argues that Van
Til inherited the Creator-creature distinction and its correlate—analogical
reasoning—“from the Amsterdam school.”78 However, he does not note that it is
from Bavinck specifically that Van Til appropriates the phrase “thinking God’s
thoughts after him” nor that it is from Bavinck and Berkhof specifically that Van
Til appropriates the language of theological principia.
In the fourth place, Van Til’s seemingly odd statements regarding the
73. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 94.
74. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus, (Philadelphia,
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974), 1:10: “No one has better than he [i.e. Bavinck] set
forth the struggle in the early church to attain a truly biblical view of the immanent or ontological
trinity as the presupposition of the intelligibility of human experience.”
75. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 37-40; quote at p. 40.
76. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 31-44, 63, 97, 116, 177-85, 274, 279, 292, 294,
298, 328, 373-75, 381, 384, 393.
77. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:47-52, 70, 107-111, 121, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137, 186; cf.
David Waring Diehl, “Divine Omniscience in the Thought of Charles Hartshorne and Cornelius
Van Til: A Systemic Comparative Study” (Ph.D. diss., Yorktown Heights, N. Y. The Hartford
Seminary Foundation, 1978), 50. Additionally, Michael S. Horton, “Consistently Reformed: The
Inheritance and Legacy of Van Tilʼs Apologetic,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed
Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 135, argues
that Van Til inherited the Creator-creature distinction and its correlate, analogical reasoning,
“from the Amsterdam school”; however, he does not note that it is from Bavinck specifically that
Van Til appropriates the phrase “thinking God’s thoughts after him” nor that it is from Bavinck
and Berkhof specifically that Van Til appropriates the language of theological principia.
78. Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 135.

98
epistemological necessity of circular reasoning 79 are recapitulations of Bavinck’s
formulations regarding the circularity inherent in theology’s principia,80 especially
as these formulations are summarized by Berkhof. Contra Frame and Bahnsen,
for example, both of whom attempt to analyze Van Til’s assertions regarding
circularity without comparing Berkhof’s and Bavinck’s formulations, 81 Van Til
virtually repeats Berkhof’s formulation.82
In the fifth place, Van Til’s robust treatment of general revelation, 83 especially
his insistence upon the clarity of general revelation, derives—according to his
own admission—from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. For instance, first consider the
following summary statement by Van Til regarding the clarity of general and
special revelation:
. . . it is the objective clarity, or perspicuity of God’s revelation, of
whatever kind that revelation may be, natural or supernatural, general
or special, that must be stressed at all costs. 84
Then, compare Van Til’s remark elsewhere regarding Calvin and Bavinck as the
sources of his formulations regarding the clarity of general and special
revelation:
Calvin and Bavinck, following Paul, have, by teaching this [i.e., the
clarity of both general and special revelation], led us away from
Scholasticism toward a unified interpretation of all the facts of human
experience in terms of the primacy of the grace of God in Christ. 85
79. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 242-44; idem, Christian Apologetics, 130;
idem, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 33; idem, The Defense of the Faith, 123, 314-26.
80. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:253, 455-59, 581-600.
81. John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,
1995), 301-09; Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,
1998), 143n144, 170n42, 201-02, 214n116, 218n128, 284-85, 482-83, 518n122.
82. Berkhof, Introduction To Systematic Theology, 125-26.
83. Cf. chs. 6-9 in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology.
84. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 188-89
85. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:49.
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Van Til thus explicitly links his formulations regarding the clarity of revelation to
the Apostle Paul via Bavinck and Calvin.

B. Summary
The evidence adduced above is not intended to be a comprehensive
tabulation, but a representative sampling. More places throughout An
Introduction to Systematic Theology could be adduced as further evidence to
demonstrate that Van Til appropriates—both explicitly and tacitly—vast amounts
of theological formulations from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. However, after a certain
point it becomes pedantic to keep on listing example after example.
Nevertheless, when viewed as a cumulative case, these various lines of evidence
clearly demonstrate that Van Til appropriates Bavinck’s thought not occasionally
but pervasively. Based upon the high frequency and near thought-for-thought
extent of Van Til’s appropriations, we can even go so far as to say that Van Til’s
first presupposition should be reformulated as follows:
I have never been called upon to work out any form of systematic
theology. My business is to teach Apologetics. I therefore presuppose the
Reformed system of doctrine, especially as it has been formulated in Herman
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek.86
This reformulation more accurately describes Van Til’s reliance upon Bavinck’s
theological formulations than either Van Til’s or Edgar’s understated remarks in
the preface and editorial introduction to the book, respectively. Further, this
reformulation is more accurate than the Copernican portrayals of Van Til’s
thought; for, it is manifestly not the case that Van Til has produced original

86. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 27; emended and emphasis added.
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dogmatic formulations throughout An Introduction to Systematic Theology. Rather,
he has clearly and pervasively appropriated Herman Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, and
he has done so many times without citation.
Furthermore, this reformulation does not imply that Van Til appropriates
Bavinck’s thought exclusively. For, as we noted above, he clearly appropriates
from others too, such as, Warfield and Berkhof. Additionally, he sometimes uses
Bavinck’s formulation as a launching point for his own nuanced refinements of a
point. For example, Van Til does not follow Bavinck’s order with respect to
explicating the doctrine of the trinity after the divine essence and attributes. 87
However, despite these differences the evidence clearly shows that Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek is the preeminent dogmatic source from which Van Til appropriates
“the Reformed system of doctrine” throughout An Introduction to Systematic
Theology. Therefore, considered materially, the answer to our question regarding
Van Til’s presupposition—From whom does Van Til appropriate “the Reformed
system of doctrine” that undergirds his Reformed apologetics?—is undoubtedly
Herman Bavinck.

87. Cf. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 348n1.

CHAPTER IV.
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN CONCRETO (PART 3):
POLEMICAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
In the previous chapter we examined Van Til’s presupposition materially
through an analysis of his positive presentation of “the Reformed system of
faith” in An Introduction to Systematic Theology. We found that, throughout this
book, Van Til pervasively appropriates theological formulations from Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek. Hence, in terms of content, Van Til’s presupposition should be
described not only as “the Reformed system of faith,” but also as “the Reformed
system of faith, especially as it has been formulated in Herman Bavinck’s
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek.”
In the present chapter we will continue to examine Van Til’s presupposition
materially, but instead of focusing upon his positive presentation of Reformed
dogmatics, we will analyze how Van Til employs his presupposition for
polemical purposes. In other words, when Van Til levels critiques against his
theological opponents, what dogmatic source does he use as his criterion for
determining whether a theologian is orthodox or heterodox?
Since we have already seen that Van Til pervasively appropriates Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek in his positive presentation of Reformed dogmatics, there is sufficient
warrant for asking a more specific question with respect to his polemical
presentations: Does Van Til use Bavinck’s Dogmatiek in particular as the paragon
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of Reformed orthodoxy by which he determines whether other Reformed
theologians are orthodox or heterodox?

A. Appropriations in The New Synthesis Theology of The
Netherlands
In An introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til appropriates Bavinck’s
thought primarily through summarizing Bavinck’s theological formulations in
order to restate the Reformed system of faith with apologetic nuances. In The
New Synthesis Theology of The Netherlands, however, Van Til exhibits another type
of appropriation. In this work he wield’s Bavinck’s theology as an orthodox
sword by which to parry the allegedly heterodox theological thrusts arising in
the Netherlands throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Van Til’s
argument is divided into two main sections: (1) the nineteenth century
background to the problem and (2) the twentieth century development of the
problem. He wields Bavinck’s theology as the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy in
both sections, but especially in the first.
1. The Context: Synthesis Theologies vs. Pure Reformed Orthodoxy
Van Til begins with a sweeping summary of pre-Reformation Medieval
theology as “a synthesis-theology” which “was an edifice composed of two
‘stories,’ the first being that of the natural theology of the Greeks, and the second
being the ‘supernatural’ theology of the Bible.” 1 Protestants in the Netherlands
1. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 2. Van Til frequently employs the two-story house
metaphor as a critique of alleged dualism in Roman Catholic theology. See, e.g., Cornelius Van
Til, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 141-42; idem, A
Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 262; idem, The
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who failed to depart from Roman Catholic natural theology became
Remonstrants, according to Van Til, thus creating the need for the Synod of
Dordt’s proclamation of “historic Protestantism, pure and simple” contra the
Remonstrants.2
Having stated the “pure and simple” starting point, Van Til proceeds to
explain impure deviations largely following an interpretive schema appropriated
from Herman Dooyeweerd’s analysis of four religious motives undergirding the
history of Western thought.3 The first is Roman Catholicism, which Van Til
summarizes as an attempt to synthesize Socrates’ autonomous man with
Christianity’s self-attesting Christ of Scripture. Likewise, Van Til summarizes
modern theology as an attempt to synthesize Kant’s autonomous man with
Christianity’s Christ à la Karl Barth’s Neo-Orthodoxy. Next, Van Til argues that
modern Reformed theologians in the Netherlands have attempted to synthesize
Neo-Orthodoxy with historic Reformed theology, a move which he sees as
Defense of the Faith, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 131, 308-09, 316. Arvin Vos, Aquinas,
Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas
Aquinas (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian University Press, 1985), 123-160, has critiqued Protestant
“two-story” interpretations of Aquinas’ theology, including Van Til’s and Herman Dooyeweerd’s
formulations, as insufficiently nuanced at best and as misrepresenting the actual interrelation of
nature and grace in Aquinas’ thought at worst. I am unaware of any studies which examine Van
Til’s interpretations of Aquinas’s theology in particular or Roman Catholicism in general, and it is
beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt such an analysis. Were one to be attempted, however,
Van Til’s appropriation of Herman Dooyeweerd’s thought would need to be a major focus; for,
Van Til explicitly appropriates Dooyeweerd’s analysis of the four religious motives of Western
thought as will be demonstrated in chapter 6 below.
2. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis, 2-3; quote at p. 3.
3. Herman Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought: An inquiry into the
transcendental conditions of philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 59-77, presents the
following four religious motifs: (1) matter and form; (2) creation, fall, and redemption; (3) nature
and grace; (4) nature and freedom. Also see idem, Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and
Christian Options, ed. Mark Vander Vennen and Bernard Zylstra, trans. John Kraay (Toronto:
Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1979), 7-39. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 4, 7, only mentions
Dooyeweerd twice; nevertheless, it is clear that Van Til’s fourfold analysis of the “Roman Catholic
Synthesis” (pp. 3-7) is largely a summary of Dooyeweerd’s thought. Compare Van Til’s
appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s fourfold schema in Cornelius Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism
(Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962), 230-239.
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a turning away from the traditional Reformed Faith, and toward the
reinterpretation (Umdeutung) of it in terms of the post-Kantian freedomnature scheme of thought, and, in particular, of neo-orthodox theology.4
Van Til traces the origins of this allegedly impure deviation of Reformed
theology in the thought of H. M. Kuitert, Robert Collingwood, Jean-Paul Sartre,
and he traces the development of it in the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher,
Albrecht Ritschl, and J. H. Scholten, the latter receiving the longest analysis. 5 All
of this serves as the backdrop against which to introduce the modern champions
of pure Reformed orthodoxy: Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck.
Both Kuyper and Bavinck were former students of Scholten, and both had
the unique intellectual fortitude and giftedness required to critique their former
teacher’s attempted reinterpretation of Reformed theology, remarks Van Til. He
interprets Kuyper’s Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid and Bavinck’s
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek in this light. Both men realized, asserts Van Til, that an
entire restatement of the Reformed worldview was needed to meet the modern
challenges issued by Scholten’s attempted reinterpretation. “The call of the
hour,” he writes,
was thus to develop a self-consciously Reformed view of science and
philosophy, consonant with the theology of the Reformed Confession
and capable of challenging a position like Scholten’s.6
Notably, in a passing remark, Van Til interprets his own work as a continuation
of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theological projects:
Have I, in saying this, read my own views into Kuyper and Bavinck? Yes,
I have, at least as to their verbal expression. But what I have said was, I
4. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 10.
5. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 10-28.
6. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 28-29; quote at p. 29.
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believe, the basic intent of both men. 7
Contra the Copernican interpretations of Van Til, he interprets his own apologetic
work as formally distinct, yet materially the same as Kuyper and Bavinck’s
theology, his critiques of “remnants of Scholasticism” in the theology of both men
notwithstanding.8 Within the context of this book, therefore, Van Til intentionally
aligns his own thought with the champions of “pure” Reformed orthodoxy over
against all attempts to synthesize Reformed theology according to modern
theology’s freedom-necessity dualism.
2. The Crux: Modern Synthesis Theologies vs. Bavinck’s Orthodoxy
Having stated the background of Reformed theology’s impure deviations in
the Netherlands and having held up Kuyper and Bavinck as defenders of the
pure orthodoxy against Scholten’s reinterpretation, Van Til proceeds to wield
Bavinck’s theology as a polemical sword against further attempts at modern
Reformed syntheses.
2.1. Bavinck contra the “Ethical Theologians”
Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye (1818–1874) was the father of the so-called
“ethical theologians,” recalls Van Til. He notes that although Kuyper and Bavinck
differed in their responses—the former wholly opposing, the latter being
critically appreciative—Bavinck’s analysis produced the same conclusion as
Kuyper’s: De la Saussaye’s theology is out of accord with Reformed theology. 9

7. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 30.
8. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 30. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck will be analyzed in chapter 5
below.
9. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 31-33.
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Van Til’s entire assessment of De la Sassaye’s thought turns upon his use of
Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology as the criterion of orthodoxy. “For example,”
writes Van Til,
would it not seem obvious that the theology of men like Kuyper and
Bavinck is based upon the idea of the Scriptures as the final source and
standard of truth, whereas the theology of De la Saussaye is based upon
the autonomous moral or ethical consciousness of man as the final source
and standard of truth?10
Van Til considers J. H. Gunning (1829–1905) to be the second father of the
“ethical theologians.” Just as with his analysis of Gunning’s predecessor, so with
Gunning himself, Van Til uses Kuyper and Bavinck as the criterion of orthodoxy.
Thus after surveying Gunning’s doctrine of Scripture Van Til concludes:
It ought to be clear from what has been said that Gunning’s final court of
appeal was not the Scriptures, in the sense that this was true for Kuyper
and Bavinck.11
Van Til concludes part one with a separate sub-section entitled “The Authentic
Bavinck” which is catena of quotations from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek arranged in
such a way as to prove that, contra Veenhof’s analysis, Bavinck unequivocally
rejected the ethical theology arising in the Netherlands. According to Van Til, the
essence of Bavinck’s disagreement with the ethical theologians is his
epistemological principle of analogical reasoning:
In short, underneath all his evaluations of ancient, medieval, and
modern thinking, Bavinck did work with an idea of analogy based upon
that of the self-sufficient triune God of Scripture and man as His
creature, who has sinned against Him, and in all cases responded to His
Word with either obedience or disobedience. 12
10. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 32.
11. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 35.
12. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 37; also cf. idem, “The Significance of Dort for Today,” in Crisis
in the Reformed Churches: Essays in Commemoration of the Synod of Dort, 1618–1619 (Grand Rapids,
MI: Reformed Fellowship, Inc., 1968), 182.
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This assertion is crucial to Van Til’s argument; for, he argues that the twentiethcentury followers of the nineteenth-century ethical theologians (i.e., Berkouwer
and Kuitert) claimed that they were simply following Bavinck. In order for Van
Til to be able to use Bavinck as his criterion of orthodoxy contra the twentiethcentury ethical theologians, therefore, he must first establish that Bavinck indeed
rejected the earlier ethical theologians. 13
Not every point of Van Til’s interpretation of “the authentic Bavinck” is
tenable. His assertion, for example, that Bavinck held Roman Catholicism to be a
“monstrosity” after the likes of “Frankenstein’s creation” is an egregious
hyperbole at best and a gross misrepresentation at worst. 14 Bavinck’s own
statements run directly contrary to Van Til’s “Frankenstein” interpretation. “In
general,” writes Bavinck in the preface to the first edition of his Dogmatiek, for
example,
Protestants know far too little about what we have in common with
Rome and what divides us. Thanks to the revival of Roman Catholic
theology under the auspices of Thomas, it is now doubly incumbent on
Protestants to provide a conscious and clear account of their relationship
to Rome.15
He further asserts:
Irenaeus, Augustine, and Thomas do not belong exclusively to Rome;
they are Fathers and Doctors to whom the whole Christian church has
obligations.16
Furthermore, throughout his Dogmatiek Bavinck interacts extensively with all of
these “Fathers,” sometimes positively appropriating insights, sometimes deftly
13. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 42-43.
14. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 36-37.
15. Herman Bavinck, “Herman Bavinck, ‘Forward’ to the First Edition (Volume I) of the
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek,” trans. John Bolt, Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 9.
16. Bavinck, “Forward,” 9.
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critiquing weakness, yet always reading them with respect and nuance. 17 To give
just one example, Bavinck's firm yet nuanced critique of Rome’s so-called Papa
dixit formulation is a far cry from Van Til’s hyperbolic “Frankensteinian
monstrosity” description of Bavinck’s position.18
Moreover, Bavinck’s very definition of theology is modeled after Thomas
Aquinas’ definition,19 a fact which by itself repudiates Van Til’s polemical
hyperbole. Additionally, Van Til himself acknowledges elsewhere that Bavinck
was highly influenced by Thomas:
Everybody knows that even Herman Bavinck incorporated much of the
thinking of Thomas Aquinas in his magnus opus, Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek.20
Furthermore, Van Til contradicts his own “Frankensteinian“ assessment; for,
elsewhere he describes Bavinck as “a true Protestant” who “learned much from
Romanism.”21 On this point, therefore, Van Til has lost sight of “the authentic
Bavinck” and instead has been carried away by polemical hyperbole.
Nevertheless, despite his misinterpretation of Bavinck’s stance toward Roman
Catholicism, the fact remains that Van Til uses Bavinck’s theology as his paragon
of Reformed orthodoxy contra the ethical theologians.

17. See, e.g., Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1,
Prolegomena (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 113-204.
18. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:81-82 [#21].
19. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34, 36, references Thomas’ definition twice before
formulating his own definition (p. 38), which definition clearly echoes Thomas’ formulation.
20. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus, (Philadelphia,
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974), n.p.; cf. Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of
Cornelius Van Til 1895–1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree Communications, 1995), s.v., 1974.G.
21. Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological
Journal 24, no. 1 (1961): 48.
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2.2. Bavinck contra G. C. Berkouwer
In chapter 2 Van Til introduces Bavinck straightway as the paragon of
Reformed orthodoxy; for, according to Van Til, the current state of theology in the
Netherlands is a devolution from Bavinck’s pristine Reformed orthodoxy to
Barth’s heterodoxy via Berkouwer’s attempted synthesis of Bavinck’s orthodoxy
and Barth’s heterodoxy:
The synod of Assen (1926) of the Reformed Churches symbolized the
high-water mark of traditional Reformed theology. That of Amsterdam
(1966), involving the same churches, symbolized the victory of neoorthodoxy. This change of direction from Bavinck to Barth mirrors
perfectly the voltefact in the theology of Dr. G. C. Berkouwer in the same
period.22
Van Til divides the chapter into two main sections, and in both he employs
Bavinck as the criterion of orthodoxy, contra Berkouwer and Berkouwer’s
followers (i.e., the so-called “Cahiers men”), respectively.
Van Til’s lengthy treatment of Berkouwer is divided into two sub-sections
representing Berkouwer’s earlier and a later views of Scripture. He claims that
the early Berkouwer presented a view of Scripture similar to that of Kuyper’s
and Bavinck’s; for, just like Kuyper and Bavinck, so Berkouwer critiqued the
attempts of the ethical theologians to synthesize revelation and reason according
to a criterion independent of revelation. “This posits, according to Berkouwer,
the problem of Scripture-criticism,” writes Van Til. “And he who seeks to ‘solve’
this problem, specifically in the manner in which [Wilhelm] Herrmann does will
end with chaos,” he concludes.23
Furthermore, Van Til recalls that the early Berkouwer begins his discussion
22. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 44.
23. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 47.
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of the problems in the Netherlands regarding historical criticism of Scripture by
recalling Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s positions, and with respect to this point Van Til
reasserts that Bavinck’s view is opposite of the view proposed by the ethical
theologians.24 He argues, moreover, that the early Berkouwer defended Kuyper’s
and Bavinck’s view regarding the mystery of Scripture. 25 Van Til notes that
Berkouwer contrasts Barth’s position with Kuyper’s and that he also affirms
“Bavinck’s warning to the effect that the problem of Scripture criticism is not
merely intellectual, but also ethical. The natural man takes offense at ‘the Christ
of the Scripture’ and ‘the Scripture of Christ.’” 26 Satisfied that the early
Berkouwer has championed the pure orthodoxy of Kuyper and Bavinck, Van Til
therefore lauds his first book as “remarkable.” 27
However, Berkouwer’s second book on Scripture is a different story,
according to Van Til. He laments Berkouwer’s fall from Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s
orthodox high ground to Barth’s heterodox low ground:
In 1936, Berkouwer had professed that Barth offered a merely “formal
sovereignty” of God. More recently, however, it is the orthodox view,
that of Kuyper and Bavinck, which is supposed to be formal and static. 28
Moreover, Van Til is particularly perturbed that Berkouwer is using Van Til’s
own paragon of Reformed orthodoxy—Bavinck—to argue against the Reformed
orthodox view of Scripture; specifically, Berkouwer employs Bavinck’s warning
24. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 55; also cf. pp. 58-59. This is an example of why Van Til
needed to substantiate Bavinck’s critique of the ethical theologians in ch. 1; for, he employs
Bavinck’s formulation as a polemic against the followers of the ethical theologians.
25. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 57. However, Van Til provides no substantiating evidence for
either (1) his summary of Kuyper’s formulation of a “principle of absolute antithesis between the
natural man and the redeemed man” (pp. 56-57) or (2) his concomitant assertion that Bavinck
followed Kuyper’s view of this absolute antithesis.
26. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 61-62; quote at p. 62.
27. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 62.
28. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 64.
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to avoid viewing Scripture as a “code-book of articles” for this purpose, admits
Van Til.29 Therefore, Van Til’s high regard for Berkouwer’s first book turns to
astonishment at his fall away from Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s positions in his
second book:
We may well think of him as having undergone an “agonizing
reappraisal” in his thinking, between his first and second work on
Scripture, not as to suggest for a moment that he has personally rejected
the Christ of Kuyper and Bavinck, but only that his second work, as it
stands, is unintelligible except it be thought of as a reinterpretation of
these men in terms of the activist principle of neo-orthodoxy, which is
based on the activist philosophy of Kant.30
Highlighting Bavinck once again as the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy, Van Til
recalls that in his first book Berkouwer had followed “in the footsteps of Calvin,
Kuyper, and especially Bavinck. . . .”31 “Now everything has changed,” however, in
Berkouwer’s second book.32
Also, it is quite clear that everything has changed with respect to Van Til’s
interpretation of Berkouwer’s work: Once Van Til sees that Berkouwer departs
from Bavinck orthodoxy, Van Til repudiates Berkouwer’s theology. Hence despite
his earlier remark that Berkouwer has not “personally rejected the Christ of
Kuyper and Bavinck,” a few pages later Van Til levels the following totalizing
repudiation against Berkouwer’s thought:
Only the traditional Reformed view, therefore, gives adequate expression
to the exhaustively personal, i.e., covenantal, character between every
human being in his relationship to every fact of the universe, and the
triune God of Scripture. Thus, when Berkouwer thought that he had
exchanged the “causal” framework of Dordt for the “personalist”
29. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 65.
30. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 69; also note the similar assessment at p. 71. Additionally, cf.
idem, The Sovereignty of Grace, 32.
31. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 73; emphasis added.
32. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 73.
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framework of neo-orthodoxy, what he had actually done was to sell his
birthright for a mess of pottage.”33
This is an unseemly metaphor. For, read in a literal sense, this metaphor would
imply that Berkouwer is either hated by God or rejected by God without hope for
repentance. The only way to harmonize this hyperbolic ad hominem polemic with
Van Til’s earlier assessment of Berkouwer’s faith in Christ is to consider the
stronger statement a gross exaggeration. Surely, on this point Van Til has drifted
again into rhetorical excess.
2.3. Bavinck contra Berkouwer’s Followers
Van Til labels Berkouwer’s followers “the Cahiers Men” since they published
a series of pamphlets entitled, Cahiers voor de Gemeente. Throughout his analysis
of this movement Van Til continues to use Kuyper, and especially Bavinck, as the
criterion of Reformed orthodoxy. He critiques T. J. Baarda’s theology, for
example, as having traded Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s formulations for “the Kantian
scheme of the primacy of the practical reason.” 34 Van Til further critiques the
Cahiers thinkers for rejecting the formal authority of Scripture. This position,
according to Van Til, was repudiated long ago by Bavinck, and by resurrecting
this view “these men have, to all intents and purposes, repudiated the position of
Bavinck.”35 Likewise, Van Til employs Bavinck’s theology as the criterion by
which to reject the Cahiers theologians’ reinterpretation of the “human factor” of
Scripture.36 Notably, Van Til summarizes his entire polemic against the “Cahiers
33. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 83.
34. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 87.
35. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 90-91; quote at p. 91.
36. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 91.
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Men” in terms of Bavinck’s theology:
Bavinck argued at length against the reduction of the idea of sin from the
notion of enmity against God to the Roman Catholic notion of
ontological poverty of being. Men hate Scripture as the Word of Christ,
said Bavinck, because they hate Christ’s call to repentance heard in it.
In other words, Bavinck defended the notion of truth as being ethical
because, with it, he defended the triune God of Scripture as the final
reference point in all human predication. The ethical theologians
(Tethischen) [sic] defended the notion that truth was ethical because they
opposed the God-centered theology of Bavinck and were influenced by
the man-centered philosophy of Kant.37
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that throughout the book Van Til appropriates
Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology as his paragons of Reformed orthodoxy. He
uses Bavinck’s thought especially as his criterion for determining orthodoxy; for
he considers only those theologians who agree with Bavinck’s formulations to be
orthodox, and he condemns those who do not as heterodox.
2.4. Excursus: Bavinck contra Berkouwer in Van Til’s Other Writings
In addition to his critiques of Berkouwer and the “Cahiers Men” noted in the
previous sections, Van Til polemicizes voluminously against Berkouwer’s
theology in several additional writings.38 While it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to analyze Van Til’s entire treatment of Berkouwer, it is fitting to adduce
briefly two additional examples wherein Van Til uses Bavinck’s theology as the
paragon of Reformed orthodoxy and hence the criterion by which he judges
Berkouwer’s later theology to be heterodox.
In the first place, within A Christian Theory of Knowledge Van Til polemicizes
against Vatican II as follows: First, he states Bavinck’s interpretation as the
37. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 94.
38. See the references to Van Til’s voluminous polemics contra Berkouwer in chapter 1, §A, 3,
above.
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orthodox Reformed position;39 Second, he presents Berkouwer’s interpretation as
a heterodox Reformed synthesis between neo-orthodox Protestantism and
Roman Catholicism;40 Third, he argues his own critiques against the documents
of Vatican II.41 By sandwiching Berkouwer’s view in between Bavinck’s and his
own, Van Til implicitly (1) contrasts Bavinck’s orthodoxy with Berkouwer’s
heterodoxy and (2) bolsters his own view by presenting it as being in accord with
Bavinck’s pristine orthodoxy.
In the second place, throughout The Sovereignty of Grace Van Til’s critique of
the reappraisal of Dort along neo-orthodox lines in Berkouwer’s later writings
presupposes that Bavinck’s theology is the criterion of Reformed orthodoxy. Van
Til’s critique has two parts: First, he demonstrates that the early Berkouwer
admitted to following Bavinck’s orthodox lead;42 Second, he rejects the later
Berkouwer’s reappraisal of Dort and argues that his later theology is not an
organic development of Bavinck’s thought but a heterodox departure from it.
Hence Van Til avers a Bavinck-or-Barth ultimatum:
The reader will note that at this stage of his thinking Berkouwer defends
the neo-orthodox teleology of the Confession of 1967 and at the same
time commends the orthodox teleology of Bavinck. Berkouwer’s
thinking passes back and forth between these two mutually exclusive
teleologies as though they were friends, together opposing the formal
view of some reactionary form of fundamentalism. Whoever says that
Scripture must be related to Christ seems to speak the truth whether this
Christ be the Christ of Scripture, whom Bavinck serves or the ChristEvent of Barth whom the neo-orthodox theologians serve.
It becomes increasingly clear, however, that Berkouwer, though
seeking continuity with Bavinck and Calvin, in practice employs the
teleology of neo-orthodoxy in order to escape synergism theology and
39. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 175-77.
40. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 177-86.
41. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 186-93.
42. Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace, 33, 37, 41, 45.
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formalism in relation to Scripture.43
Since the later Berkouwer appropriates Barth’s neo-orthodoxy, Van Til asserts:
“We shall therefore go back to Calvin, to Bavinck and to the earlier Berkouwer
for help.”44
Furthermore, Van Til himself summarizes his main critique in this book in
terms of Berkouwer’s devolution from Bavinck’s orthodoxy to Barth’s
heterodoxy:
I have been interested from the beginning in the new approach to
theology in the Netherlands. In his day, Masselink criticized me for
departing on relative points from Kuyper, Bavinck, and in particular Dr.
Hepp. Now Berkouwer has departed further from these men than I have
ever thought of doing, but no one in the Christian Reformed Church
criticizes Berkouwer. . . . Of course, Berkouwer does not admit for one
moment that he is involving himself in the approach of modern
existentialism. However, even his friends are beginning to realize that he
is seeking now to combine Barth and Bavinck, and that Barth is gaining
on Bavinck.45
In both of these books, therefore, Van Til consistently uses Bavinck’s theology as
the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy by which he judges Berkouwer’s thought to
be heterodox.
3. Summary
Van Til’s entire polemic throughout The New Synthesis Theology of the
Netherlands turns upon the hinge of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. According to Van Til,
the story of modern Reformed theology in the Netherlands is a story of
devolution from Kuyper and Bavinck’s orthodoxy to Barth’s heterodox neo43. Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace, 77.
44. Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace, 55-56.
45. Van Til, “The Development of My Thinking,” an unpublished letter to John Vander Stelt,
1968; Reproduced in Bristley, Guide, 14-17; quote at p. 16.
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orthodoxy by means of G. C. Berkouwer’s attempt to synthesize Bavinck’s
theology with Barth’s. This attempted synthesis is an utter failure, according to
Van Til; hence his vehement polemic.
This story is particularly perturbing to Van Til since, as we noted in chapter 1
above, (1) Van Til viewed his own life’s work as that of carrying on Kuyper’s
antithetical vision and (2) Van Til’s Alma Mater—Princeton Seminary—had
already fallen prey to Barth’s neo-orthodox theology. Van Til sees that the same
devolution that happened at Princeton is now happening at De Vrije Universiteit
in the chair of dogmatic theology—the very chair in which both Kuyper and
Bavinck had sat! This chair is now occupied by G. C. Berkouwer, who, according
to Van Til, is allowing Barth’s theology to infiltrate De Vrije Universiteit.
Therefore, in Van Til’s view Berkouwer has become the mortal enemy not only of
Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision, but also of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatiek.
Additionally, although throughout the book Van Til mentions Kuyper along
with Bavinck, the majority of his polemical arguments are based upon Bavinck’s
theological formulations rather than Kuyper’s. Thus, Van Til, acting as a selfstyled guardian of Kuyper’s antithesis, employs Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as his chief
polemical sword against the novel “synthesis theology” that is invading the
country of his birth.

B. Appropriations in The Theology of James Daane
In 1954 James Daane—who studied for his Th.D. under the supervision of G.
C. Berkouwer at De Vrije Universiteit—published a polemic against Van Til’s
doctrine of common grace. “It is a peculiar circumstance,” remarks Daane, “that
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few, if indeed any, of the proponents of Van Til’s thought claim to understand
it.”46 Against this peculiarity Daane attempts in particular to demonstrate that
Van Til’s view of common grace is out of accord with the traditional view as
found in the thought of Kuyper and Bavinck and in the Three Points of the 1924
Kalamazoo Synod of the Christian Reformed Church. 47
In 1959 Van Til published a reply to Daane’s critique. 48 Van Til describes his
reply as follows:
James Daane wrote a book in criticism of my views. I answered by a little
book about his evidences. . . . My purpose in doing so was not so much
to answer Daane as to point out to the Christian Reformed Church that
to flirt with neo-orthodoxy is to play with fire.49
Thus, rather than vindicating his own views directly, Van Til offers only an
indirect vindication by means of a polemic against “the drift and direction” of
Daane’s entire theology.50 The following analysis is limited to the several salient
points of Van Til’s counter-polemic in this book which evince appropriations of
Bavinck’s thought.51
In the first place, Van Til sets up his critique of Daane’s “dynamic” view of
Scripture by first asserting Bavinck’s view as the criterion of a truly “dynamic”
view, even translating a quotation from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek:
So far from being static this view of Scripture is alone truly dynamic.
46. “Preface” in Daane, A Theology of Grace, n.p.
47. Daane, A Theology of Grace, 15-17.
48. Cf. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane.
49. Van Til, “The Development of My Thinking” in Bristley, Guide, 15.
50. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 21.
51. For Van Til’s additional polemics against Daane’s theology, cf. The Defense of the Faith, 6-7,
20-22, 43n49, 43-44n52, 58n16, 77n3, 89n41, 204-215, 395-408; idem, “Letter to James Daane,” The
Reformed Journal 6, no. 11 (December 1956): 20-21; James Daane, “Reply to Cornelius Van Til,” The
Reformed Journal 6, no. 11 (December 1956): 21-23; Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 363365n25.
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“Scripture is not a dry tale of an old chronicle, but it is the ever living
youthful word which God at the present time and always sends out to
his people. It is the ever continuing speech of God to us.… It is the viva
vox Dei epistola omnipotentis ad suam creaturam” (Bavinck Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek I, p. 405). It is they who work on any other foundation than
that of this Word who will ultimately end up with staticism. 52
He then implies that Daane’s view of Scripture is a devolution from Bavinck’s
view, the lack of any references to Daane’s works notwithstanding. 53
In the second place, “following Kuyper and Bavinck” regarding the Bible’s
self-authenticating authority,54 Van Til alleges that Daane has deviated from the
orthodox Reformed doctrine of God’s decree, a doctrine which Van Til views as a
necessary correlate of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture. “In other
words,” alleges Van Til, “he rejects what Calvin, Hodge, Bavinck and Berkhof
taught in plain terms on this point.”55
In the third place, Van Til begins his response to Daane’s critique regarding
the doctrine of the ontological trinity as an epistemological principle56 by
asserting that he has simply reiterated Bavinck’s doctrine of the trinity:
Actually there is nothing appreciably different in what I have said about
the ontological trinity from what Berkhof and Bavinck have previously
stated nor has Daane sought to prove that there is. In fact, I have not
dealt with the subject other than to use what was already ascertained
and established, especially by Bavinck, for apologetic purposes. 57
Van Til then levels a counter polemic against Daane’s position by adducing a
series of quotations from Bavinck's Dogmatiek in order “to indicate that Daane
52. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 22.
53. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 23.
54. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 23.
55. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 26.
56. Even though Van Til does not reference it explicitly, Daane’s critique comprises ch. 7 in
Daane, A Theology of Grace, 100-111.
57. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 33.
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would find no support in Bavinck for his contrast between the idea of the
ontological trinity and his christological approach.”58 He concludes his counter
polemic by further adducing quotations from B. B. Warfield’s writings in order to
show that “[Warfield] as well as Bavinck points out that only those who have
deviated from sound theology have objected to the idea of the ontological trinity
as being the basis of all theology.”59 Van Til’s rejoinder on this point, therefore, is
grounded predominantly upon Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the paragon of Reformed
orthodoxy.
In the fourth place, Van Til accuses Daane’s view of election and reprobation
to be Arminian rather than Reformed according to the criterion of Bavinck’s and
Calvin’s orthodoxy. “It would clarify the air,” writes Van Til, “if Daane would tilt
directly at Bavinck and Calvin. Is Daane with Pighius or is he with Calvin?” 60
In the fifth place, Van Til begins his chapter on supralapsarianism and
infralapsarianism with this remark: “We turn to Herman Bavinck in order to note
his analysis of the subject.”61 The entirety of the chapter is a synopsis of Bavinck’s
formulations interspersed with criticisms against Daane’s alleged deviations
from Bavinck’s orthodoxy. For example, after praising Bavinck’s “all-important”
58. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 34-35; quote at p. 35.
59. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 35-38; quote at pp. 35-36.
60. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 66.
61. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 81. Idem, Common Grace and the Gospel, 227, asserts (1)
that within The Theology of James Daane he follows Bavinck’s formulation regarding double
predestination and (2) that he is “following the lead of Bavinck” in asserting that the
supralapsarian-infralapsarian distinction should not be carried on in modern theology. Regarding
the latter assertion, however, Van Til misinterprets Bavinck’s nuanced discussion of the topic in
two ways: (1) Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:180, 361-392, never asserts that the supralapsarianinfralapsarian distinction should be dropped from Reformed dogmatics; rather, he claims that
neither the supra position nor the infra position alone can accurately present the richness of God’s
decree; (2) Bavinck himself continues to employ this distinction throughout his dogmatics
(Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:180; idem, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:278, 564; idem, Sin and Salvation in
Christ, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 3, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2006), 182, 278).
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point regarding the unity of the infralapsarian and supralapsarian positions on
the matter of God’s sovereign control over all events, Van Til avers: “It is this
basic Reformed position, common to the supra and the infra position, which
Daane finds so objectionable.”62 Similarly, regarding the question of the equal
ultimacy of election and reprobation, Van Til uses Bavinck’s thought as his
criterion of orthodoxy. “When Bavinck says that the first sin was in any case due
to the sovereign will of God,” writes Van Til, “Daane, in complete contradiction
of this, says that Adam could have decided not to sin.” 63
Moreover, three of Van Til’s four rejoinders against Daane’s view of election
in Christ are restatements of Bavinck’s theology. 64 For example, his second
rejoinder is an explicit judgment against Daane’s alleged deviation from
Bavinck’s historic Reformed orthodoxy:
(2) Bavinck himself, throughout his truly great work on dogmatics,
constantly speaks of the object of election as being the Christus mysticus,
Christ with his body the church.
We may therefore await the production of evidence on the part of
Daane to prove that Berkhof, the adherents of 1924, or others have, in
this respect, departed from Bavinck and the Reformed tradition. 65
In the sixth place, having presented a synopsis of Bavinck’s orthodox view of
election in chapter 6, Van Til then summarizes Karl Barth’s heterodox view in
chapter 7, the longest chapter in the book. The contrast of Barth’s view with
Bavinck’s by means of juxtaposition is intentional; for, Van Til’s purpose is to
show that the source of Daane’s theological aberrations is Barth’s theology, and
he seeks to call Daane back to the historic Reformed position as maintained by
62. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 86.
63. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 91.
64. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 92-94.
65. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 92; For all four points see pp. 92-94.

121
Bavinck:
Can he [i.e., Daane] show us how to be of service to modern theology in
any other way than by following in the footsteps of Calvin, Dort, Bavinck
and Berkhof; and telling men that there is no truly biblical view of the
grace of God, unless it is based upon the sovereign God of Scripture who
doeth among the armies of heaven and earth as he will? 66
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that throughout the book Van Til frequently
appropriates Bavinck’s theology as the orthodox criterion by which he judges
Daane’s views to be heterodox. The most obvious and extensive appropriations
appear in the chapter on the trinity and in the chapter on lapsarianism.

C. Appropriations contra Karl Barth
Van Til’s polemic against Karl Barth’s alleged “new modernism” is as
vehement as it is voluminous.67 His categorical rejection of Barth’s thought is
well known in scholarship regarding the reception of Barth’s theology in
America.68 What is not well known, however, is the fact that Van Til employs a
Bavinck-vs.-Barth motif as one of his primary polemics against Barth’s views.
66. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 117. Even though herein Van Til mentions Calvin,
Dort, and Berkhof in addition to Bavinck, the juxtaposition of this chapter and the previous
chapter is a clear contrast between Barth’s and Bavinck’s views. Furthermore, throughout the
entire book Van Til does not adduce any evidence from Berkhof’s writings to support his polemic
against Daane, nor does Van Til explicate the cannons of Dort. He does, however, explicate
Calvin’s views in multiple places throughout the book.
67. See the references to Van Til’s polemics contra Barth in chapter 1, §A, 3, above.
68. For older scholarship, see, e.g., T. F. Torrance, “Review of The New Modernism (London:
James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1946), by Cornelius Van Til” The Evangelical Quarterly 19 (1947): 144-149;
also cf. Alister E. McGrath, “Karl Barth's Doctrine of Justification from an Evangelical
Perspective,” in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology: Convergences and Divergences, ed. Sung Wook
Chung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 172n1. For recent scholarship, see Thorne,
Evangelicalism and Karl Barth, 33-41; George Harinck, “‘Give Us an American Abraham Kuyper’:
Dutch Calvinist Reformed Responses to the Founding of the Westminster Theological Seminary
in Philadelphia,” Calvin Theological Journal 33, no. 2 (1998): 299-319; Gavin Ortlund, “Wholly
Other or Wholly Given Over? What Van Til Missed in His Criticism of Barth,” Presbyterian 35, no.
1 (2009): 35-52; Lewis, Karl Barth in North America, 33-67; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “A Person of the
Book? Barth on Biblical Authority and Interpretation,” in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology:
Convergences and Divergences, ed. Sung Wook Chung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006),
28-30.
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Although he does not appropriate Bavinck’s thought to the same pervasive
extent as is evident in the polemical writings examined above, Van Til
nevertheless uses Bavinck’s theology in the same manner, namely, as the criterion
of Reformed orthodoxy by which to judge Barth’s formulations as heterodox.
Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s theology contra Barth’s can be seen in his
two book-length rejoinders.
1. Appropriations in The New Modernism
In The New Modernism69 Van Til uses Bavinck’s thought only a few times, but
always as a paragon of orthodoxy. In the first place, he begins the book with a
passing reference to Bavinck as the paragon of traditional Reformed orthodoxy,
an orthodoxy which, according to Van Til, is being attacked by Barth and
Brunner more vociferously than by Roman Catholicism or modern
Protestantism.70 “Traditional orthodoxy,” he writes,
and especially traditional Reformed theology [i.e., the theology
represented by Herman Bavinck], seems to be, in the eyes of Barth and
Brunner alike, the worst offender of the three.
In view of these facts, we naturally ask whether Barth and Brunner
will not eventually join the forces of modern Protestantism in an all-out
final offensive against the Reformed Faith.71
Van Til thus describes the inciting incident for his polemic as an attack on
Reformed orthodoxy as represented by the modern paragon of Reformed
orthodoxy—Herman Bavinck.

69. The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner is Van Til’s first
major publication. Published originally in 1946, Van Til released two subsequent editions in 1947
and 1972 respectively, both of which contained expanded material on Barth’s theology. Cf.
Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1946.G, 1947.A, 1972.G.
70. Van Til, The New Modernism, 1-2.
71. Van Til, The New Modernism, 2.
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In the second place, in reference to Barth’s formulation of the doctrine of
God’s aseity, Van Til remarks that “it might even seem as though Barth’s position
on the aseity of God were identical with that of outstanding Reformed
theologians such as Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck.” 72 According to Van
Til, however, the appearance is only formal:
Yet even the brief exposition of Barth’s conception of the freedom of God
that we have given so far, ought to be sufficient to convince us that
Barth’s view and that of these men are as divergent as they could
possibly be.73
Van Til’s polemic here goes well beyond a single point regarding Barth’s
formulation of God’s aseity; for, he further insists that the foundation of
Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s entire theology (i.e., the distinction between the Creator
and the creature) “would be,” in Barth’s view, “to hold to all that is evil in
theology.”74 Van Til’s critique, therefore, is intended to totally undermine Barth’s
entire doctrine of God vis-à-vis Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s orthodoxy.
In the third place, Van Til deems Barth’s view of Holy Scripture to be a
degradation of the classic Reformed view championed by Bavinck, among
others:
And Barth wants, by all means, to interpret Christ in terms of the Bible.
But what he means by the Bible is not what Luther and Calvin, Hodge
and Warfield, Kuyper and Bavinck meant by the Bible. 75
Even though there are only three brief appropriations in this book, each one of
them is an important part of Van Til’s polemic. Most notably, Van Til uses
Bavinck as his paragon of orthodoxy at the beginning of the book in order to
72. Van Til, The New Modernism, 217.
73. Van Til, The New Modernism, 217.
74. Van Til, The New Modernism, 218.
75. Van Til, The New Modernism, 483.
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insinuate a that Barth’s thought is a direct contradiction of Reformed orthodoxy
as represented by Bavinck. Therefore, we find here, albeit only in seed form, the
polemic that Van Til later expands and levels against Berkouwer in The New
Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands as noted above—Barth’s neo-orthodoxy is the
antipode of Bavinck’s Reformed orthodoxy.
2. Appropriations in Christianity and Barthianism
After spending six chapters within Christianity and Barthianism on
summarizing aspects of Barth’s thought, Van Til turns in the seventh toward
adducing evidence from orthodox Reformed theologians that proves Barth’s
theology to be heterodox. The first theologian Van Til uses in this polemical
manner is Herman Bavinck. He argues that the orthodox view of Holy Scripture
(i.e., the view represented by Bavinck) understands “Scripture as directly
identical with the Word of God.”76 According to Van Til, Barth’s “activist view of
revelation” is out of accord with the orthodox view, and thus, by implication,
Bavinck’s view.
“That the Reformed view of Scripture,” continues Van Til, “is itself imbedded
in and is an expression of Reformed theology as a whole was well expressed by
Herman Bavinck and by Abraham Kuyper.” 77 He then adduces five quotes from
Bavinck (and an affirmation that Kuyper’s view is the same as Bavinck’s) as
sufficient warrant for interpreting Barth’s view of Scripture as undoubtedly
heterodox despite its prima facie resemblance to orthodoxy.78 “Try as they would,”
76. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 117.
77. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 118.
78. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 118-20.
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concludes Van Til,
Reformed theologians could not limit the dispute between themselves
and Barth to a question of exegesis. Barth might well have the correct
exegesis on certain passages of Scripture, and Reformed theologians may
well have given a wrong exegesis of certain passages of Scripture. Even
so, between historic Reformed theology and Barth there lies a basically
different approach to the whole idea of Scripture. And with it there is a
basically different idea of the Christ of the Scripture. 79
Van Til therefore presents the orthodox Reformed response to Barth’s theology as
primarily a contrast between Bavinck’s and Barth’s views, and he understands
this contrast to be categorically antithetical.
Van Til employs this Bavinck-vs.-Barth motif consistently throughout the
remainder of the book, giving the impression that there is no agreement between
the two thinkers on any subject whatsoever. This antithetical motif is evident in
the following examples.
2.1. Bavinck contra Barth’s View of Scripture
Van Til argues that Berkouwer’s assessment of Barth’s view of Scripture is
parallel to his own antithetical assessment. Van Til’s synopsis of Berkouwer’s
criticism proceeds in three steps: First, Berkouwer alleges that Barth’s view of
Scripture is subjectivist. 80 Second, Berkouwer judges that the several attempts to
escape subjectivism made by modern theologians, such as, Ritschl, Hermann,
Haering, Stephan, Frank, Wobbermin, and Ihmels also fall prey to the same
79. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 120. The “Reformed theologians” Van Til has in
mind are the three theologians whose critiques of Barth’s theology he summarizes throughout the
remainder of the chapter: G. C. Berkouwer (pp. 120–135), Klaas Runia (pp. 136–138), and Klaas
Schilder (pp. 139–145). On Van Til’s personal relationship with Schilder and his reliance upon
Schilder’s critical assessment of Barth’s theology, see Harinck, “‘Give Us an American Abraham
Kuyper’”; idem, “‘How can an elephant understand a whale and vice versa?’: About the Dutch
Origins of Cornelius Van Til’s Appraisal of Karl Barth,” n.d. (publication forthcoming
(Eerdmans)).
80. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 120-121.
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subjectivism found in Barth’s view, despite prima facie similarities with Reformed
orthodoxy.81 “Berkouwer soon makes plain,” asserts Van Til, recapitulating his
own antithetical view, “that for all the striking similarity of words between
Bavinck and the theologians of which he speaks, there is a basic difference of
meaning between them.”82 Third, Berkouwer confirms his allegation that Barth’s
view is subjectivist via a detailed analysis of Barth’s view. 83
2.2. Bavinck as The Criterion of Reformed Orthodoxy
Van Til’s synopsis of Berkouwer’s criticism against Barth’s view of Scripture
explicitly presupposes Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s formulations as the criterion of
orthodoxy. After showing that Berkouwer quotes F. W. Grosheirde regarding the
ultimate question of final authorities—whether God or man will have the last
word—he avers the following ultimatum:
Thus it is that Berkouwer, with Grosheide, holds to a view of Scripture
similar to that of Kuyper and Bavinck. Only if one holds to this view of
Scripture does one have the true Christ. Only if one holds to this view of
Scripture does one have a truly objective revelation. Only if one holds to
this view of Scripture can one escape subjectivism, projectionism, and
therefore illusionism.84
This ultimatum reappears later on in Van Til’s synopsis. After summarizing
Berkouwer’s contrast between Barth’s view of Scripture and Kuyper’s and
81. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 121-23.
82. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 123.
83. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 125-38.
84. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 124. Compare Van Til’s later expansion of G. C.
Berkouwer’s criticisms of Barth’s theology at p. 135: “It is therefore in line with Berkouwer’s
criticism to say that two mutually exclusive views of Scripture involve two mutually exclusive
views of Christ, and therewith of God and of man. And only the Christ of the Scriptures rather
than the Christ of Barth can save us from subjectivism and illusionism. With all due credit to the
influence of the Scriptures and of the Christ of the Scriptures upon Barth’s work, it must still be
set diametrically over against the Scriptures and the Christ of Reformed theology and of historic
Christianity.”
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Bavinck’s views,85 Van Til concludes:
It appears then that according to the arguments of the three books
discussed, Barth’s rejection of the traditional Reformed doctrine of
Scripture entails his reinterpretation along activistic lines of all the
articles of the Christian faith.86
Thus he reasons that to disagree with Kuyper and Bavinck is to depart from
Reformed orthodoxy.
The polemical benefit Van Til receives from mentioning that Berkouwer
interprets Barth’s view to be a departure from Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology
is that he demonstrates that he is not the only one who is using these two
theologians as criterions of Reformed orthodoxy. This benefit likely explains why
Van Til mentions their names again, albeit only in passing, in a similar passage
wherein he summarizes Berkouwer’s critique of Barth’s doctrine of providence. 87
His insinuation is that Barth’s view is a heterodox degradation from Kuyper’s
and Bavinck’s orthodoxy. Furthermore, Van Til mentions Bavinck in passing in
another passage wherein he summarizes Berkouwer’s criticism of Barth’s view of
election.88 In this passage too Van Til’s intent is clearly implied, namely, to
demonstrate that Barth’s heterodox theology is out of accord with Bavinck’s
pristine orthodoxy.
This implicit Bavinck-vs.-Barth polemic is drawn out explicitly in another
passage wherein Van Til summarizes Berkouwer’s critique of Barth’s
formulation of humanity’s fall into sin. “In the present work,” writes Van Til,
Berkouwer shows that, according to Barth, the belief in the historical fall
85. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 133-34.
86. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 134.
87. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 153.
88. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 167.
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also constitutes an attack on the true idea of grace in Christ. The
difference between Calvin and Bavinck, on the one hand, and Barth, on
the other hand, is again shown to be one as deep as is possible. These are
two mutually exclusive views of grace competing with one another. And
this difference rests upon a basic difference in the view of God implied in
both of these positions.89
According to Van Til, therefore, Berkouwer alleges that a categorical antithesis
exists between Bavinck’s and Barth’s positions not only on the Christological and
anthropological implications arising from humanity’s fall into sin, but also on the
doctrine of God.
In another chapter, moreover, Van Til explicitly employs Bavinck’s theology
(along with Berkouwer’s), albeit only in passing, as a criterion of Reformed
orthodoxy against the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Against Balthasar’s
description of Barth’s dialectical formulation of the principle of theology, Van Til
rejoins: “If we apply the criterion of Bavinck or of Berkouwer, we shall have to say
that here two forms of subjectivism are to be compared with one another.” 90 He
thus rejects both the theology of Barth and the theology of Balthasar on the
grounds that their views of revelation are subjective when measured against
Bavinck’s and Berkouwer’s objective formulations.
2.3. Bavinck contra Barth’s View of Christ
“Barth’s view of Christ,” asserts Van Til boldly, “does not seem to be
anything like the Reformation view of Christ.”91 He defends this assertion in the
following manner: First, Van Til summarizes several basic Christological points

89. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 159.
90. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 324; emphasis added.
91. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 216.
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from Bavinck’s thought, referencing Bavinck’s Dogmatiek four times.92 Second, he
avers, “On Barth’s view, this simple picture of the biblical view of sin and its
origin as presented by Bavinck falls away.” 93 Third, he cites Bavinck’s Dogmatiek
three more times in an effort to summarize the Reformed view of sin’s origin and
nature.94 Fourth, he cites several extensive passages from the Canons of the
Synod of Dort regarding predestination.95
Fifth, he returns to Bavinck’s theology and provides a lengthy synopsis of
Bavinck’s views regarding the eternal trinitarian ground of redemption in the
pactum salutis and the temporal outworking of the pactum through the covenant
of grace.96 Van Til particularly highlights the fact that, in Bavinck’s view, Christ is
central to the story of redemption both in God’s eternal decree and in the
temporal outworking of that decree. He thus notes, “It is all important, says
Bavinck, to hold that neither in the counsel of peace nor in the covenant of grace
must Christ even for a moment be thought of as separate from his own. In both it
is the Christus mysticus.”97 Nearly his entire presentation of the Reformed
doctrine of Christ, therefore, is a synopsis of Bavinck’s theology. Throughout this
fifth section alone Van Til references Bavinck’s Dogmatiek eighteen times, and he
even translats several brief passages from the Dogmatiek into English.98
Van Til’s rhetoric against Barth’s theology is calculated to maintain a stiff
antithesis between Barth’ and Bavinck’s views. At one point in this fifth section,
92. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 216-17, 217nn10-13.
93. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 217.
94. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 217, 217nn14-16.
95. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 218-20.
96. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 220-21.
97. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 222.
98. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 220-24, 220-23nn29-46.
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for example, Van Til pauses his synopsis of Bavinck’s presentation of the pactum
salutis in order to contrast Barth’s views:
It is in this manner that we can see something of the nature of the
triumph of grace as Reformed theologians, following Calvin, have seen
it. This grace is free or sovereign. The three persons of the trinity are
from all eternity equally involved in its conception and in its execution.
The triune God creates freely. There is therefore no power of any sort that
stands over against him to resist his work. . . . There is no power of evil
which is original. There is no non-being that stands over against being as
a reactionary force. . . . There is no Nihil that has independent power over
against God.99
Several polemical insinuations are embedded herein: (1) Van Til levels this
critique immediately after summarizing Bavinck’s formulation of the pactum
salutis. Oddly, however, Van Til makes no reference to Barth’s vehement rejection
of the pactum.100 His insinuation, therefore, is that, contra Barth’s rejection of the
pactum along with its underlying trinitarian distinction between the opera Dei ad
intra and ad extra, the triumph of grace is only possible in Protestant theology by
following Bavinck’s formulation wherein (a) the consilium Dei regarding
redemption is understood as an opus Dei ad intra in the form of the pactum salutis,
and (b) the execution of this consilium in time is viewed as an opus Dei ad extra in
the form of the foedus gratiae.101 (2) His “triumph of grace” language is likely a
veiled reference to the title of G. C. Berkouwer’s book, The Triumph of Grace in the
Theology of Karl Barth,102 which Van Til references extensively in order to support
99. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 221-22.
100. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W.
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2004), IV/1:65.
101. Cf. Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally
From Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich. Baker Books, 2006), s.vv., consilium Dei,
foedus gratiae, opera Dei ad extra, opera Dei ad intra, pactum salutis.
102. G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. Harry R. Boer
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1956); a translation of idem, De triomf der genade in de theologie van
Karl Barth (Kampen: Kok, 1954).
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his own polemic against Barth’s views.103 Thus a double entendre appears herein
connoting both (a) the failure of Barth’s theology to produce an actual triumph of
grace (in contrast with Bavinck’s successful formulation of the triumph of grace
via the pactum salutis and foedus gratiae) and (b) a polemical double whammy
from not one but two rejoinders—Berkouwer’s and Van Til’s. (3) Van Til’s
remark, “as Reformed theologians, following Calvin, have seen it,” implies that
Barth does not follow Calvin and thus is not in accord with historic Reformed
orthodoxy. (4) Van Til’s language about there existing no ultimate power of evil,
no ultimate non-being, and especially no Nihil, is a direct polemic against Barth’s
formulations regarding “nothingness” (i.e., das Nichtige) within the doctrine of
creation, despite his lack of references to Barth’s writings. 104
In light of these several polemical insinuations and explicit allusions it is
evident that Van Til’s rhetoric is calculated toward achieving his underlying aim,
namely, presenting Barth’s theology as wholly heterodox, especially when it is
viewed in contrast with Bavinck’s orthodoxy. Thus, notwithstanding his own
admissions that his synopses of Bavinck’s and Dort’s formulations of the person
and work of Christ are the “barest outline” and a “brief sketch” of “a Protestant
view of Christianity,”105 Van Til categorically rejects Barth’s theology as out of
accord with Protestant orthodoxy. “Barth’s views of the person and work of
Christ,” he concludes, “are, at every point, the antipodes of this historic

103. E.g., Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 363-65n25; idem, Christianity and
Barthianism, 33, 42, 111-13, 134-35, 169-71.
104. See §50, “God and Nothingness,” in Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/3:289-368; cf. Joseph L.
Mangina, Karl Barth: Theologian of Christian Witness (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press,
2004), 100-102.
105. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 224.
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Protestant view.”106 In other words, Barth’s views are at every point the antipodes
of Bavinck’s.
2.4. Excursus: Barth pro Bavinck
Although a full analysis of Van Til’s various polemics against Barth’s
theology is beyond the scope of this thesis, his repeated insistence that Barth’s
thought is “at every point” antithetical to Bavinck’s theology creates a problem
for his own polemic which ought to be mentioned briefly; for, Van Til’s Bavinckvs.-Barth motif presupposes that Barth’s theology reciprocates an antithetical
posture toward Bavinck’s thought. In actuality, however, rather than viewing
Bavinck’s theology as the categorical antipode of his own, Barth positively
appropriates several insights from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. John Vissers has recently
analyzed Barth’s appropriations of Bavinck’s thought,107 and he presents the
following salient observations.
In the first place, Barth viewed Bavinck and Kuyper as “theologians who had
style or class,”108 and he read Bavinck’s Dogmatiek during his preparations for his
first lectures in dogmatics.109 “Despite the fact that some Dutch Neo-Calvinists
sought to use Bavinck against Barth to bolster their critique,” writes Vissers
contra Van Til’s Christianity and Barthianism, “I argue that Barth himself never
quite saw Bavinck in that light. Bavinck represented, for Barth, a deep and rich

106. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 224.
107. John Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,”
Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 79-86.
108. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 79.
109. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 7980.
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expression of Reformed theology.”110 Therefore, according to Vissers, Barth’s
general attitude toward Bavinck’s theology is appreciative rather than
antithetical.
In the second place, Barth appropriates Bavinck’s thought seven times in the
first volume of his Göttingen Dogmatics.111 Barth’s definition of dogmatics and his
rejection of the anthropocentric interpretation of Reformed theology, for example,
derive from Bavinck’s thought.112 The most notable of these seven appropriations
is Barth’s quip regarding the ground of theology—Deus dixit; for, even though
“Barth does not share Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture,” writes Vissers, “he does
share Bavinck’s fundamental affirmation concerning revelation and the
knowledge of God . . . namely, that in revelation God shares God’s selfknowledge with us.”113 Accordingly, Barth’s hallmark phrase—Deus dixit—is an
appropriation of Bavinck’s earlier formulation.114
In the third place, within the Göttingen Dogmatics and the Church Dogmatics,
Barth both lauds Bavinck’s formulation of the doctrine of the trinity and seeks to
go beyond it by giving even more prominence to the trinity. 115 Accordingly, in
both works Barth repositions the doctrine within the locus on prolegomena
rather than following Bavinck’s classical arrangement of the doctrine under the
locus de Deo.116 According to Vissers, Barth saw his rearrangement as more
110. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 80.
111. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 80n7.
112. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 80-81.
113. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 81.
114. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 81-82.
115. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 82-84.
116. E.g., Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1:295-304, presents five reasons for considering the
trinity within prolegomena (i.e., in Barth’s terms, within “The Revelation of God”), and he cites
Bavinck approvingly at p. 302. Contrast Bavinck’s view: Although not referring to exactly the
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befitting the ontological priority of the trinity in relation to humanity’s response
to divine revelation—just as ontology precedes epistemology, so the trinity
should precede all other dogmatic loci.117
There is an intriguing irony in Barth’s expansion upon Bavinck’s position on
this point vis-à-vis Van Til’s polemics against Barth’s theology; for, Van Til himself
reverses Bavinck’s order and presents the doctrine of the trinity before the
doctrine of God’s communicable attributes. 118 Given our earlier observations that
within An Introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til closely follows Bavinck’s
dogmatic formulations, it is surprising that he deviates from Bavinck’s position.
Although Van Til does not provide any reasons for this reorganization himself,
William Edgar suggests that Van Til’s rearrangement is designed to give
preeminence to the ontological trinity viewed as the epistemological
presupposition of all predication.119 Therefore, it is ironic that Van Til makes the
same theological move mutatis mutandis as does his bête noire: Whereas Barth
rearranges Bavinck’s placement of the trinity in order to emphasize its
ontological priority, Van Til rearranges Bavinck’s placement in order to
emphasize the trinity’s epistemological priority. 120
same reasons presented by Barth for explicating the trinity within prolegomena, Bavinck,
Reformed Dogmatics, 1:109-10, rejects the trinitarian schema as an organizing principle for
dogmatics. Furthermore, Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend,
vol. 2, God and Creation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 149-150, argues that in
dogmatics it is preferable for the doctrines of God’s essence and attributes to be treated before the
doctrine of the trinity.
117. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 82-83.
118. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of
Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 348-397.
Compare the arrangement in Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:178-334, and note Bavinck’s
argument that the divine essence and attributes ought to be treated before the trinity (pp. 149150).
119. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 348n1.
120. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “A Person of the Book? Barth on Biblical Authority and
Interpretation,” in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology: Convergences and Divergences, ed. Sung
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In the fourth place, Barth extols Bavinck’s presentation of the
incomprehensibility of God. According to Vissers, Barth particularly appreciates
the fact that, in Bavinck’s view, incomprehensibility plays a fundamental role in
the entire epistemological relationship between God and man. 121 Ironically, Van
Til’s own insistence upon the incomprehensibility of God is also rooted in
Bavinck’s formulation, as we noted above with respect to Van Til’s book, An
Introduction to Systematic Theology.
In light of these four examples it is evident that Van Til’s Bavinck-vs.-Barth
motif is one-sided polemical rhetoric. Vissers demonstrates that, regardless of the
significant dogmatic differences between Barth and Bavinck, Barth appropriates
Bavinck’s thought positively in several places throughout the Göttingen
Dogmatics and the Church Dogmatics.122 Van Til simply omits this fact. “In short,
and at least on the basis of reading Barth,” Vissers concludes, “it is difficult to see
the stark divide between Barth and Bavinck that is represented by someone such
as Cornelius Van Til who sets Bavinck’s orthodoxy over against Barth’s
modernism.”123

D. Appropriation in Jerusalem and Athens
“I use Herman Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek as my source of
information,” begins Van Til in part one of his two-part rejoinder to John
Wook Chung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 30, notes several unwitting similarities
between Van Til’s and Barth’s formulations of key doctrinal themes, including the following:
“both made the doctrine of the Trinity their key presupposition.”
121. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 8485.
122. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 86.
123. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 86.
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Warwick Montgomery’s criticisms of his apologetic method.124 Specifically, Van
Til relies upon Bavinck’s explication of the Reformed maxim, finitum non est capax
infiniti, in order to confute Montgomery’s allegedly Lutheran interpretation of it
following Francis Pieper’s Christian Dogmatics. Though Van Til does not provide
any specific references to Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, it is likely that he has in mind both
Bavinck’s epistemological125 and his Christological126 uses of this maxim; for, he
levels both epistemological and Christological critiques against Montgomery’s
position.127 Therefore, within this brief rejoinder Van Til explicitly appropriates
Bavinck’s theology as the criterion of orthodoxy upon the basis of which he
judges Montgomery’s thought to be heterodox.

E. Summary
Although in some places throughout these polemics Van Til mentions not
only Bavinck’s thought but also Kuyper’s and Berkouwer’s theology as criterions
of Reformed orthodoxy, his primary paragon is Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. For, as we
have seen, the entire structure of Van Til’s lengthy polemic throughout The New
Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands presupposes Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the
paragon of Reformed orthodoxy. Likewise, in The Theology of James Daane Van Til
frequently pits Daane’s allegedly heterodox views against Bavinck’s orthodox
positions. Furthermore, throughout his voluminous polemics against Karl Barth’s
124. Cornelius Van Til, “Reply to Once Upon an A Priori . . .,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical
Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Presbyterian and
Reformed, 1971), 397.
125. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:309-310.
126. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 3, Sin and
Salvation in Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006).
127. Van Til, “Reply to Once Upon an A Priori . . .,” 397-398, 402-403.
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neo-orthodox theology, Van Til explicitly employs a Bavinck-vs.-Barth motif, and
at one point he even expressly admits to using Bavinck’s (and Berkouwer’s)
theology as the criterion by which to judge Barth’s theology as heterodox.
Moreover, in his response to Montgomery in Jerusalem and Athens, Van Til
expressly states that he uses Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the source of his polemic
against Montgomery’s position.
For all of these reasons the answer to the question with which we began this
chapter—whether Van Til uses Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the paragon of Reformed
orthodoxy by which he determines whether other Reformed theologians are
orthodox or heterodox—is therefore a patent affirmative.

CHAPTER V.
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN DEFECTU ET IN EXCESSU (PART 1):
DIALECTICAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
Thus far we have surveyed Van Til’s positive appropriations of Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek. We have examined these appropriations from three perspectives—
formally (or structurally), materially, and polemically—and from all three
viewpoints we have seen that Van Til appropriates from Bavinck’s thought not
occasionally but pervasively. We suggested accordingly that Van Til’s first
presupposition be emended to clarify the fact that when Van Til asserts that he
presupposes Reformed dogmatics for his Reformed apologetics, it specifically
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek that he primarily presupposes. In other words,
Van Til’s Reformed apologetics presupposes Bavinck’s Reformed dogmatics to
such an extent that his apologetics is nearly unintelligible without Bavinck’s
dogmatics.
For this reason the final aspect of Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s
thought which we will examine in this essay—his totalizing critiques of the
patent “scholasticism” in Bavinck’s theological formulations—leads us to a
perplexing, twofold dialectical tension with respect to Van Til’s presupposition.
In the first place, since he blatantly and pervasively appropriates from
Bavinck’s theological formulations, Van Til’s totalizing critiques against
Bavinck’s “scholasticism” are not only odd, but also formally self-contradictory.
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To borrow one of Van Til’s favorite metaphors,1 for him to level totalizing
critiques against Bavinck’s Reformed dogmatics is like the little apologist-girl
who slaps her dogmatician-daddy in the face—all the while being held firmly by her
daddy; for, if Van Til’s allegations against Bavinck’s theology are valid, then he
risks undercutting his own polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek
surveyed in chapter 4 above. His theological opponents could simply use Van
Til’s critiques against Bavinck as their rejoinder against Van Til’s employment of
Bavinck’s thought as the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy. Additionally, by
criticizing Bavinck’s theology so strongly Van Til risks undercutting his positive
presentation of Reformed dogmatics as noted in chapter 3 above. Hence the first
dialectical tension: How hard does Van Til want to slap Bavinck in the face at the
risk of undercutting both his polemics against neo-orthodox theology and his
positive presentation of Reformed dogmatics?
In the second place, Van Til’s critique of the “scholasticism” in Bavinck’s
thought is unoriginal in two senses. First, in terms of its material content, Van
Til’s critique is a direct appropriation—without citation—of Herman
Dooyeweerd’s criticism of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought (along with the
scholasticism in Abraham Kuyper’s and Jan Woltjer’s thought). Second, in terms
of its form, Van Til’s critique is simply one iteration of the same bipolar polemic
that he levels against Kuyper, Berkouwer, and Dooyeweerd, namely, that there
are two streams running through the thought of these theologians: a Reformed
1. Cornelius Van Til, The Case for Calvinism, International Library of Philosophy and
Theology: Philosophical and Historical Studies Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1964), 147-48;
idem, Essays on Christian Education (Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1971), 89; idem, Jerusalem
and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Nutley, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 98, 403; Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van
Til 1895–1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree Communications, 1995), 15, 23.
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(i.e., antithetical) stream and a scholastic (i.e., synthetical) stream. Hence the
second dialectical tension: On the one hand Van Til presents himself as the
American guardian of the neo-Calvinist antithesis, but on the other hand he
criticizes the very theological wells from which he draws his neo-Calvinist
dogmatic water as having been poisoned by scholasticism.2
Our analysis of this twofold dialectical tension regarding Van Til’s
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought will proceed in two steps. First, in the present
chapter we will survey Van Til’s various criticisms of Bavinck in order to locate
the crux of the critiques and to elucidate the dialectical nature of the critiques.
Second, in the following chapter we will demonstrate that Van Til’s
“scholasticism” polemic is an appropriation both of Herman Dooyeweerd’s
definition of scholasticism and of Dooyeweerd’s application of this definition
contra neo-Calvinist theology. Then, based upon our findings regarding the
nature and the sources of Van Til’s criticisms, we will argue that the critiques are
invalid due to Van Til’s misguided dialectical, idealistic reconstruction of
Bavinck’s thought.

A. Van Til’s Critiques of Bavinck’s Thought
1. Dialectical Interpretations of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck’s theology and the wider neo-Calvinist
theological movement spearheaded by Abraham Kuyper are well known in the
Copernican line of Van Til scholarship that was introduced in chapter 1 above.
Specifically, self-styled “Van Tilian” scholars frequently portray their master as a
2. Both of these points will be demonstrated in chapter 6 below.
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veritable Copernicus who revolutionized Christian apologetics specifically by
purging the scholasticism of his Reformed predecessors and hence producing for the
first time ever a truly Reformed approach to metaphysics, epistemology, and
ethics. Such is the case, for example, with Greg Bahnsen’s interpretation of Van
Til’s “inward” criticisms of “the teachings . . . of Dutch Reformed authors” such
as Bavinck.3 Furthermore, K. Scott Oliphint appropriates Van Til’s criticisms of
the scholasticism in Bavinck’s formulations of epistemological realism and
argues that
. . . there is in Herman Bavinck’s otherwise most useful analysis of
epistemology and theological prolegomena a viral infection—call it
Bavinck’s bug—that, if it spreads, will serve to undermine the basic
foundation of his own Reformed theology.4
William’s Dennison’s remark exemplifies such Copernican interpretations of Van
Til’s criticisms of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought:
As most Van Tilians realize, Van Til fought diligently to purge the
Reformed tradition from the remnants of scholasticism which remained
in the thought of Old Princeton, Kuyper, and Bavinck. 5
Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are therefore a part of the larger hero story
purported by the Copernican interpretation of Van Til wherein he purportedly
saves the entire Reformed tradition from the wiles of scholasticism.
3. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998),
13-14. Bahnsen lists Van Til’s main criticisms of Bavinck at p. 14n42, yet he makes no attempt to
analyze them.
4. K. Scott Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck,” in Speaking the Truth
in Love: The Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 201; cf. the
expanded version of this article in idem, “Bavinckʼs Realism, The Logos Principle, and Sola
Scriptura,” Westminster Theological Journal 72, no. 2 (2010): 359-90.
5. William D. Dennison, “Analytic Philosophy and Van Tilʼs Epistemology,” Westminster
Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 55. Compare Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic, 13-16, 542. Contrast
the more nuanced, critical assessment of John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His
Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1995), 339-52, and the non-revolutionary, albeit too brief,
assessment of John R. Muether, Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman, American
Reformed Biographies (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 56.

142
Not every interpretation of Van Til’s critiques of scholasticism follows the
Copernican approach, however. Most notably, as we saw in chapter 1 above,
Brian Mattson has recently analyzed Van Til’s various critiques of Bavinck at
some length and has concluded that they are largely superficial, misdirected, and
hence invalid.6 Additionally, William Masselink argues that, far from trimming
select scholastic twigs from from the Reformed theological tree, Van Til, insofar
as he makes common cause with the “reconstructionists,” aims his anti-scholastic
axe at the very roots of neo-Calvinist theology (i.e., Kuyper, Bavinck, and
Valentine Hepp (1879–1950)):
Instead of reconstruction, we seem to face some destruction. Instead of
relieving the “Kuyper tree of some unhealthy twigs,” to use Schilder’s
phraseology, they [i.e., the “reconstructionists,” including Schilder,
Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, and Van Til7] have, according to my thinking,
severed some of the roots upon which the life of the tree depends.
Instead of removing a few loose shingles from the roof of the calvinistic
structure of science, they have, I am afraid, dislodged or attempted to
dislodge some of the foundation stones upon which the whole building
rests.8
Two nearly opposite approaches to Van Til’s criticisms are therefore evident in
the scholarship. On the one hand, the Copernican scholars hold up these
criticisms as the pinnacle of Van Til’s Copernican revolution, as if Van Til saved
Reformed theology in general and of Bavinck’s theology in particular from
scholasticism. On the other hand, at least two scholars find Van Til’s criticisms of
Bavinck’s thought to be less than convincing. This dialectical tension in the
6. Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,” Westminster Theological Journal 70,
no. 1 (2008): 111-127.
7. William Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace: A Defense of the Historic Reformed
Faith Over Against the Theology and Philosophy of the So-called “Reconstructionist” Movement (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1953), 12.
8. William Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 15. Masselink views Van Til’s
apologetics as a “departure from Machen’s and Warfield’s apologetics as well as from Kuyper,
Bavinck, and Hepp. . .” (p. 13).
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secondary scholarship mirrors the dialectal tension evident in Van Til’s
simultaneous pervasive appropriations and totalizing criticisms of Bavinck’s
thought.
Since Van Til’s main criticisms of Bavinck’s thought have been treated at
length by Mattson, there is no need for a detailed analysis of every point of the
various criticisms. However, Mattson’s analysis needs to be expanded in several
ways. First, Mattson does not cover all of Van Til’s criticisms. Arguably, he omits
the two most important sources of Van Til’s criticisms: (1) Common Grace and the
Gospel and (2) Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics; for, within these
works Van Til provides clues to the motivation behind his criticisms. Second,
although Mattson briefly analyzes Van Til’s review of R. H. Bremmer’s first book
on Bavinck, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, he omits Van Til’s review of
Bremmer’s second book, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten. As will be
demonstrated below, due to this omission Mattson draws a false conclusion on
an important point of Van Til’s analysis of Bavinck’s thought. Third, Mattson
does not analyze the crux of all of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck’s
theological and epistemological formulations. Beyond the the obvious fact that
Van Til misreads and misrepresents Bavinck’s thought at several points, much
more needs to be said about why he criticizes Bavinck’s thought in such a
perfunctory manner and why he chooses the topics of principia and epistemology
as the main heads for his critiques. Mattson helpfully and correctly elucidates
several aspects of the that, but he sheds little light on the why. Therefore, we must
first survey the full scope of Van Til’s criticisms before we can attempt to shed
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light on why Van Til levels these criticisms in the first place.
2. Criticisms in An Introduction to Systematic Theology9
“Herman Bavinck has given to us,” writes Van Til at the beginning of the
chapter that is devoted to criticizing Herman Bavinck’s and Valentine Hepp’s
formulations of theological epistemology,
the greatest and most comprehensive statement of Reformed systematic
theology in modern times. In this chapter we wish to note something of
the breadth and depth of Bavinck’s presentation, and then point out
where we believe he might have gone somewhat further than he has
along the path that he has laid out for us.10
Van Til proceeds to praise Bavinck’s insistence upon a threefold principa for
dogmatics: (1) God is the sole source of human knowledge, (2) Holy Scripture is
the sole external principle of theology, and (3) believing reason is the sole internal
principle of theology.11 Yet, this praise serves as the terminus a quo for Van Til’s
criticisms; for, he argues that Bavinck contradicts his own principia in several
ways.12 According to Van Til, Bavinck’s catalog of self-contradictions includes the
following metaphysical formulations: (1) Bavinck fails to escape Thomas
Aquinas’ influence with respect to realism, and Bavinck thus falls prey to
appealing “to facts as though they were brute facts when it comes to the
formulation of a theory of metaphysics.”13 (2) Bavinck’s critique of idealism fails
to go far enough; for, since he “does not tell us that the basis of his criticism is the

9. Cf. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 123-27.
10. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of
Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 89.
11. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89-91.
12. Van Til repeats this self-contradiction argument against Bavinck elsewhere. E.g., see idem,
A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 20.
13. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 92.
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presupposition of the self-existent God,”14 and since he approvingly cites a quip
by Aquinas regarding knowledge of heavenly things, Bavinck falls prey to both
an anti-Christian, “Aristotelian notion of gradation in the created universe” and
an anti-Christian “Greek depreciation of the things of the sense world.” 15 (3) By
following the metaphysical realism of Aquinas and Gijsbert Voetius (1589–1676),
Bavinck fails “to distinguish carefully a Christian epistemology from the nonChristian epistemology.”16 (4) Likewise, with respect to scholasticism in general,
Bavinck fails to reject “its principle of commingling Aristotelianism with
Christian principles.”17 Thus Bavinck’s formulation of “moderate realism” is “not
a specifically Christian position based upon the presupposition of the existence
of the God of Scripture.”18
In addition to these four arguments against Bavinck’s metaphysical
formulations, Van Til continues his catalog of criticisms with the following
allegations against what he views as “the weakest point”19 in Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek, namely, the self-contradictions in Bavinck’s epistemological
formulations: (1) On the one hand, Bavinck roots human knowledge in the Logos
of creation. Yet, on the other hand, Bavinck follows Thomas Aquinas who
“trimmed Aristotle’s principles down but did not reject the foundation on which
they were built.”20 Bavinck is thus guilty of mixing pagan Greek philosophy with
Christian theology. (2) With respect to natural reason Bavinck follows Aquinas’
14. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 92.
15. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 92-93; quotes at p. 93.
16. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 94.
17. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 94.
18. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 95.
19. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 95.
20. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 95-96; quote at p. 96.
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formulation of knowing per participationeum—a formulation that “has not cut
itself free from its monistic origin in Platonic Aristotelian thought.” Hence
Bavinck falls prey to “the half-Christian, half-Greek speculation of Thomas.”21
3. Criticisms in The Defense of the Faith22
Similar to his critiques in An Introduction to Systematic Theology, the structure
of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck’s thought in The Defense of the Faith
proceeds from praise to polemic. The praise part can be seen, for example, in Van
Til’s summary of the first section of the book wherein he lauds Bavinck’s
formulation of the Reformed worldview (along with Hodge’s and Warfield’s):
It is on the basis of the work of such men as Charles Hodge, Herman
Bavinck, and B. B. Warfield, to mention no others, that we have
formulated the broad outline of the Reformed life and world view. It is
only by the help of such men that we have been enabled to attain to
anything like a consistent Protestantism.23
The praise is further evident in a similar passage wherein Van Til appropriates
Bavinck’s thought (along with Hodge’s, Warfield’s, and Kuyper’s) as a polemic
against Roman Catholic and Arminian theology:
The one great defect of the Roman Catholic and the Arminian view is, as
noted, that it ascribes ultimacy or self-sufficiency to the mind of man.
Romanism and Arminianism do this in their views of man as stated in
their works on systematic theology. It is consistent for them, therefore,
not to challenge the assumption of ultimacy as this is made by the nonbeliever. But Reformed theology, as worked out by Calvin and his recent
exponents such as Hodge, Warfield, Kuyper and Bavinck, holds that
man’s mind is derivative.24
21. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 96-98; quotes at p. 97 and p. 98,
respectively.
22. Cf. Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 116-23. Note, however, that Mattson does not
cover all of the critiques that Van Til levels against Bavinck throughout The Defense of the Faith.
23. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R, 2008), 103.
24. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 113; Also cf. p. 276.
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Additionally, in chapter ten Van Til summarizes his apologetic methodology in
such a way that praise precedes his criticisms:
If Christian theism is not true then nothing is true. Is the God of the Bible
satisfied if his servants say anything less?
And have I, following such a method, departed radically from the
tradition of Kuyper and Bavinck? On the contrary have learned all this
primarily from them. It is Kuyper’s Encyclopedia that has, more than any
other work in modern times, brought out the fact of the difference
between the approach of the believer and of the unbeliever. It is
Bavinck’s monumental work which set a natural theology frankly
oriented to Scripture squarely over against that of Romanism which is
based on neutral reason. It is Bavinck who taught me that the proofs for
God as usually formulated on the traditional method prove a finite god. I
have indeed had the temerity to maintain that these great Reformed
theologians have in some points not been quite true to their own
principles. But when I have done so I have usually tried to point out that
when they did so and to the extent that they did so they had departed
from Calvin.25
Van Til uses these statements of praise as the terminus a quo for his various
criticisms of Bavinck’s alleged self-contradictions—contradictions which Van Til
thinks are rooted in Bavinck’s invalid attempt to synthesize Reformed and
Roman Catholic thought. Ironically, on the one hand Van Til praises the “main
thrust” of Bavinck’s theology as being against the “scholastic synthesis” of
“Aristotle and Christ.”26 Yet, on the other hand, he levels the following criticisms
against the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought.
3.1. Chapter 8: A Brief Excursus on Sources
Due to the fact that many portions of The Defense of the Faith are
concatenations of extended citations from Van Til’s various syllabi, a brief note
on the sources of chapter eight is necessary. Van Til begins the chapter by noting
25. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 264.
26. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 286.
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that most of the material herein is “taken verbatim from a syllabus on A Christian
Theory of Knowledge.”27 This 1954 syllabus was later divided and published in two
separate books: A Christian Theory of Knowledge28 and The Defense of the Faith. The
latter has been published in four editions, two unabridged 29 and two abridged.30
Furthermore, within The Defense of the Faith the portion of chapter eight which
contains Van Til’s criticism of Bavinck’s theology is comprised of an extended
citation from Van Til’s book, Common Grace, which itself is a concatenation of
three articles which Van Til published in the Westminster Theological Journal.31
Additionally, Common Grace was later published within Van Til’s expanded
treatment of the same topic—Common Grace and the Gospel.32 For simplicity’s sake
the following survey will cite only the fourth edition of The Defense of the Faith.
3.2. Chapter 8: Common Grace and Scholasticism
Van Til alleges that Bavinck and Kuyper fail to overcome the Roman Catholic
formulation of the concepts of innate knowledge of God (i.e., cognitationes insitae)
and common notions (i.e., koinai ennoiai and notiones impressae). Specifically,
Bavinck and Kuyper “sometimes employed the notions of brute fact and of
abstract universals,” writes Van Til.33 Furthermore, “they also at times adopt in
their process of reasoning the non-Christian principles of continuity and of
discontinuity” insofar as “they seek for common notions between believers and
27. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 171; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1954.K.
28. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1969.G.
29. For the first unabridged edition, cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1955.G; The 2008 4th edition of
Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, is unabridged and includes added commentary from the editor.
30. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1963.B, 1967.A.
31. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1945.D, 1946.F1-2, 1947.C.
32. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1972.E.
33. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 184-85; quote at p. 185.
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unbelievers that are not exclusively based upon the idea of the sensus dietatis.”34
They then ignore the difference between the idea of fact and logic as it
springs from the position that is based upon the notion of the
autonomous man, and the idea of fact and logic which springs from the
position that is based upon the notion of the ontological Trinity.35
In sum, then, Bavinck and Kuyper fail to formulate a fully Christian
epistemology insofar as they accept the Roman Catholic formulation of common
notions and innate knowledge of God, formulations that Van Til views as invalid
mixes of pagan philosophy and Christian theology.
3.3. Chapter 13: Amsterdam and Old Princeton36
Staying true to the overall structure of his criticisms against Bavinck’s
theology, Van Til begins his section on Bavinck by praising Bavinck’s insistence
upon Holy Scripture “as the principium unicum of the Christian.”37 Then Van Til
levels an allegation to the effect that Bavinck contradicts his own principium:
In spite of this stress on the Scripture as self-attesting and as such the
primary principle for the interpretation of man and the world, Bavinck
too [i.e., in addition to Kuyper] sometimes reverts to the idea that man
can without this principle interpret much of experience truly. 38
Van Til catalogs Bavinck’s contradictions as follows: (1) Despite his insistence
upon Scripture as the principium unicum, Bavinck sometimes argues from the
principum of “self-consciousness as such” without any attempt to relate this

34. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 186.
35. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 186.
36. With respect to the material content of this chapter, note Van Til’s remark in The Defense of
the Faith, 345n1: “Most of the material in this chapter is taken from the syllabus on A Christian
Theory of Knowledge.”
37. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 374.
38. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 374.
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principium to God or to Christ.39 (2) Within his 1908 Princeton Stone Lectures 40
Bavinck omits the doctrines of creation and providence in order to meet
philosophers on their own terms.41 (3) Bavinck employs abstract (i.e., nonChristian) definitions of the terms “real” and “ideal” in his use of the phrase,
“the unity of real and ideal being.” 42 (4) Bavinck contradicts his own views of
innate and acquired knowledge and of general revelation since he seeks to “start
with the cogito as such as the foundation of human knowledge.”43 (5) Bavinck
fails to properly relate natural and special revelation insofar as he follows
Thomas Aquinas’ formulation “that supernatural revelation is necessary for man
because natural revelation is uncertain.” 44 (6) Likewise, because Bavinck follows
Aquinas, he unduly lowers the claims of the objective clarity of general
revelation. Hence he admits that the Christian “has no compelling proofs for his
position,” only probabilities.45 (7) Contrary to his own Reformed theology,
Bavinck starts with the foundation of Descartes’ “cogito as such” and then builds
up a “piecemeal” argument from the causal argument to the teleological
argument and then to the ontological argument. 46 Van Til concludes accordingly:
. . . surely we must not follow Bavinck when, starting from man as
ultimate, he leads on to an ultimate Cause that is not clearly God, to an
ultimate Purpose that is not clearly God’s, and to an ultimate Being who
does not help us out of the vicious circle of our thought. 47
39. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 374-75; quote at p. 375.
40. Herman Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation: The Stone Lectures for 1908-1909, Princeton
Theological Seminary (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908).
41. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 375.
42. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 375-76; citing Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation, 61.
43. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 376.
44. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 376-77; quote at p. 377.
45. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 377-78; quote at p. 377.
46. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 378-79.
47. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 379.
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In sum, Van Til charges Bavinck for appropriating Descartes’ anti-Christian cogito
and then building upon this autonomous epistemological foundation a schema
of proofs for God’s existence that at best proves only the probability of God’s
existence rather than demonstrates the necessity of God’s existence as the
ultimate precondition for all truth.
4. Criticisms in Common Grace and the Gospel
Despite the fact that some of the material within Common Grace and the Gospel
is recapitulated in An Introduction to Systematic Theology and The Defense of the
Faith, Van Til’s longest and most detailed criticisms are found herein.
Furthermore, the context of these criticisms is important background material for
chapter 6 below. Additionally, Van Til insinuates that Common Grace and the
Gospel contains his definitive critique of Bavinck’s errors.48 Thus for our purposes
it is important to survey these criticisms despite a few repetitions.
4.1. The Context of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck’s thought throughout Common Grace and the
Gospel are set within the context of his interpretation of the American debate
regarding the Three Points on common grace issued by the 1924 Synod of the
Christian Reformed Church in North America. He divides the parties of the
debate as follows:
Broadly speaking there are in this latest struggle three parties. (a) There
are those who would cling quite closely to the traditional, that is, the
48. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia,
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974), 3:31: “For a fuller understanding of the nature of
the scholasticism that faced Dooyeweerd as he began his work, a consideration of Herman
Bavinck’s views would be helpful. But I must refer the reader to my Common Grace and the Gospel
for a discussion of Bavinck’s views.”
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Kuyper-Bavinck point of view. Professor V. Hepp of the Free University
of Amsterdam may be said to be the leading representative here. (b)
There are those who deny common grace. Herman Hoeksema is now the
recognized leader of this group. (c) There are those who would not deny
common grace, nor yet affirm it in its traditional form, but reconstruct it.
Dr. K. Schilder may be said to represent this group. 49
For reasons that will become apparent in chapter 6 below, it is important to
highlight two points regarding the context of Van Til’s criticisms. In the first
place, Van Til explicates the third party in terms of a larger theological and
philosophical reconstruction movement that seeks both to build upon the
traditional Kuyper-Bavinck position and to rebuild “certain abstractions” that
threaten the stability of that position:
The reconstruction effort [of Schilder] is closely related to a broad
movement in theology and philosophy which attempts to build up the
traditional Reformed position while yet to an extent rebuilding it. The
Philosophy of Sphere Sovereignty of Professors H. Dooyeweerd and D.
H. Th. Vollenhoven represents a part of this movement. It seeks to
appreciate the concrete approach that Kuyper has given to the problems
of theology and philosophy without clinging to certain abstractions that
he retained.50
He then references an article by Dooyeweerd 51 and a booklet by Cornelis
Veenhof52 as exemplars of this theological and philosophical reconstruction
movement. The importance of Dooyeweerd’s article with respect to Van Til’s
criticisms of Bavinck’s theology will be analyzed below.
In the second place, Van Til aligns himself with this reconstruction
movement by appropriating a major aspect of Schilder’s critique of Kuyper’s
49. Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and
Reformed Pub. Co., 1972), 23.
50. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 23.
51. Herman Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939): 193232.
52. Cornelis Veenhof, In Kuyperʼs lijn (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1939).
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formulation of common grace—concrete vs. abstract thinking. Hence Van Til
comments upon Schilder’s book, Wat is de Hemel?,53 as follows: “The whole thrust
of his [I.e, Schilder’s] thinking,” writes Van Til, “is an effort to proceed
concretely.”54 Similarly, Van Til remarks:
The contribution made in this book is of great value. This contribution
consists in stressing the need of concrete procedure in all our theological
thinking.55
Even though Van Til is critical of certain aspects of Schilder’s formulations, he
nevertheless appropriates Schilder’s concrete-vs.-abstract thinking motif, and he
then uses this motif as the paradigm according to which he levels critiques
against Bavinck’s theology. Hence he introduces his criticisms as follows:
It would seem to be obvious that if we are to avoid thinking abstractly on
the common grace problem, we must seek to avoid thinking abstractly in
the whole of our theological and philosophical effort. Perhaps the first
question we should ask ourselves is whether the Kuyper-Bavinck form
of theological statement in general, in which nearly all, if not all, who
have been engaged in the recent common grace debate have been
nurtured, does not, to some extent at least, suffer from the disease of
abstraction. Perhaps the physicians have not altogether escaped the
disease against which they have inoculated others. As a grateful patient
it is my duty now to assert that in my humble judgment such is the
case.56
Furthermore, later on in the book where Van Til responds to William Masselink
he insinuates that he does belong to the so-called “reconstruction theology”
movement led by Schilder and Dooyeweerd. 57
Though he does not spell out herein the significance of this reconstruction
53. Klaas Schilder, Wat is de Hemel? (Kampen: Kok, 1935); translated and condensed as idem,
Heaven: What Is It? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1950).
54. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 24.
55. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 25.
56. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 34.
57. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 148ff.
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movement with respect to his own criticisms of Bavinck, it is important to note
that Van Til recognizes that he is not the only theologian leveling critiques
against Kuyper, Bavinck, and other neo-Calvinist thinkers. Van Til’s relation to
this reconstruction movement is highly significant, and one salient aspect of this
relation will be examined in the following chapter—Van Til’s appropriation of
Herman Dooyeweerd’s formulations regarding scholasticism.
4.2. The Catalog of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til summarizes the basic thrust of his criticisms against Bavinck (along
with Kuyper and Hepp) in terms of his abstract-vs.-concrete motif. Specifically,
he links Bavinck’s abstract thinking with an alleged Roman Catholic synthesis of
Aristotelian and Christian thought:
Rome’s semi-Aristotelian epistemology influences, and accords with, its
semi-Aristotelian ethics. Rome’s notion of the common area of Reason
between believers and non-believers controls its conception of the
common cardinal virtues. So also what Kuyper and Bavinck think of the
reprobate’s knowledge of God will influence what they think of the
reprobate’s deeds before God. We shall seek to intimate, be it all too
briefly, that in the epistemology of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp there are
remnants of an abstract way of thinking that we shall need to guard
against in our common grace discussion.58
After stating generally that Bavinck mixes Aristotle and Christ, Van Til alleges
several specific instances of Bavinck’s commingling.
In the first place, Bavinck at times contradicts his own affirmation of Holy
Scripture as the sole principium externum of theology. He does this by adopting “a
moderate realism.”59 Specifically, “by accepting what he calls the good of
empiricism and what he calls the good of rationalism, and dropping the evil of
58. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 34.
59. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 44-45; quote at p. 45.
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both,” argues Van Til, Bavinck makes common cause with “non-Christian
realists” over against rationalism and with “non-Christian rationalists” over
against empiricism.60
But, we object, the abstract principles of rationalism are not made
concrete by bringing them into relation with the brute facts of
empiricism, and the brute facts of empiricism are not made accessible by
bringing them into relation with the abstract principles of rationalism. 61
Van Til thus concludes that with respect to the principia of theology Bavinck falls
prey to abstract thinking. In other words, he “does not make a thorough break
with Scholasticism.”62
In the second place, a concomitant of his failure to make a clean break with
scholasticism is that Bavinck fails to provide a Christian formulation of the
incomprehensibility of God. Instead, his view is “obtained in part by Christian,
and in part by non-Christian, principles of reasoning.”63 Thus Van Til asserts that
on this point Bavinck’s view should be replaced with Calvin’s:
With all our admiration for Bavinck we yet found that he allowed
himself to be influenced by the Greek ideal of the comprehension of God.
This ideal works havoc with true Reformed theology. Perhaps we may
here learn anew from the greatest of theologians, John Calvin. 64
In the third place, a further concomitant of Bavinck’s scholasticism is that in his
formulation of the theistic proofs (1) he “has not altogether cut himself loose
from non-Christian forms of reasoning” and (2) he fails “to show that this
procedure [i.e., the epistemological procedure of the autonomous man] is

60. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 45.
61. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 45.
62. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 45.
63. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 46-47; quote at p. 47.
64. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64-65.
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basically mistaken.”65 Bavinck’s formulation of the proofs is thus
very similar to the old Princeton position, and both are very similar to
the Scholastic position. There are differences in degree between these
three positions, but they agree in holding that all reasoning about
Christian theism must be done on “common” ground. . . . For all his
effort to the contrary, Bavinck sometimes seems to offer us a natural
theology of a kind similar to that offered by the church of Rome.66
Additionally, Van Til avers that Bavinck fails to challenge the Roman Catholic
view of natural theology since he fails to “presuppose the ontological trinity”
before treating the theistic proofs.67 Such a failure has catastrophic consequences
for Bavinck’s theology; for, according to Van Til, “unless we may make this
presupposition, all human predication is meaningless.” 68 In sum, Bavinck’s
adherence to the Roman Catholic formulation of the theistic proofs and hence to
the Roman Catholic view of natural theology undergirding the theistic proofs
contradicts “the real position of Bavinck,” namely, that the “Christian must stand
with both feet upon the bed-rock of special revelation in his study of nature.” 69
In the fourth place, yet another concomitant of his failure to overcome
scholasticism is that Bavinck’s view of the innate knowledge of God is not fully
Christian. Bavinck contradicts his own principia by allowing for “the idea of brute
facts of Empiricism and the idea of abstract universals of Rationalism.” 70 Using
an idiosyncratic distinction between psychological and epistemological innate
knowledge of God, Van Til poses the following question:
Psychologically there are no atheistic men; epistemologically every
65. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 47-48; quote at p. 48.
66. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 48-49; quote at p. 49.
67. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 49.
68. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 49.
69. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 50-51; quote at p. 51.
70. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 51-52; quote at p. 52.
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sinner is atheistic. Has Bavinck kept this fact in mind? 71
He answers with a resounding negative:
Bavinck speaks of Cicero as saying that that on which all men agree,
because of their common nature, cannot be wrong. Cicero no doubt
meant that there is some basis of agreement between all men,
epistemologically as well as psychologically. That is to say, for Cicero
there was an area of common interpretation, however small, in which all
men are epistemologically in agreement. It is on such notions as those of
Cicero that Roman Catholic natural theology is built. Bavinck has not
always kept this point in mind.72
After further detailing Bavinck’s allegedly Roman Catholic—and hence nonChristian— view of humanity’s innate knowledge of God,73 Van Til concludes by
summarizing the entire catalog of his critiques:
Taken in its entirety, the section dealing with the cognitio Dei insita has
not escaped the ambiguity that we found in Bavinck’s general treatment
of the principia in science, in his conception of mystery, and in his
conception of the theistic proofs. It is the same ambiguity throughout
that meets us. And it is the same ambiguity that we have found in
Kuyper. These men have certainly led the way in modern times in the
direction of working out a truly Protestant theology. But they have not
quite had the courage to go consistently along the path they have
marked out for us. There are elements of abstract reasoning in their
procedure that lead to a natural theology which is not consistently set
over against the natural theology of Rome at every point. When they
deal with the objective aspect of the matter, that is with the revelational
question, they cater, to some extent, to the idea of a probability position.
This probability position is the result of seeking for truth in the abstract
way, combining impersonal principles with brute facts. When they deal
with the subjective aspect of the matter, with the common ideas, they do
not make a clear-cut, ringing distinction between that which is
psychologically revelational and that which is epistemologically
interpretative.74
In the fifth place, over against Bavinck’s allegedly abstract thinking Van Til
proposes another idiosyncratic formulation, namely, the doctrine of the trinity as
71. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 52-54; quote at p. 54.
72. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 54.
73. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 54-57.
74. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 57-58.
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the epistemological “concrete universal.”
What has been said by way of criticism on the remnants of abstract
thinking found in Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp has virtually suggested
the direction of thought we would follow in approaching the question of
common grace. The ontological trinity will be our interpretative concept
everywhere. God is our concrete universal; in Him thought and being are
coterminous, in Him the problem of knowledge is solved.
If we begin thus with the ontological trinity as our concrete
universal, we frankly differ from every school of philosophy and from
every school of science not merely in our conclusions, but in our startingpoint and in our method as well. For us the facts are what they are, and
the universals are what they are, because of their common dependence
upon the ontological trinity. Thus, as earlier discussed, the facts are
correlative to the universals. Because of this correlativity there is genuine
progress in history; because of it the Moment has significance. 75
5. A Brief Criticism in The Sovereignty of Grace
In this book Van Til briefly criticizes Bavinck’s “critical realism” as a
devolution into Roman Catholic natural theology and hence a departure from
Reformed theology:
In recent times Bavinck, much as he stressed the “ethical” character of
the Reformation, none-the-less, developed a philosophical prolegomena
in which he developed a critical realism. In this he followed Thomas
Aquinas.76
This brief example displays the consistency of Van Til’s overall criticism of
Bavinck’s theology, namely, that the root of Bavinck’s errors is his affinity for
scholasticism à la Thomas Aquinas.
6. Criticisms in “Bavinck the Theologian” and “As I think of Bavinck”
In 1961 and 1966, respectively, Van Til wrote review articles for both of R. H.
Bremmer’s books: Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus and Herman Bavinck en zijn
75. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64.
76. Cornelius Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace: An Appraisal of G. C. Berkouwer’s View of Dordt
(Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1969), 28.
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tijdgenoten.77 In these review articles Van Til does not level any new criticisms
against Bavinck’s thought. Nevertheless, these articles are appropriate to
consider under the heading of Van Til’s criticisms since in both he affirms
Bremmer’s main criticism of Bavinck’s thought—scholasticism.
Mattson makes two assertions regarding Van Til’s first review article: (1) He
claims that Van Til fails to write on the assigned topic—Bremmer’s book—and
instead levels unrelated critiques against the theological formulations of Herman
Dooyeweerd, Karl Barth, and Jan Lever. (2) He claims that Van Til grants
Bremmer’s allegation of scholasticism in Bavinck’s theology largely for the sake
of argument.78 Both assertions, however, are misguided.
In the first place, Van Til’s conclusion undermines both of Mattson’s claims.
Referring to Bremmer’s books, Van Til writes:
The two volumes together will, no doubt, prove to be of great help not
only for the understanding of Bavinck but also for an appreciation of the
double-headed fact that (a) we must be true followers of Bavinck in order,
then, to go beyond him, and (b) to avoid Bavinck’s tendency toward
Scholasticism we must be alert to the deadly danger of modern
activism.79
The whole point of the article is to vindicate this “double-headed fact.”
Accordingly, Van Til clearly agrees with Bremmer’s assessment that it is time to
go beyond Bavinck’s scholasticism, and he disagrees only with Lever’s,
Dooyeweerd’s, and Barth’s invalid attempts to do so insofar as these
contemporary theologians ground their formulations in “the deadly danger of
77. Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological
Journal 24, no. 1 (1961): 48-64; a review of R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus
(Kampen: Kok, 1961); and Cornelius Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” International Reformed
Bulletin 9, no. 27 (1966): 19-26; a review of R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten
(Kampen: Kok, 1966).
78. Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 115.
79. Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian,” 64; emphasis added.
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modern activism.” Van Til therefore does not fail to write on the assigned topic;
rather, he affirms Bremmer’s critique of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought
and then analyzes Lever’s, Dooyeweerd’s, and Barth’s formulations according to
Bremmer’s premise.
Furthermore, in Van Til’s review of Bremmer’s second book—which review
Mattson omits—Van Til explicitly affirms Bremmer’s criticism of the
scholasticism in Bavinck’s dogmatics: “Bremmer’s criticism of Bavinck is
legitimate,” he writes. “We do well to go beyond Bavinck by dropping the
remnants of Thomistic realism still present in his thought.”80
Additionally, throughout his second review article Van Til recapitulates the
“double-headed fact” motif from his first article, albeit without using the term.
Thus, on the one hand, Van Til criticizes the “internal inconsistency” in Bavinck’s
thought:
We have dwelt on this internal inconsistency in Bavinck’s theology
because it illustrates, we believe, a measure of ambiguity that appears in
his theology at various places.81
Then, on the other hand, he immediately adds a caveat:
But our negative attitude toward Bavinck must be based upon a positive
attitude toward what was, after all, his basic approach, and that was his
simple assumption of the direct revelation of God in history through
Christ and his Word as found in Scripture. 82
Van Til’s recapitulation of the “double-headed fact” motif regarding Bavinck’s
“internal inconsistency” is therefore obvious.
Moreover, with respect to Van Til’s seemingly unrelated digressions on B. B.
80. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 24.
81. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 22.
82. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 24.
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Warfield, Foppe M. ten Hoor, and Karl Barth,83 these discussions, like those
found in Van Til’s first review article, are not instances of his failing to write on
the assigned topic. Rather, he brings these thinkers under his purview in order to
use them as foils for vindicating his “double-headed-fact” interpretation of
Bavinck’s theology. Thus, on the one hand, he vehemently denies that Barth’s
dialectical theology is a valid advancement beyond Bavinck’s scholasticism:
We could wish that those who want to go “beyond Bavinck” à la Barth
would simply tell us that they are done with Bavinck. But we do not
really want them to seek for an impossible fusion of the Gereformeerde
Dogmatiek and the Kirchliche Dogmatik. We really hope that hey will learn
to challenge the Christ of modern subjectivism as he is set forth in the
Dogmatik by the Christ of the Scriptures as he is in the Dogmatiek.84
Nevertheless, on the other hand, he affirms Bremmer’s evaluation regarding the
need to overcome Bavinck’s scholasticism. “To go beyond Bavinck in this
fashion,” he writes, “may also bear rich fruit for Christian apologetics.”
Ironically, the “fashion” that Van Til puts forth as the valid way to advance
beyond Bavinck is “the Christ of the Scriptures as he is in the Dogmatiek.” For Van
Til, therefore, the way to overcome Bavinck’s scholasticism is to follow Bavinck’s
non-scholastic theology! Hence the dialectical nature of the “double-headed fact.”
7. Criticisms in Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics
In his 1974 syllabus on Herman Dooyeweerd’s Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee Van
Til mostly reiterates his earlier criticisms against the scholasticism in Bavinck’s
theology rather than leveling new critiques. Nevertheless, this syllabus is highly
significant for understanding the why behind the that of Van Til’s criticisms; for,
83. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 22-25.
84. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 25.

162
herein Van Til explicitly connects his criticisms of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s
thought with Herman Dooyeweerd’s earlier criticisms of the scholasticism in
Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Jan Wolter’s thought. Building upon Dooyeweerd’s
analysis, for example, Van Til writes, “Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck
still have not altogether escaped the Thomistic-Aquinian position.” 85 This
important connection between Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s criticisms will be
analyzed in the following chapter. For our present purpose of cataloging Van
Til’s critiques, we will simply summarize his criticisms.
Van Til’s dialectical analysis of Bavinck’s “double-headed fact” is clearly
evident throughout this syllabus; for, he lauds several aspects of Bavinck’s
theology before recapitulating his earlier criticisms.
Regarding Bavinck’s positives, Van Til avers: (1) Bavinck provides great help
in formulating “a truly Reformed theology along the lines of the Reformation
principle.” (2) Bavinck provides the theological paragon for “a truly biblical view
of the immanent or ontological trinity as the presupposition of the intelligibility
of human experience.” (3) “[N]o one brought out more forcibly than did
Bavinck” the doctrine of God’s incomprehensibility and its implications for both
Christians and non-Christians. (4) Since all of man’s knowledge is covenantal,
then Bavinck has correctly argued that “mystery is the life element of
dogmatics.” (5) Bavinck correctly affirms that since humanity is the image of
God, then humans have an “ineradicable” and “certain” knowledge of God. 86
Despite these positives, Van Til maintains that “Bavinck, as well as Kuyper
85. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
86. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
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has not cut himself fully free from scholastic methodology.”87 Citing passages
from his Common Grace syllabus, he alleges the following evidence for Bavinck’s
non-Christian scholasticism: (1) Bavinck waffles between Christian and nonChristian philosophies of fact and law. (2) Bavinck adopts a non-Christian form
of “moderate realism.” (3) Bavinck’s formulations of God’s incomprehensibility
sometimes devolve into invalid syntheses of Christian thought and pagan
philosophy rather than maintaining the antithesis between Christian and nonChristian formulations. (4) Bavinck’s formulation of the theistic proofs fails to
show that the methodology underlying the proofs is fundamentally misguided.
Thus Bavinck’s formulation of the proofs contradicts Calvin’s. (5) Bavinck’s
formulation of humanity’s innate knowledge of God is Roman Catholic rather
than Christian; for, Bavinck illegitimately employs brute facts from non-Christian
empiricism and abstract universals from non-Christian rationalism. 88
No small measure of perplexity attends Van Til’s “double-headed” praises
and criticisms in this section; for, nearly all of the positives that he lists herein are
also leveled as criticisms either on the very next page or in Van Til’s other
writings that we surveyed above!
Additionally, a few pages later Van Til recapitulates and comments upon the
criticisms he leveled against Bavinck’s theology in An Introduction to Systematic
Theology: (1) Bavinck’s realism is “unusable for apologetic purposes” since it falls
prey to the same defects as Scottish common sense realism. (2) Bavinck mixes
Christian and non-Christian views of certainty. (3) Bavinck affirms the pagan,
87. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:11.
88. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:11.
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Greek view of universals.89 “Thomas Aquinas,” summarizes Van Til,
trimmed Aristotle’s principles down but did not reject the foundation on
which they were built. To an extent, this is also true of Bavinck. He has
largely followed Thomas in this aspect. Accordingly, he tells us at one
moment that our certainty lies in the Logos of creation, but then forgets
about the Logos in the course of his argumentation and makes certainty
to exist merely in the fact that there are a priori principles regardless of
the foundation of these principles.
Here the idea of a “metaphysical archetypal intellect,” the idea of
making an “appeal to the analytic judgment” with all that is implied in
them is clearly identified, in thought-content if not in words, and rejected
as being a foreign element in Bavinck’s thinking.90
Van Til’s “double-headed” analysis is clearly evident herein; for, he labels his
critiques of Bavinck’s theology as merely “a friendly Auseinandersetzung.”91
Furthermore, Van Til insists that even though Bavinck fell under the scholastic
spell of Aquinas, the seed of the “authentic Bavinck”—the Bavinck who insists
that natural revelation cannot be understood apart from Scripture—can still be
found beneath the inauthentic Bavinck’s scholastic shell. 92
For these very reasons, however, Van Til’s dialectical analysis is all the more
perplexing. On the one hand, Van Til consistently portrays Bavinck’s
epistemology as a corrupt mix of pagan and Christian thought. Yet, on the other
hand, he views his own criticisms of Bavinck’s thought as a mere
Auseinandersetzung between truly Christian brothers. Van Til’s criticisms are thus
tacitly attended at every point by two nagging questions: Does Bavinck really
have two heads? And if so, then can Bavinck’s non-scholastic seed be separated
so easily from his scholastic husk?
89. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19.
90. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19-20.
91. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19.
92. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:21.
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B. Summary
1. The Crux of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til’s various criticisms of Bavinck’s theology can be summarized in one
word—scholasticism. Van Til uses this term to represent the opposite of Kuyper’s
formulation of the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian thought,
namely, the synthesis of Christian and non-Christian thought. He presents
Thomas Aquinas as the paragon of scholasticism; for, according to Van Til,
Aquinas represents the most robust attempt of any theologian to synthesize
Christian theology and pagan Greek philosophy. Regarding Bavinck’s adherence
to scholasticism, Van Til argues that on many points, especially with respect to
epistemology and theological principa, Bavinck falls prey to Aquinas’ scholastic,
synthesizing influence. Therefore, to return to Van Til’s daddy-daughter
metaphor, he feels duty bound to slap his dogmatic daddy in the face; hence, he
directs several weighty, totalizing objections primarily against Bavinck’s
scholastic epistemological formulations.
2. Van Til’s Perplexing Self-Evaluation of His Criticisms
In light of the weighty catalog of critiques that Van Til levels against
Bavinck’s epistemological formulations, his understated self-evaluation of these
critiques is greatly perplexing. For example, he appears appalled at William
Masselink’s allegation that Van Til himself has departed from the epistemological
formulations of “the great Reformed theologians, such as Kuyper, Bavinck,
Hepp, Warfield, and Machen.” 93 He thus exclaims:
93. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155.
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Well, has there been in anything I have ever said or written as much as
an insinuation that the root of their thinking was not from the Bible?94
Furthermore, after chiding Masselink for misrepresenting his critiques, Van Til
insists that with respect to old Princeton he has never “expressed a basic
difference with its theology or its basic epistemology.” 95 Likewise, with respect to
old Amsterdam he insists that he has merely “criticized ‘subdivisions’ of the
theology of Kuyper and Bavinck.”96 Additionally, as we noted above, elsewhere
he labels his criticisms of Bavinck as a mere Auseinandersetzung.
The irony both of Van Til’s exclamation and his insistence that he has merely
criticized subdivisions in Bavinck’s thought is obvious. For, in his catalog of
criticisms Van Til blatantly and repeatedly levels totalizing objections against the
scholasticism—the Thomistic synthesis of Greek and Christian thought—that
allegedly plagues Bavinck’s theology. Does Van Til really think, then, that he has
never even insinuated that Bavinck’s thinking is not biblically based when, for
example, he distinguishes his own view from Bavinck’s, Kuyper’s, and Hepp’s
theology in such totalizing terms as follows:
If we begin thus with the ontological trinity as our concrete universal, we
frankly differ from every school of philosophy and from every school of
science not merely in our conclusions, but in our starting-point and in
our method as well.97
Likewise, can Van Til’s exclamation be taken seriously after he has alleged that
Bavinck exchanges the Holy Scriptures for Descartes’ anti-Christian cogito as the
epistemological principium of theology? Additionally, can Van Til’s exclamation
94. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155.
95. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155.
96. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 156; citing Simon Jan Ridderbos, Rondom het
gemene-gratie-probleem (Kampen: Kok, 1949).
97. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64.

167
be taken seriously in light of the totalizing critiques he levels against Bavinck’s
scholastic, synthesis, Greek-influenced and hence non-Christian thinking which
he summarizes Bavinck’s errors in statements such as:
With all our admiration for Bavinck we yet found that he allowed
himself to be influenced by the Greek ideal of the comprehension of God.
This ideal works havoc with true Reformed theology.98
Moreover, if Van Til truly criticizes only mere “subdivisions” of Bavinck’s
thought, then why does he assert that Bavinck’s epistemological formulations are
“unusable for apologetic purposes”?99 And why do the Copernican interpreters
of Van Til’s thought allege (1) that Van Til’s apologetics necessarily sets him at
odds with every modern Reformed theologian and philosopher 100 and (2) that a
“viral bug” threatens to undermine the entirety of Bavinck’s dogmatics? 101
3. An Irreducible Dialectic
It is impossible to reconcile fully Van Til’s bipolar statements regarding
Bavinck’s theology. On the one hand, he lauds Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the
greatest modern statement of Reformed theology and extols his labors toward
formulating a Christian view of all areas of life.102 Yet, on the other hand he levels
totalizing critiques against Bavinck’s “scholasticism,” that is, his affirmation of
epistemological realism with respect to the principia of theology, as if this
affirmation is somehow a deadly concession to pagan, anti-Christian, Greekbased philosophy. Therefore, despite Van Til’s earnest efforts to vindicate his
98. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64-65.
99. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19.
100. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic, 13-20.
101. Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle.”; idem, “Bavinckʼs Realism.”
102. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 26.
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“double-headed fact,” Masselink’s assessment of Van Til’s criticisms is more in
accord with Van Til’s own statements; for, Van Til clearly attempts more than a
mere trimming of a few twigs—he attempts to decapitate one of Bavinck’s two
heads. The dogmatic daddy thus receives far more than a hand slap from his
apologist daughter.
The most serious implication of this dialectical tension is that, if Van Til’s
criticisms of Bavinck’s theology are pressed to their logical conclusion—and
given Van Til’s proclivity for pressing his theological opponents’ views to their
logical conclusions, it is difficult to see how else Van Til’s criticisms are to be
taken than on his own terms of principled consistency—then he seriously
jeopardizes the validity of his pervasive formal, material, and polemical
appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as detailed in chapters 2–4 above.

CHAPTER VI.
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN DEFECTU ET IN EXCESSU (PART 2):
DIALECTICAL APPROPRIATIONS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD’S
WIJSBEGEERTE DER WETSIDEE
In the previous chapter we surveyed the catalog of critiques that Van Til
levels against Bavinck’s theology, especially his epistemological formulations,
and we found that, although Van Til downplays his criticisms as mere intramural
disputes over secondary points, the critiques themselves are formulated in
totalizing terms: antithesis vs. synthesis; pure Reformed theology vs. an impure
scholastic synthesis of Christian theology and Greek philosophy; the authentic,
non-scholastic Bavinck vs. the neo-Thomist, scholastic Bavinck. Additionally, we
noted that Van Til asserts that a “double-headed fact” must govern one’s
approach to Bavinck’s thought. Thus, on the one hand, Van Til insists that we
must go beyond Bavinck’s scholastic formulations; yet, on the other hand, he
maintains that the only way to go beyond Bavinck’s scholasticism is to follow
Bavinck’s own non-scholastic principles. We further noted that in light of Van
Til’s pervasive formal, material, and polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s
Dogmatiek, his precarious “double-headed-fact” criticism of Bavinck’s theology
introduces an irreducible dialectal tension with respect to Van Til’s
appropriations: Either Bavinck does have two heads and hence Van Til’s formal,
material, and polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek are jeopardized
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accordingly, or Bavinck does not have two heads and hence Van Til’s criticisms
are misdirected. His criticisms are therefore either in excessu or in defectu.
In the present chapter we refocus our attention upon Van Til’s criticisms, but
this time we will ask not what Van Til criticizes but why: Why does Van Til
criticize Bavinck’s thought in terms of two Bavincks—the authentic one the
scholastic one—and in terms of a “double-headed fact”? Are these criticisms
instances of Van Til’s Copernican originality? Or, rather, is it the case that,
considered within his neo-Calvinist context, Van Til’s criticisms are
appropriations and development of standard anti-scholastic sentiment evident
among a host of neo-Calvinist theologians and philosophers?
Over against the Copernican line of Van Til scholarship, which, as we noted
in chapter 5 above, presents Van Til as a revolutionary who saved Reformed
theology from the wiles of scholasticism, we will argue that the reason why he
levels these criticisms against Bavinck’s theology is that he was significantly
influenced by Herman Dooyeweerd’s anti-scholasticism polemics. Specifically,
we will demonstrate that Van Til appropriates both Dooyeweerd’s criticisms of
scholasticism in general and his criticisms of scholastic elements in neo-Calvinist
theology—including Bavinck’s theology—in particular. If our attempt to analyze
Van Til’s criticisms within his neo-Calvinist “reconstructionist” context is valid,
then the Copernican interpretation of Van Til as the anti-scholastic hero contra the
entire Reformed tradition after Calvin will need to be reassessed as an
abstraction.
In making such an argument we are following the lead of Van Til himself; for,
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as we noted in chapter 5 above, in his book, Common Grace and the Gospel, Van Til
implicitly indicates his affirmation of certain aspects of the so-called
“reconstructionist movement” led by neo-Calvinist theologians and
philosophers, such as, Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, and Schilder. 1 We noted, for
example, that Van Til appropriates Schilder’s polemic against the alleged abstract
thinking in Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology and his concomitant assertion that
truly Reformed thinking must proceed concretely. Moreover, Masselink and
Muether both interpret Van Til’s position on common grace to be grounded in
this “reconstructionist” movement.2 Furthermore, John Bolt suggests that Van
Til’s criticism of the scholastic elements in Bavinck’s thought is significantly
influenced by Dooyeweerd’s Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, especially Dooyeweerd’s
article, “Kuyper’s wetenschapsleer,” 3 wherein Dooyeweerd repudiates Bavinck’s
“Logos-speculatie” as “neeoplatoons, thomistisch en dus scholastiek” and as
contrary to the “bijbelse, reformatorische” ground-motive. 4 Therefore, we are not
arguing something new. Rather, in light of the affinities between Van Til and the
Dutch neo-Calvinist “reconstructionist” philosophers which Van Til himself
acknowledges and which have been noted by others, we are merely further
highlighting the connection between Van Til’s “reconstructionist” context and his
criticisms of Bavinck’s theology.
1. See chapter 5, §A, 4, 4.1, above.
2. William Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace: A Defense of the Historic Reformed
Faith Over Against the Theology and Philosophy of the So-called “Reconstructionist” Movement (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1953), 148ff.; John R. Muether, Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and
Churchman, American Reformed Biographies (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 152-53.
3. Herman Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939): 193-232.
4. John Bolt, “Een gemiste en een nieuwe kans: Herman Bavinck over openbaring en religie,”
in Ontmoetingen met Herman Bavinck, ed. George Harinck and Gerrit Neven, Ad Chartas-reeks 9
(Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006), 153.
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After briefly summarizing the current state of scholarship pertaining to Van
Til’s complex interaction with Dooyeweerd’s thought, we will then survey the
main lines of Dooyeweerd’s analysis of scholasticism in general and of the
scholastic elements in neo-Calvinist theology in particular. Next, we will
compare the main lines of Van Til’s formulations regarding the same. Finally, we
will summarize the results of our comparative analysis.

A. Scholarship on Van Til and Dooyeweerd
1. The Untold Story in General
“The full story of Van Til’s relationship to the Amsterdam philosophy, and
especially to Herman Dooyeweerd, has not yet been told,” wrote William Edgar
in 2003.5 Indeed, eight years later the scholarly relationship between the DutchAmerican Reformed apologist, Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987) and the Dutch
Reformed philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd (1894–1977), remains largely
unexplored in the secondary literature attending both thinkers. The scant extant
scholarship on this topic consists mostly of passing remarks regarding alleged
disagreements between the two thinkers. 6 Furthermore, these remarks are based
primarily upon (1) Van Til’s Christianity in Conflict syllabus7 and (2)
Dooyeweerd’s and Robert Knudsen’s contributions to the Van Til festschrift
5. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,
2003), 57n4.
6. Cf. Leendert Kalsbeek, Contours of a Christian Philosophy: An Introduction to Herman
Dooyeweerdʼs Thought, ed. Bernard Zylstra and Josina Zylstra (Toronto: Wedge Publishing
Foundation, 1975; repr. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2002), 28, 301n55; Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs
Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998), 14, 18-19, 48-52, 673-74; John M.
Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1995), 6, 22, 46, 146,
147n26, 172-73, 312; Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 153, 197, 200-201, 216.
7. Cornelius Van Til, Christianity in Conflict, Syllabus, (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster
Theological Seminary, 1962); cf. Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van Til 1895–
1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree Communications, 1995), s.v., 1962.I.
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(along with Van Til’s replies)8 rather than upon Van Til’s longest and most
detailed criticism of Dooyeweerd’s thought—his 1974 syllabus, Herman
Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.9
John Frame’s chapter-length analysis of Van Til’s thought vis-à-vis
Dooyeweerd’s may be an exception in terms of length. 10 However, throughout
the chapter Frame does not engage Dooyeweerd’s corpus directly; rather, his
criticisms are based upon Van Til’s second-hand summaries of Dooyeweerd’s
thought in his Christianity in Conflict syllabus.11
Notwithstanding the predominant focus in the related scholarship upon
Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s nuanced disagreements, several significant affinities
between the two thinkers have been noted. In the first place, as Robert Knudsen
remarks, generally speaking, both men shared the same mission—to develop the
philosophical implications of Abraham Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist theology:
My own interpretation of Van Til's position, as I have said, places him
squarely within the camp of those who hold to this general philosophical
position [i.e., “the so-called Calvinistic philosophy”]. There is a broad
unity of the major proponents of this school, namely, Herman
Dooyeweerd, D. H, Th. Vollenhoven, C. Van Til, and Hendrik Stoker, in
their attempt to erect a philosophy on the foundation of a Reformed
world-and-life-view.”12
8. Cf. the following essays in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and
Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971):
Herman Dooyeweerd, “Cornelius Van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical
Thought,” 74-89; Cornelius Van Til, “Response to Herman Dooyeweerd,” 89-127; Robert D.
Knudsen, “Progressive and Regressive Tendencies in Christian Apologetics,” 275-98; Cornelius
Van Til, “Response to Robert D. Knudsen,” 298-305.
9. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia,
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974); cf. Bristley, Guide, 1974.G. Frame, Cornelius Van Til,
372, mentions this syllabus only in passing. Likewise, Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic, 14n44,
673n265, references the syllabus twice but does not analyze any portion of it. Muether, Cornelius
Van Til, 200-01, omits the syllabus altogether within his discussion of Van Til’s reluctant criticism
of Dooyeweerd’s work.
10. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 371-86.
11. Van Til, Christianity in Conflict.
12. Robert D. Knudsen, “Crosscurrents,” Westminster Theological Journal 35, no. 3 (1973): 313.
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Knudsen’s remark is in harmony with Van Til’s insistence that he is “in full
agreement” with Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, and Stoker regarding their
overarching goal of displaying “the variegated richness of the Christian life-andworld view as a whole.”13 Thus, Van Til clearly shared the common neo-Calvinist
concern to develop an all-encompassing Christian worldview.
In the second place, Van Til supported Dooyeweerd’s philosophical school in
significant official and unofficial ways. For example, John Muether points out
that in 1936 Van Til “eagerly accepted” the offer to become an editor of the
Dooyeweerdian school’s scholarly journal, Philosophia Reformata, and that he held
this editorial post for forty-two years.14 Thus, Van Til actively propagated the
Orgaan van de vereeninging voor Calvinistische wijsbegeerte15 in an official capacity,
notwithstanding his disagreements with some of Dooyeweerd’s philosophical
formulations. Likewise, John Frame recalls that Van Til regularly encouraged
students who wished to study philosophy to go to De Vrije Universiteit in
Amsterdam in order to study under the cosmonomic philosophers. 16 For
Compare Henry Stob, “Observations on the Concept of the Antithesis” in Perspectives on the
Christian Reformed Church: Studies in Its History, Theology, and Ecumenicity, ed. Peter DeKlerk and
Richard R. DeRidder (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), 252: “Let it be said that I share with Kuyper,
Herman Dooyeweerd, Van Til, and many other Christian thinkers the view that all knowledge is
embraced at its edges by an all-encompassing Weltanschauung”; cited in Richard J. Mouw, “Dutch
Calvinist Philosophical Influences in North America,” Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 1 (April 1,
1989): 106. Likewise, Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy: The Greek
Prelude, ed. Robert D. Knudsen, Daniël Strauss, and Al Wolters, trans. Ray Togtmann, vol. 1, The
Collected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd, Series A (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2004), 1,
indicates that his “Philosophy of the Law-Idea” is an attempt to build upon Abraham Kuyper’s
thought.
13. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 56-57.
14. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 146, 227. Meuther notes, however, that Van Til’s participation
in the journal appears to be lackluster. E.g., in forty-two years Van Til published only one article
in the journal (Ibid., 146).
15. This subtitle appeared on the cover of Philosophia Reformata from its inception in 1936
(i.e., vol. 1) until 1992 (i.e., vol. 57).
16. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 371.
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example, H. Evan Runner moved to Amsterdam in order to study Dooyeweerd’s
Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee under Vollehoven after receiving encouragement to do
so from Van Til.17
In the third place, Muether notes that, at first, “Van Til regretted the need to
go public” with his criticisms of Dooyeweerd’s thought and that he described his
dispute with Dooyeweerd as, personally speaking, the most difficult one of his
career.18 Muether’s observation can be expanded as follows. In 1974—very late in
his career—Van Til leveled a totalizing critique against Dooyeweerd’s thought. 19
Nevertheless, the very next year he continued to explicitly appropriate
Dooyeweerd’s formulations, such as, the four religious ground motives that
undergird theoretical thought.20 Also, Van Til continued to publicly defend
Dooyeweerd from false misrepresentations of his thought even after having
repudiated his entire philosophical project. 21 In this regard Muether notes that
Van Til defended Dooyeweerd against rash American critics, such as Ronald
Nash, who attempted to criticize Dooyeweerd without reading any of
Dooyeweerd’s Dutch corpus.22 Therefore, similar to Van Til’s perplexing
17. Cf. Calvin Seerveld, “A Note of Personal Gratefulness,” Christian Renewal, Special
Supplement: Runner remembered (March 10, 2003): 19. Several other articles in this special
supplement mention Van Til’s influence upon Runner.
18. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 201.
19. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.
20. Cf. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 3-7; with idem, Christianity and Barthianism
(Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962), 230-239. Regarding the latter, Frame,
Cornelius Van Til, 356-57, 369, notes in passing that Van Til appropriates Dooyeweerd’s religious
“ground-motif” schema in his polemic against Karl Barth’s theology.
21. Cornelius Van Til, “Defends Dooyeweerd,” The Banner 109, no. 33 (August 30, 1974): 20;
idem, “A Complaint,” The Banner 109, no. 40 (October 18, 1974): 20; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1974.J1,
J2.
22. In addition to the perplexing fact that Van Til continued to appropriate Dooyeweerd’s
formulations despite his own devastating criticisms against Dooyeweerd’s thought, Van Til also
defended Dooyeweerd against allegedly rash American critics of Dooyeweerd, such as Ronald
Nash; cf. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 201.
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dialectical stance toward Bavinck’s theology, he evinces a strong measure of
affinity toward Dooyeweerd’s thought, his totalizing criticisms notwithstanding.
For these three reasons there is much more to the Van Til-Dooyeweerd story
than only disagreements. “Surely, then,” to borrow Frame’s conclusion, “at least
in a broad sense, we must describe the Dooyeweerdian school as one significant
influence on Van Til’s thought, at least after the mid-1930s.” 23 Nevertheless, the
theological and philosophical relationship between Van Til and Dooyeweerd
remains largely underdeveloped in the related scholarship.
2. The Untold Story in Particular
This underdevelopment is acutely evident with respect to Van Til’s
allegations that a corrosive scholasticism wreaks deadly havoc upon certain
aspects of Bavinck’s thought. The Copernican line of Van Til scholarship has
simply accepted the major and minor premises of Van Til’s argument without
any critical reflection upon the historical context within which Van Til’s
argument was developed:
Major premise—scholasticism is inherently bad.
Minor premise—Bavinck’s theology is scholastic on certain points.
Ergo—Bavinck’s theology is corrupt on certain points and hence must be
purged of it scholastic trappings.
Considered abstractly, this argument may at first glance appear to be an
instance of Van Til’s Copernican originality. However, when the argument is
interpreted concretely, that is, when it is viewed within the neo-Calvinist context
23. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 22. Also cf. Frame’s similar comment at p. 426.
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that Van Til himself claims as his own, then Van Til’s reasoning appears as the
antipode of revolutionary novelty; for, upon comparing his formulations with
Dooyeweerd’s, it is clear that Van Til appropriates not only the two premises of
his argument but also the conclusion directly from Dooyeweerd’s thought.

B. Dooyeweerd on Scholasticism
We turn first to Herman Dooyeweerd’s works for the purpose of
summarizing the main lines of his critique against neo-Calvinist scholasticism.
Due to the immensity of Dooyeweerd’s corpus we will have to be highly
selective.
1. Brief Excursus on Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy
The work most apropos of our inquiry is Dooyeweerd’s three-volume
treatise, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy. Two important caveats about
this work need to be stated up front, however. First, only the first volume—a
translation of Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte—has been published.24
Volumes two and three exist only in the form of pre-published manuscripts. 25
According to a note in the first volume, the material in volumes two and three is
comprised primarily of articles which Dooyeweerd published in Philosophia
Reformata between 1945 and 1950.26 However, it is evident that the new volumes
24. Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, vol. 1 (Franeker: T.
Wever, 1949); translated as idem, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, vol. 1.
25. Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy: An Introduction to the
Anthropology of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, vol. 2, 3 vols., The Collected Works of
Herman Dooyeweerd, Series A (Paideia Press, 2011); idem, Reformation and Scholasticism in
Philosophy: Natural Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology, vol. 3, 3 vols., The Collected Works of
Herman Dooyeweerd, Series A (Paideia Press, n.d.). NB: I am using pre-published editions of
vols. 2 and 3 of Dooyeweerd’s Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy. Thus, the page numbers
cited herein may be slightly different than those in the forthcoming published versions.
26. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:iii: “Parts of Volumes II and III
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include materials published in Philosophia Reformata at least as far back as 1936.
For instance, portions of Dooyeweerd’s 1936 article, “Kuyper’s
wetenschapsleer,” appear in volume two.27
Second, our analysis proceeds upon an assumption, namely, that Van Til had
access to all of these newly translated materials in their original, untranslated
form. There is strong warrant for such an assumption; for, Reformatie en
Scholastiek is a work that Van Til references numerous times throughout various
writings,28 and his writings evince strong evidence that he was well acquainted
with the content of this book. Furthermore, since the bulk of the material within
volumes two and three was published in the journal of which he was an editor
for over forty years, it is entirely plausible to infer that Van Til was aware of the
contents of these articles.
In order to unpack Dooyeweerd’s critique of the scholasticism in neoCalvinist thought, we must first summarize Dooyeweerd’s general definition of
scholasticism and the context within which this definition is situated, namely, the
theory of Western philosophy’s four ground-motives that he propounds in
Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy.
2. Scholasticism in General: Synthesis Thinking
Two correlations within Dooyeweerd’s opening paragraph are notable for
appeared in theJournal Philosophia Reformata between 1945 and 1950. Volume III was left
uncompleted, but it does contain the main ideas of Dooyeweerd with regard to the theory of
enkaptic interlacements and Dooyeweerd’s anthropological theory of the complex bodily
structure of the human being.”
27. Cf. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 211; with idem, Reformation and
Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:46.
28. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic Ethics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Reformed
Episcopal Seminary, 1940), ch. 14; idem, Christianity and Barthianism, ch. 5, section 5; idem, The
Great Debate Today (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1970), ch. 5, section D.
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our thesis. He begins by placing his life’s work in the context of three major
events within the closing decades of the nineteenth century: (1) the failure of
humanistic philosophy, (2) the rise of neo-Thomism, or what Dooyweerd calls, “a
great Renaissance of Scholastic philosophy, more particularly of Thomism,” and
(3) the rise of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, a Calvinist school of philosophy
based directly upon the revolutionary work of Abraham Kuyper. 29 In this way
Dooyeweerd indirectly draws an important correlation between himself and
Abraham Kuyper, namely, he presents himself as building directly upon
Kuyper’s revolutionary neo-Calvinist thought. Additionally, though he has not
yet defined the term, he correlates “Scholasticism” with Roman Catholicism in
general and Thomas Aquinas in particular. Thus already in the opening
paragraph the two main topics of our investigation are set before us in seed form
—neo-Calvinism and scholasticism.
Continuing further Dooyeweerd explains that from the polis of the ancient
Greek city-states to the church-state hegemony of Medieval Roman Catholicism
to the shifting church-state relation in the Protestant Reformation to the rise and
fall of modern humanism, a “Promethean struggle” between spiritual cultural
forces is obvious within the history of the West. He remarks that these spiritual
cultural forces express themselves philosophically by means of four “groundmotives.”30 Yet, before explicating the ground-motives individually, he divides
them into two groups:
Of them, three are clearly dialectical. That is to say, they are town by an
inner dualism, which constantly induces them to span positions in which
29. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:1.
30. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:2-3.
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one factor is set irretrievably in diametrical opposition to the other. 31
If we interpret this statement in light of the sub-title to Part I of the book—“Initial
Survey of the Religious Ground-Motives and the Conflict They Produce between
the Reformational and Scholastic Spirits in Philosophy”—we perhaps receive a
foretaste of the overarching thesis of the book, namely, those who wish to follow
Kuyper truly must make a choice for either scholasticism or Reformational
philosophy.
2.1. The Greek Form-Matter Ground-Motive
Aristotle was the first to use the terms “form” and “matter” to describe this
ground-motive, according to Dooyeweerd. “It originated,” he writes,
in an unresolved conflict within the Greek religious consciousness
between the ground-motive of the older telluric, chthonic, and uranic
nature religions, on the one hand, in which a proto-Greek nucleus was
supplemented by many elements both of indigenous pre-Greek (Minoan)
and of foreign origin, and, on the other hand, the ground-motive of the
newer culture religion, the religion of the Olympic pantheon.32
Regarding the nature religions, Dooyeweerd admits the difficulty involved with
drawing conclusions based on the scant number of extant pre-Homeric primary
sources. Nevertheless, he asserts that enough evidence exists to show that the
primary ground-motive of pre-Homeric nature religion is “the motive of the
divine, eternally flowing stream of life.”33 Rooted in mother earth, this divine life
stream governs the cycle of life and death. It gives life to every individuated
form, and it takes life according to the law of fate/necessity (i.e., Anankē).
Additionally, the life stream is viewed as a sort of “psychic fluid” that is not
31. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:3.
32. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:3-4; quote at p. 4.
33. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:4-5; quote at p. 5.
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limited by bodily forms and is hence unable to die. Dooyeweerd labels this
ground-motive as the Greek “matter motive,” and he presents the Greek god
Dionysus as the paragon of this ground-motive.34
Dionysus’ antipode—the Delphic god, Apollo—is the paragon of the Greek
culture religion, according to Dooyeweerd. 35 “In contrast to the religion of
nature,” he writes,
it was the religion of rational form, measure, and harmony. . . . The
Olympian deities left “mother earth” and became immortal, radiant formgods, who in their supersensible form and personal shape were
equivalent to idealized and personified cultural powers.36
Dooyeweerd labels this ground-motive the Greek “form motive” accordingly,
and he holds up Homer’s epic poetry as “its most brilliant expression.” 37
Dooyeweerd asserts that, notwithstanding the antithesis between Apollo’s
form motive and Dionysus’ matter motive, the Greek culture religion
attempted to absorb into itself the older religion, both as to its original
Greek and as to its imported and its pre-Greek domestic elements. It
attempted to adapt it to its own ground-motive of form, measure, and
harmony. In particular, it sought to restrain the ecstatic, telluric worship
of Dionysus by means of the lawful form principle of the service of
Apollo. At Delphi, Apollo and Dionysus became brothers, with the latter
losing his indeterminate wildness and appearing in the more serious role
of a “shepherd of souls.”38
In this passage Dooyeweerd introduces a hallmark trait of his view of
scholasticism, namely, synthesis thinking. In other words, the Greek attempt to
domesticate the antithetical relationship between Dionysus and Apollo is the first
large-scale example of synthesis thinking in Western philosophy, and this
34. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:5-6; quotes at p. 6.
35. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:6, 8.
36. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:8.
37. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:8.
38. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:8.
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attempted synthesis serves as a paradigmatic adumbration of Dooyeweerd’s later
analysis of synthesis thinking within scholastic philosophy.
Returning to his analysis of the attempted Greek matter-form synthesis, we
find that Dooyeweerd avers three reasons why this alleged synthesis was
doomed to fail: (1) the culture religion failed to engage the deepest problem of
life—death; the Olympian deities were powerless against Anankē; (2) the ethics
of the Olympian gods were out of accord with ethics of the Greek people, as if
the gods lived “beyond good and evil” (Homer); (3) due to the socio-politico
transition from Mycenean knighthood to the Greek polis, the Homeric version of
what takes place on Mt. Olympus became sorely out of touch with ordinary
Greek people.39
Despite the ultimate failure of the Greek synthesis, however, Dooyeweerd
argues that an important aspect of this attempt to unite the form and matter
motives lived on—“the dialectical religious ground-motive.”40 That it to say, in
subsequent Greek thought
the principles of form and matter are unbreakably interrelated, in the
sense that they mutually presuppose each other. In their dialectical
interrelationship they determine the Greek concept of the “nature”
(physis) of things.41
Dooyeweerd therefore employs this dialectical religious form-matter groundmotive as the hermeneutical key that unlocks the meaning of the sometimes
wildly divergent and antithetical streams within Greek thought:
This dialectical ground-motive leads Greek thought into true polar
antithesis and causes it to diverge into movements that seem to oppose
39. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:9-10.
40. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:10.
41. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11.
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each other radically. These, however, manifest their underlying affinity
within this ground-motive itself. The Greek intellectual community was
rooted in this ground-motive, and for this reason it is quite impossible to
understand the history of Greek philosophy in its uniqueness without
having come to grips with it.42
Therefore, according to Dooyeweerd, the crux of the Greek form-matter groundmotive is its attempt to synthesize polar opposites.
2.2. The Biblical Creation-Fall-Redemption Ground-Motive
“The second ground-motive,” begins Dooyeweerd, “is that of creation, the fall
into sin, and redemption through Christ Jesus in the communion of the Holy Spirit.”43
Due to its concomitant doctrine of creation, the Christian ground-motive is
diametrically opposed to the Greek form-matter ground-motive; for, as he
concludes after citing Psalm 139: “Truly, the message of this psalm stands as the
antipodes of the Greek dualism of the form and matter motives.” 44 Dooyeweerd
argues that the apex of the antithesis between the Christian and Greek groundmotives evinces itself in their respective anthropologies. Whereas Christianity
posits the human heart as “the integral, individual-spiritual fundamental unity
of all the functions and structure of temporal reality,” the Greek dialectical
synthesis posits a
religious dualism of the Greek form-matter motive, which comes to its
clearest expression in the religious antithesis found in Greek
anthropology between a material body and a theoretical mental
substance having the character of pure form. 45
42. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11.
43. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11.
44. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11-12 ; quote at p. 12. Compare
p. 25: “There is an absolute antithesis between the ground-motive of the Christian religion and
that of the Greek religious consciousness. This antithesis holds just as well between the Christian
and the humanistic ground-motives, even though in its process of formation the latter passed
through the former.”
45. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:12.
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Furthermore, with respect to the fall into sin, whereas Christianity posits a
“radical” rebellion in the human heart against “the absolute Source of life” and
hence a “spiritual death” within man’s heart that “affected the temporal cosmos
in its entirety,” the Greek dialectical motive cannot allow the idea of sin since
Greek thought precludes divine revelation altogether. 46 Additionally,
Dooyeweerd argues, albeit only implicitly, that the incarnation of the divine
Logos in Jesus Christ is a further antipode to Greek anthropology; for, Jesus took
to himself both “the root and the temporal ramifications” of human nature,
namely, soul and body.47 “Thus,” he avers, “as long as it is understood in its pure,
Scriptural sense, this [Christian] religious ground-motive in no way manifests in
itself a dialectical, dualistic character.” 48
In its struggle against Hellenism, however, the Christian ground motive was
corrupted by the Greek form-matter motive, argues Dooyeweerd in a passage
that serves as a segue into the third ground-motive. 49 He reasons that from the
Christological and trinitarian controversies to Gnosticism to the Logos
speculation of the early Apologists to Marcionism, the church was plagued on
every sided with the dualistic Greek form-matter ground-motive. By God’s
grace, however, the church fought back against all of these dualisms, and
Augustine especially managed to preserve the Christian ground-motive in its
basic form.
No one was yet in a position, however, to achieve a sufficiently
independent expression of the Christian ground-motive within
46. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:12-13; quotes at p. 13.
47. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:13.
48. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:14.
49. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:14-15.
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philosophical thought itself. In particular, there existed at this time great
unclarity concerning the relationship of philosophy to dogmatic
theology, because the inner connection of philosophic thought to the
religious ground-motives had not yet been discovered. 50
Accordingly, philosophy became subordinated to theology and then identified
with it. What is more, argues Dooyeweerd, because Christian theology did not
yet recognize the pagan ground-motive of Greek thought, there was no objection
to taking over lock, stock, and barrel many important elements from ancient
philosophy,” hence “theologians resorted to adapting or accommodating heathen
thought to the doctrine of the Christian church.” 51 Thus again we find the
characteristic trait of Dooyeweerd’s view of scholasticism—synthesis thinking.
2.3. The Scholastic Nature-Grace Ground-Motive
The attempt by Christian theologians “to bridge the radical antithesis
between the Greek and the Christian ground motives” led to a new dialectical
theme that dominated the Medieval Roman Catholic cultural hegemony in the
same way that the form-matter ground-motive dominated Greek culture
—“nature and grace.”52 Even Reformed theology could not escape this scholastic
dualism; for, despite the attempts of Luther and Calvin to build upon
Augustine’s preservation of the Christian ground-motive, Melanchthon
introduced a revised version of the scholastic nature-grace dualism into
Reformed theology thus giving rise to a Protestant version of Scholasticism.53 The

50. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:14.
51. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:15.
52. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:15.
53. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:15-16. For Dooyeweerd’s
further explication of how the nature-grace dualism invades Protestant scholastic thought, see
pp. 33-39. Also cf. 2:12-13.
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Roman Catholic version of scholasticism, on the other hand, was dominated by
the theology of Thomas Aquinas, “who,” argues Dooyeweerd,
posited nature as the autonomous but subordinate “preamble” of grace
or supernature. Further, the mutual relationship between these was
conceived as that between matter and form. Thus Thomas came to his
solution with the aid of the same device that had already done service in
the Greek intellectual community to bind together two antagonistic
religious ground-motives.54
2.4. The Humanistic Nature-Freedom Ground-Motive
The fourth ground-motive arose within philosophy during the era of the
Renaissance, explains Dooyeweerd. During this time Roman Catholicism’s
Medieval church-state hegemony began to decline, and at the same time, he
notes, “the idea of the absolute autonomy or self-legislation of the human
personality, centered in its reason,” began to dominate. 55
Hand in hand with this new freedom motive of the humanistic ideal of
personality, there developed a new conception of nature. . . . Here nature
was viewed as the macro-cosmic reflection of the human personality, as a
cosmos that offered infinite possibilities for the deployment of man’s
creative powers. . . . It was regarded as independent of all supernatural
powers and influences.56
Thus a humanistic nature motive—exemplified in Giordano Bruno’s definition of
nature as natura naturans—became wedded to its complete opposite, the
humanistic freedom motive, and conflict between the two was inevitable; for, as
Dooyeweerd argues, although the mathematical advances in modern science led
to a rationalistic scientific ideal based on the nature motive, the the apex of the

54. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:16. At pp. 16-17 Dooyeweerd
remarks that the nature-grace ground-motive will be examined in detail in the second volume of
this work.
55. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:17.
56. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:17.
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freedom motive (i.e., fully autonomous human persons) critiqued this
rationalistic scientific ideal on empirical grounds, thus causing an irreconcilable
conflict between the two ground-motives. Empiricism (in the form of historicism)
thus replaced rationalism as the new scientific ideal, and the same irreconcilable
conflict ensued, claims Dooyeweerd. Further, he avers that this cycle of conflicts
has led to “a process of religious uprooting.”57 “In this entire development,”
concludes Dooyeweerd,
the dialectical character of the humanistic ground-motive comes into
sharp relief. Until the end of the previous century it had undergirded the
thought of the Western community at large. Through its absolute
supremacy in modern culture, it had also impressed its conceptual
pattern in many ways upon Catholic and reformational thought, at least
insofar as these intellectual currents did not want to have themselves
banned from the scientific community. 58
3. Scholasticism in Neo-Calvinist Thought in Particular
Now that we have seen that Dooyeweerd defines scholasticism in terms of
synthesis thinking—specifically, a synthesis between one of the three nonChristian ground-motives with the Christian ground-motive—we are in a
position to survey his allegations against the patent scholasticism in the neoCalvinist theological formulations of Kuyper and Bavinck and philosophical
formulations of Jan Woltjer (1849–1917). In order to view his critiques in their
proper historical perspective, however, two factors should be kept in mind.
In the first place, Dooyeweerd treats Kuyper as the paragon of Neo-Calvinist
thought. Therefore, despite the fact that throughout his article on Kuyper’s

57. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:18-19; quote at p. 19; also cf.
2:16.
58. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:19.
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epistemology and throughout volume two of Reformation and Scholasticism
Dooyeweerd devotes most of his attention to Kuyper’s thought, he nevertheless
lists Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s names along with Kuyper’s. In “Kuyper’s
wetenschapsleer,” for example, Dooyeweerd employs Kuyper’s reformatorische
grondconceptie as the explicit standard by which he judges not only Kuyper’s
thought, but also Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s:
Immers in deze rede heb ik mij genoodzaakt gezien den vinger to leggen
op bepaalde gedachtenlijnen in de geschriften van Kuyper, Woltjer en
Bavinck, die m. i. met de inzonderheid door Kuyper ontwikkelde
reformatorische grondconceptie der Christelijke wijsbegeerte op geenerlei
wijze te rijmen zijn.59
Specifically, Dooyeweerd places his finger on the following crux of these alleged
“bepaalde gedachtenlijnen”:
De waarheid is deze, dat aantoonbaar de beide gedachtenlijnen in
Kuyper's wetenschappelijken arbeid met elkander in tegenspraak zijn en
dat een innerlijke verzoening daarom onmogelijk moet worden geacht,
wijl zij op elkander volstrekt uitsluitende uitgangspunten teruggaan. 60
Apart from one exception, this de-beide-gedachtenlijnen premise governs
Dooyeweerd’s entire criticism of the scholasticism in Kuyper’s theology and
hence his entire criticism of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s thought.
The one exception is that, according to Dooyeweerd, Kuyper’s Reformational
conception of the heart overcomes the scholastic, dualistic errors that plague
Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s anthropological formulations:
Slechts Kuyper deed hier den geweldigen greep, welke met één slag den
anthropologischen kijk in schriftuurlijken zin radicaal omwendt. Noch in
Woltjer’s genoemde geschriften, noch in Bavinck’s Beginselen der
Psychologie zal men deze opvatting van het hart terug vinden. Beide
blijven hier volkomen in de scholastische leer van de zielsvermogens en
59. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 193.
60. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 196-97.
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het intellect als leidend, centraal deel van de ziel bevangen. 61
Therefore, in contradistinction to Bavinck and Woltjer, Kuyper alone receives
Dooyeweerd’s commendation for overcoming scholasticism on this foundational
anthropological point.62
In the second place, Dooyeweerd appreciates Kuyper far more than he
criticizes him. For example, we have already noted above that in volume one of
Reformation and Scholasticism Dooyeweerd presents Kuyper as the direct
philosophical predecessor to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. Additionally, he begins
his article on Kuyper’s epistemology with (1) a lamentation over the fact that he
has to criticize his former teachers and (2) an attempt to relativize his criticisms
by noting the unique challenges that his predecessors faced:
Zij waren mijn leermeesters, voor wie ik groote liefde en hoogachting
koester, en die baanbrekenden arbeid hebben verricht in een tijd, toen het
behooren tot den kring der Vrije Universiteit nog als een abdicatie aan
het wetenschappelijk geweten werd gebrandmerkt. 63
Furthermore, the critiques of the scholastic line in Kuyper’s thought that we will
survey below in volume two of his Reformation and Scholasticism are preceded by
lofty commendations, such as:
Through this critical religious turn in his understanding of science,
Kuyper indeed became the spiritual father of the new reformational
philosophy. It is not an overstatement to call his appearance a critical
turning point in the history of Western philosophical thought, since
there, for the first time, the relation between religion and philosophy was
determined solely on the basis of the reformational ground-motive of the
Christian religion itself.64
61. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 211-12; also cf. idem, Reformation and
Scholasticism in Philosophy, 3:121.
62. Cf. John Bolt, “Een gemiste en een nieuwe kans: Herman Bavinck over openbaring en
religie,” 153.
63. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 193.
64. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:15.
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Dooyeweerd therefore levels his critiques against Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and
Woltjer’s scholastic formulations only after praising their pioneering work.
3.1. Kuyper’s First Line: The Truly Reformational
Dooyeweerd argues that the Reformational line in Kuyper’s thought begins
in God’s Word and charts its course solely according to the Christian groundmotive. He describes this line as
. . . prescientific, or rather, supra-theoretical in character, which means
that it is concerned solely with the presuppositions of a genuinely
reformational philosophy and does not draw out the implications of
these presuppositions within the realm of actual scientific inquiry. 65
Dooyeweerd lists four philosophical presuppositions for this Christian groundmotive: (1) the confession of God’s sovereignty as the Creator according to what
is revealed in Scripture; (2) the acceptance in faith of Scripture’s teaching
regarding the heart as the “religious root” or nexus of humanity’s temporal
existence; (3) the confession of humanity’s radical fall into sin, Jesus Christ’s
radical redemption from sin, and the concomitant antithesis in every sphere of
life implied in these two facts; (4) the belief in a need for a repudiation of
traditional scholastic anthropology.66
Additionally, Dooyeweerd avers that, beyond establishing these four
presuppositions for a truly Reformational philosophy, Kuyper made another
significant advancement for Reformational philosophy with respect to the
doctrine of sphere sovereignty, namely, he “raised sphere sovereignty to the level
of a cosmological principle that is directly connected to God’s absolute
65. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:75.
66. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:75.
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sovereignty as Creature of the universe.” 67 Thus, although Kuyper himself did
not develop the sphere sovereignty doctrine scientifically, “he did state the
starting point for such an elaboration with great clarity.” 68
3.2. Kuyper’s Second Line: The Scholastic Synthesist
Despite his praise for the philosophical accomplishments arising out of the
truly Reformational line in Kuyper’s thought, Dooyeweerd asserts that a
contradictory scholastic line—a line of “accommodation” or synthesis thinking—
corrupts certain aspects of Kuyper’s thought, especially his scientific theological
formulations. Rather than having the Christian ground-motive as its starting
point, this scholastic line of thought is rooted in an illegitimate attempt to
accommodate the Christian ground-motive to the form-matter, nature-grace, and
nature-freedom ground-motives. 69 Dooyeweerd adduces three examples to
demonstrate this scholastic tendency.
In the first place, despite his high esteem for Kuyper’s formulation of the
heart, Dooyeweerd criticizes Kuyper’s affinity for scholastic anthropology:
As far as I know Kuyper was the first to fathom, in its full depth and
riches, the teaching of Holy Scripture concerning the heart as the
religious center of human nature, and to lift this teaching from the
overgrowth of Greek philosophy. Even so, in his scientific theological
works he continued to use the scholastic constructs of body and soul. 70
In the second place, Dooyeweerd asserts that Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s
response to Kant’s epistemological revolution is beset by so-called neo-scholastic
67. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:77.
68. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:78; also cf. idem, “Kuyperʼs
wetenschapsleer,” 224.
69. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:78.
70. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:46.
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“critical realism.” He sets up this assertion by first noting that the neo-Thomists,
led by Cardinal Mercer, attempted to meet Kant’s critique with synthesis
thinking, namely, they attempted to transform Kant’s “critical idealism” into
“critical realism.”71
The core of the challenge was to bring to expression, in the problem areas
internal to philosophy, the basic religious conception of Calvinism that
Kuyper had developed so masterfully. It was precisely here, however,
that the scholastic and humanistic traditions proved too strong, and
Kuyper was unable to wrestle free of the established ways of posing the
problems.72
According to Dooyeweerd, Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer attempted to answer
Kant’s challenge by advocating the critical realist position that Kuyper
formulated in his Encyclopaedie. However, instead of following Kuyper’s truly
Reformational line of thought, the neo-Calvinists succumbed to the influence of
Cardinal Mercer and the neo-Thomists.
Thus there arose in this new Reformed school of thought a “critical
realism,” which initially was welcomed by many Reformed scholars as
the dawn of a Calvinistic philosophy. Intrinsically, however, this critical
realism was as alien to Reformed principles as was the old scholasticism
of the days of Gisbert Voetius.73
Specifically, Dooyeweerd labels two aspects of Kuyper’s epistemological
formulations as scholastic and hence problematic: (1) his supposition that the
soul is anima rationalis with two primary faculties—knowledge and will and (2)
his solution to the subject-object problem in terms of a distinction between
elements and relations.74 Regarding the latter, Dooyeweerd rejoins:
71. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:54-55.
72. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:55.
73. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:55; also cf. idem, “Kuyperʼs
wetenschapsleer,” 199.
74. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:56.
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This theory was nothing more than an adaptation of the “critical”
viewpoint of modern humanistic epistemology to traditional scholastic
psychology and ontology. It has not the slightest internal connection with
Kuyper's basic religious conception of Calvinism.75
He goes on to further criticize Kuyper’s elements and relations theory as a mere
objective “idea-realistic twist” to Kant’s subjective critical idealism. 76
Therefore, it is evident that Dooyeweerd views the “critical realist”
formulations of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer as a significant deviation from the
pure Reformational line in Kuyper’s thought.
In the third place, as a concomitant of his repudiation of critical realism,
Dooyeweerd argues that the logosleer77 inherent within Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and
Woltjer’s formulations of critical realism is beset by synthesis thinking. He
reasons that since the Logos theory has a long and honored pedigree in Christian
theology, it is not surprising that the neo-Calvinists made use of the doctrine.
Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd insists—“Let the theory be examined!” 78 Accordingly,
after subjecting the logosleer to a lengthy historical analysis beginning with its
origins in the Platonic school, Dooyeweerd concludes that the theory is a
thoroughly corrupt synthesis of Christian and non-Christian ground-motives.79
On the basis that the Logos doctrine is patently non-Christian, he then argues
that Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s theory of science unduly “logicized God’s
order for the creation” and that hence the logosleer could not provide the basis for
an adequate rejoinder to Kant’s epistemological critiques. “For,” reasons
75. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:56.
76. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:56-57; quote at p. 57.
77. Cf. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 197, 207ff.
78. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:59.
79. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:59-71.
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Dooyeweerd regarding what he sees as the crux of Kant’s critiques,
no change was made in Kant's view that all law-governed relations
without exception are logical. Instead, the origin of these relations was
sought not in the human, but in the divine Logos, the divine Reason with
its unity of “logical thought” and “word” that had already been spoken
of by Philo. The relationships in knowable things thus were not seen as
subjectively logical, but as objectively logical; and it was thought that this
logical nature was what allowed them to be grasped by our logical
thought. For these thinkers [i.e., Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer]
maintained that in the process of gaining theoretical knowledge, as
Aristotle had taught, there is a union between the subjective logical
function of thought and the objective logical ontic forms of knowable
things.80
Furthermore, in addition to alleging that the neo-Calvinists’ use of the logosleer
precluded their ability to answer Kant’s critique of knowledge with a truly
Christian rejoinder, Dooyeweerd avers that Kuyper’s use of the Logos doctrine
flatly contradicts his formulation of sphere sovereignty. 81
Based upon these three examples of scholasticism in Kuyper’s thought,
Dooyeweerd reaffirms his premise regarding the two divergent lines therein—a
purely Reformational line and a scholastic line. “This, however,” he insists,
in no way proves that both viewpoints have an equal right to exist in an
intrinsically reformed philosophy. It only shows that Kuyper lacked the
opportunity to carry through his basic reformed conception in the
internal course of scientific inquiry. 82
4. Summary
For Dooyeweerd, scholasticism is synthesis thinking. More specifically, it is
the attempt to synthesize the two antithetical poles of one or more of the three
non-Christian religious ground-motives: form-matter, nature-grace, or nature80. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:71.
81. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:72-74.
82. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:74; also cf. idem, “Kuyperʼs
wetenschapsleer,” 210.

195
freedom. Insofar as all such attempts are deviations from the Christian groundmotive, however, they are doomed to end up in a never-ending dialectical
tension.
The Greek dialectical synthesis between the matter and form motives—
between Dionysus and Apollo—is paradigmatic for Dooyeweerd’s formulation
of scholasticism. All subsequent syntheses are recapitulations of the this
foundational synthesis. Hence volume one of Dooyeweerd’s Reformation and
Scholasticism is devoted to ancient Greek philosophy up to and including Plato. 83
In stark contrast to the dialectical form-matter ground-motive, the Christian
ground-motive of creation, fall, and redemption is diametrically opposed to all
forms of synthesis thinking. Due especially to the Christian doctrine of creation,
the Christian ground-motive precludes all dualisms and dialectic tensions by
definition. The Roman Catholic scholastic synthesis is an attempt to synthesize
the Greek and Christian ground-motives. Yet, insofar as these two are mutually
exclusive, the synthesis can only be dialectical in nature. Hence scholasticism is
doomed to fail according to its own self-contradictory presuppositions. Likewise,
the modern humanistic nature-freedom ground-motive cannot advance beyond a
dialectical synthesis between mutually exclusive principles and hence it is no
more successful than any of the other attempted syntheses.
The whole point of Dooyeweerd’s theory of the four ground motives is to
demonstrate that Christianity alone provides the basis for a non-dialectical, nondualistic, non-synthesis-based worldview. With respect to scholasticism,
therefore, by arguing that it is based upon dialectical synthesis thinking,
83. Cf. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:39.
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Dooyeweerd repudiates it as non-Christian. Therefore, according to Dooyeweerd,
since Kuyper and the neo-Calvinists have fallen prey to synthesis thinking
especially with respect to epistemology and the philosophy of science, neoCalvinist theology must be purged of its scholastic trappings.

C. Van Til on Scholasticism
Van Til never wrote a book or syllabus exclusively on the topic of
scholasticism. Nevertheless, he frequently employs both the term and the
concept throughout many of his writings. It can even be said that scholasticism is
a primary polemical theme that runs throughout Van Til’s thought. In the
following survey we will focus primarily upon the syllabus that contains his
most extensive discussion of scholasticism—his lengthy, three-part critique of
Herman Dooyeweerd’s thought.84 Due to the length of this syllabus, our
treatment must be selective.
1. Scholasticism in General: Synthesis Thinking
Van Til defines the term “scholasticism” explicitly only once throughout his
entire corpus, despite the fact that he employs the term frequently. 85 His
definition is found in Part III of Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics,
which part is entitled, “Synthesis Thinking”:
Scholasticism is an attempt to combine the man-centered thinking of the
Greeks, notably of Aristotle, with the God-centered thinking of
Christianity. Thomas Aquinas, the chief scholastic thinker, interpreted
the “lower” half of reality by means of the notion of (a) human
84. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.
85. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56, notes that Van Til uses this term “imprecisely,” that is,
usually in reference to what he interpreted as Aquinas’s allegedly autonomous use of human
reason.

197
autonomy with its implicates of an abstract, timeless principle of identity,
thought of as correlative to a pure contingency notion of diversity and
the “upper half” of reality by means of the notion of the creation-fallredemption by Christ through communion with the Holy Spirit. . . .
Thomas thought he could combine the scale-of-being idea of the
Greeks, climactically expressed in the philosophy of Plotinus with the
Augustinian notion of the struggle between the Civitas Dei and the
Civitas Terrena.86
Not only is the title of Part III—“Synthesis Thinking”—an emulation of
Dooyeweerd’s basic definition of scholasticism, but also Van Til’s language of
“creation-fall-redemption” is clearly a recapitulation of Dooyeweerd’s
formulation of the Christian ground-motive. Additionally, Van Til’s
“combination” language bear obvious resemblance to Dooyeweerd’s language of
“synthesis thinking” and “accommodation.” Furthermore, earlier in the same
work Van Til defines the scholastic worldview using Dooyeweerd’s “synthesis”
terminology explicitly:
After we have seen what the non-Christian view of life is in its
opposition to the christian view of life it is easier to see what the
scholastic view of life is. It is the fruit of an effort to synthesize these two.
Scholasticism thinks it is intelligible to synthesize (a) the Christian
and the non-Christian view of man (b) the Christian and the nonChristian view of the principle of unity (logic) and (c) the Christian and
the non-Christian view of diversity by which man must interpret God,
himself and the world.87
In yet another passage Van Til defines the “nature of scholasticism” in terms of
“synthesis thinking”:
It is a world and life view, a view including philosophy as well as
theology which makes an amalgam of the Greek form of apostate
thought, the Greek paideia with the Christian thought, the Christian
paideia. Thomas of Aquinas [sic] is the greatest exponent of this
synthesis. Calvin’s thinking is in principle opposed to this synthesis. But
86. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:1. Also cf. 1:9-14 wherein Van Til
criticizes scholasticism within traditional apologetics.
87. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:26.

198
many of his followers fell back to an extent on scholastic forms of
thought. Even the recent revival of Reformed thinking has not been able
to escape scholasticism wholly. Even Kuyper dared not to be altogether
true to his deepest convictions in the field of apologetics. 88
Moreover, Van Til employs Dooyeweerd’s “synthesis thinking” terminology in
the title of his polemical book that we surveyed above, The New Synthesis
Theology of the Netherlands.89
Additionally, Van Til defines the crux of scholasticism in terms reminiscent of
Dooyeweerd’s formulation. First, consider Van Til’s formulation:
The root-error of Scholasticism is that it fails to place the whole man, as
the creature made in the image of God, subject to the ordinance of God. 90
Then, compare Dooyeweerd’s summary of the same crux in terms of “law” and
“subjugation”:
In contrast to this Greek view, the scriptural doctrine of creation
underscores the truth that thought is not the origin of the divine creation
order, but is rather subject and subordinate to that order. . . . God's order
for the creation is only disclosed to human thinking when humankind
begins to bow in faith before God's majesty, submitting his thought to
God's law instead of trying to logicize that law in accordance with Greek
logos theory.91
Whether or not Van Til appropriates Dooyeweerd’s formulation, his point is the
same.
2. Scholasticism in Neo-Calvinist Thought in Particular
Van Til’s appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s definition of scholasticism becomes
even more obvious as we look at his specific critiques against the scholasticism
88. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:31. Also cf. p. 21: “This scholastic
paideia constitutes a synthesis of the Greek and the Christian paideia.”
89. Van Til, The New Synthesis. Cf. chapter 4, §A, above.
90. Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological
Journal 24, no. 1 (1961): 52.
91. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:71.
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latent in Kuyper’s thought; for, Van Til simply recapitulates the main points of
Dooyeweerd’s earlier criticisms.
In the first place, Van Til appropriates Dooyeweerd’s de-beide-gedachtenlijnen
premise in terms of “Kuyper the Calvinist” and “Kuyper the Thomist.”
According to Van Til, the former “taught E Voto Dordraceno,” but the latter “spoke
with the voice of Thomas” and hence “[h]is reasoning is scholastic.”92
Although he does not admit to appropriating Dooyeweerd’s premise
specifically, Van Til asserts that he is in full agreement with Dooyeweerd’s
analysis of Kuyper’s de beide gedachtenlijnen as summarized in Dooyeweerd’s
article, “Kuyper’s wetenschapsleer.”93 Hence he admits that he “is in agreement
with Dooyeweerd on the need for removing scholastic elements from Kuyper’s
thinking. . . .”94 Likewise, Van Til affirms Dooyeweerd’s two-lines analysis of
Kuyper’s thought by asking the following rhetorical question with an implied
affirmative:
Haven’t I expressed agreement with Dooyeweerd’s assertion that,
whether in philosophy or in theological apologetics, we must go beyond
Kuyper’s scholasticism by building on and developing his Calvinism? 95
Similarly, Van Til expressly affirms Dooyeweerd’s two-lines analysis in this
remark:
[Kuyper’s] basic religious conviction was Calvinistic but, as Dooyeweerd
says, when he was, somehow, unable to be fully himself, then he fell back
on Scholasticism.96
92. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:28.
93. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer”; cf. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed
Apologetics, 2:22-24.
94. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:24.
95. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:10.
96. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:28; emphasis added.

200
Therefore, it is clear that Van Til not only affirms Dooyeweerd’s analysis of
Kuyper’s de beide gedachtenlijnen, but also recapitulates this criticism in terms of
two Kuypers—the Calvinist and the Thomist.
In the second place, aspects of Van Til’s own analysis of the scholasticism in
Kuyper’s thought are recapitulations of Dooyeweerd’s prior analysis. For
example, just as Dooyeweerd argued that Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s
affirmation of critical realism and its concomitant logosleer precluded these neoCalvinist thinkers from providing a truly Reformational answer to Kant’s
skeptical critique of knowledge, so Van Til avers:
On the basis of Kuyper’s argument there would be no confrontation
between believers and unbelievers because neither would or could exist
except by way of a common participation in one pure faith having faith
in itself, without ever having anything to believe.
Kuyper should have told his skeptic friends . . . that they are unable
to be skeptical except they are what the Scripture says they are. . . . As it
is the argument of part of the Encyclopedia compromises the Christ of
Scripture, the Logos of John’s gospel with the Logos of the Greeks, the
One of pure negation.97
In the third place, despite the fact that he has appropriated Dooyeweerd’s
definition of scholasticism in general and his specific criticisms of the scholastic
elements in neo-Calvinist thought in particular, Van Til attempts to turn
Dooyeweerd’s argument on its head by asserting that Dooyeweerd himself falls
prey to the very scholastic line of synthesis thinking that he sought to purge from
Kuyper’s thought!98 Thus Van Til categorically rejects select aspects of
Dooyeweerd’s thought. For example, he writes:
One may accept either the Kuyperian or the Dooyeweerdian view of
sphere-sovereignty but one cannot consistently accept both. The are
97. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:28.
98. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:51-62.

201
exclusive of one another.99
Furthermore, he concludes his syllabus with a categorical rejection of
Dooyeweerd’s entire philosophical project:
We had looked toward the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, and
especially toward Dooyeweerd’s expression of it to lead us onward
against the forces of apostate thinking in the philosophic field. We had
hoped that Dooyeweerd would really build his philosophy upon
Kuyper’s Calvinism and not on Kuyper’s Scholasticism.
However, Dooyeweerd’s new form of synthesis thinking, his seeking
for religious instead of intellectual unity is regressive and compromising
at best. The apologetics implied in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy seem to be
no better than the apologetics of the Aquinas-Butler type while the
theology implied in his philosophy is worse than that of the theology of
the old-Princeton or the old-Amsterdam men. Dooyeweerd has gone
“beyond” Kuyper but his “transcendental method” based on his
religious-supra temporal sphere of occurrence leads toward the
theological directionalism of Berkouwer, Kuitert, etc. 100
Notwithstanding the dialectical perplexity present herein due to Van Til’s
simultaneous appropriation of and polemic against Dooyeweerd’s formulations
with respect to scholasticism, his categorical repudiation of Dooyeweerd’s
thought according to Dooyeweerd’s own definition of scholasticism—“synthesis
thinking”—is yet another example of Van Til’s appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s
thought.
3. Summary
In light of the several lines of evidence adduced above primarily from Van
Til’s syllabus, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, three conclusions may
be drawn with respect to Van Til’s definition of scholasticism in general: (1)
Based upon his recapitulation of Dooyeweerd’s “synthesis thinking” terminology
99. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:57.
100. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:54.
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and his ground-motive language, it is clear that Van Til appropriates
Dooyeweerd’s definition. (2) Furthermore, both Van Til and Dooyeweerd present
Thomas Aquinas as the paradigmatic scholastic synthesizer. (3) Finally, both Van
Til and Dooyeweerd interpret the crux of scholasticism as an invalid assertion of
human autonomy and hence a violation of God’s law.
Regarding Van Til’s critiques of the scholasticism in neo-Calvinist thought in
particular, three conclusions may be drawn: (1) Van Til appropriates
Dooyeweerd’s premise regarding two lines of thought in Kuyper’s theology—a
truly Reformational line and a corrupt scholastic line. In Van Til’s parlance,
Dooyeweerd’s two lines become “Kuyper the Calvinist” and “Kuyper the
Thomist.” Furthermore, as with Dooyeweerd, so with Van Til—all of his
criticisms proceed from this two-lines premise. (2) Van Til fully agrees with
Dooyeweerd’s assessment regarding the need to go beyond Kuyper’s
scholasticism in order to formulate a truly Reformational epistemology and
philosophy of science. (3) Oddly, after appropriating Dooyeweerd’s formulations
regarding scholasticism, Van Til turns Dooyeweerd’s own criticism against its
original formulator and claims that Dooyeweerd himself has fallen prey to
scholastic “synthesis thinking.” Hence a dialectical tension attends Van Til’s
appropriations of Dooyeweerd’s thought.

D. Van Til on Bavinck in light of Dooyeweerd
The fact that Van Til appropriates both Dooyeweerd’s definition of
scholasticism and his criticisms of the scholastic elements in neo-Calvinist
thought places Van Til’s criticisms of the scholastic elements in Bavinck’s

203
theology in a whole new light. With the true source of Van Til’s criticisms in view,
we are now in a position to consider the soundness of the criticisms themselves.
1. Van Til’s criticisms are largely second-hand.
In light of Dooyeweerd’s critiques of the scholastic elements in Kuyper’s,
Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s formulations, Van Til’s criticisms of the scholastic
elements in Bavinck’s theology are manifestly unoriginal. Even though he
expands upon certain points of Dooyeweerds criticisms with respect to the
detailed theological formulations within Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, Van Til’s criticisms
never advance beyond the overarching critique that he appropriates from
Dooyeweerd—“synthesis thinking.”
Furthermore, several aspects of Van Til’s specific criticisms of Bavinck’s
thought give the impression that he has simply emulated Dooyeweerd’s
criticisms of Kuyper’s thought.
In the first place, Van Til follows Dooyeweerd’s example of praising his neoCalvinist predecessors before polemicizing against the scholastic elements in
their thought.
In the second place, Van Til’s “double-headed-fact” analysis that governs his
entire criticism of Bavinck’s thought is a recapitulation of Dooyeweerd’s
overarching de-beide-gedachtenlijnen analysis of Kuyper’s thought. Accordingly,
just like Dooyeweerd argues that, Kuyper, in his better moments, was truly
Reformational, so Van Til argues that, Bavinck, in his better moments, followed
Calvin’s pure Reformed thinking rather than Aquinas’ corrupt synthesis
thinking. In this manner, both Dooyeweerd and Van Til oddly aver that they
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know the true intentions of their predecessors better than their predecessors
themselves knew them!
In the third place, just as Dooyeweerd argues—with Van Til’s explicit
agreement—that contemporary Reformed philosophy must go beyond the
scholasticism in Kuyper’s thought, so Van Til argues that contemporary
Reformed theologians must go beyond the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought.
In the fourth place, just as Dooyeweerd argues against the critical realism
and logosleer in Kuyper’s thought, so Van Til argues against the critical realism
and Logos doctrine in Bavinck’s thought.
Therefore, with respect to the sources of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck’s
theology, we conclude that Van Til’s polemics are largely recapitulations of
Dooyeweerd’s prior criticisms and that, accordingly, the “Copernican”
interpretation of Van Til’s role in Reformed theology as the sole champion contra
scholasticism is historically untenable.
2. Van Til’s criticisms are unsound.
Although a full analysis of Dooyeweerd’s first-hand and Van Til’s secondhand criticisms of the scholasticism in neo-Calvinist thought is beyond the scope
of this thesis, a few critical comments based upon the primary source evidence
adduced in chapters 5 and 6 are in order.
2.1. The current analyses, both pro and con, are underdeveloped.
We have already noted in chapter 5 that the secondary scholarship regarding
Van Til’s criticisms of the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought is divided
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with respect to the validity of the criticisms. 101 On the one hand, the Copernican
scholars, such as, Bahnsen, Dennison, and Oliphint, argue to the effect that Van
Til single-handedly saved Reformed theology from the wiles of scholasticism and
thus revolutionized Reformed theology. Additionally, in an effort to reestablish
the validity of Van Til’s criticisms of neo-Calvinist scholasticism in contemporary
Reformed theology, Oliphint appropriates and expands Van Til’s criticisms
against Bavinck’s critical realist epistemological formulations in two recent
publications.102 However, these Copernican interpretations of Van Til remain lost
in historical abstraction regarding Van Til’s view of scholasticism insofar as they
fail to note (1) that Van Til appropriates both his definition of scholasticism and
his critiques of neo-Calvinist scholasticism primarily from Dooyeweerd and (2)
that Van Til’s view of scholasticism is significantly influenced by the debates at
De Vrije Universiteit over the validity of classical Reformed scholasticism; for, Van
Til clearly sides with the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee philosophers in rejecting all
forms of scholasticism over against Valentijn Hepp’s103 and Hendrik Steen’s104
stern criticisms of Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s views. 105 These highly
101. Cf. chapter 5, §A, 1, above.
102. K. Scott Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck,” in Speaking the
Truth in Love: The Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 201232; idem, “Bavinckʼs Realism, The Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,” Westminster Theological
Journal 72, no. 2 (2010): 359-90.
103. Valentine Hepp, Dreigende deformatie, 4 vols. (Kampen: Kok, 1937); cf. Masselink, General
Revelation and Common Grace.
104. Hendrik Steen, Philosophia Deformata (Kampen: Kok, 1937).
105. For an introduction to the basic issues at stake in the debate, including Hepp’s and
Steen’s polemics and Dooyeweerd’s rejoinders, see ch. 6 in Marcel E. Verburg, Herman
Dooyeweerd, Passage 5 (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989); also cf. Daniël F. M. Strauss, “Skolastiek en
Gereformeerde Skolastiek kontra Reformatories-christelike denke,” Nederduits Gereformeerde
Teologiese Tydskrif 10, no. 2 (March 1969): 97-114; Jacob Klapwijk, “Rationality in the Dutch NeoCalvinist Tradition,” in Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition, ed. Hendrik Hart, Johan Van der
Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 113-131;
Albert M. Wolters, “Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophy and Rationality,” in Rationality
in the Calvinian Tradition, ed. Hendrik Hart, Johan Van der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff
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significant contextual factors are completely overlooked by the Copernican
interpretations.
On the other hand, Mattson and Masselink have challenged the validity of
Van Til’s criticisms. Mattson’s alleges that Van Til read Bavinck’s work
uncharitably at points and hence misinterpreted several of his formulations.
While this is undoubtedly true in the instances that Mattson cites, such an
analysis does not penetrate to the heart of Van Til’s criticisms as a whole, namely,
his appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s formulations regarding scholasticism in
general and neo-Calvinist scholasticism in particular. Thus, although Mattson
has made real progress with respect to challenging the details of Van Til’s
criticisms, he has not reached the final destination with respect to either the
historical context or the scopus of the criticisms.
The opposite is the case with Masselink’s analysis. Whereas Mattson is
mostly correct on the details but insufficient on the historical context, Masselink
is mostly correct on the context but insufficient on the details. For example,
Masselink argues correctly with respect to the context of Van Til’s criticisms that
“Van Til expresses general agreement with Dooyeweerd’s criticism of Kuyper’s
Epistemology.”106 “It appears,” he likewise surmises, “that Van Til’s general
approach to historical Reformed theology resembles that of Schilder, Vollenhoven
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 113-131. (I am indebted to Professors Danie
Strauss and Harry Vandyke for alerting me to the Verburg and Strauss sources via
correspondence on the Thinknet newsgroup <http://www2.redeemer.ca/dooyeweerd/thinknetforum.php>.) For Van Til’s alignment with the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee philosophers on this issue,
see his remarks regarding Hepp’s and Steen’s “false criticism” in Cornelius Van Til, “Response to
Herman Dooyeweerd,” 92; also cf. idem, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:22.
Incidentally, it should be noted that in one place Van Til uses Hepp’s term, “dreigende
deformatie,” positively, albeit in a sense unrelated to the scholasticism debate at De VU, namely,
with reference to developments at Princeton Seminary: idem, “De ‘Preaching Mission’,” De
Reformatie 17, no. 21 (February 19, 1937): 167.
106. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 120.
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and Dooyeweerd.”107 Yet, despite his accurate assessment of Van Til’s neoCalvinist context, Masselink misconstrues aspects of Van Til’s position, such as
his formulation of the essence and task of apologetics.108
Therefore, insofar as a sound analysis of Van Til’s criticisms requires an
accurate interpretation both of his historical context and of the details of his
position, not only the Copernican interpretations but also the non-Copernican
analyses require further refinements in order to overcome the current dialectical
tension within the Van Til scholarship regarding his criticisms of neo-Calvinist
scholasticism.
2.2. The “double-headed fact” premise is wholly subjective.
Emulating Dooyeweerd’s allegation that there are two irreconcilable “lines”
in Kuyper’s thought—a Reformational line and a scholastic line—Van Til divides
Bavinck’s thought into two halves and agues that the truly Reformed half of
Bavinck’s thought is at odds with the scholastic half. Furthermore, just as
Dooyeweerd argues that Kuyper’s Reformational line is stronger than his
scholastic line and thus may serve as the foundation for a truly Reformational
philosophy, so Van Til avers that Bavinck’s truly Reformed side is stronger than
his scholastic side and thus may serve as the foundation for a truly Reformed
theology and apologetic. The underlying premise of Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s
criticisms of neo-Calvinist scholasticism is therefore the same: regarding their
most basic presuppositions, or, to use Dooyeweerd’s terminology—regarding
their ground-motives—there are two Kuypers and two Bavincks.
107. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 18.
108. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 176. Cf. chapter 2, §B, above.
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However, the two-Kuypers and two-Bavincks premises are wholly
subjective. This fact becomes immediately apparent as soon as one asks: How
does one determine that there are two Kuypers or two Bavincks instead of one
each? By what norm is such a bipolar determination made? The answer to these
questions reveals the subjectivity of the premise: According to the norms
supplied by the critics themselves! 109
How then do Dooyeweerd and Van Til establish their norms? Do they they
start with an objective historical analysis of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s views of the
nature of scholasticism? Or, do they begin by analyzing Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s
own evaluations of whether or not the scholastic method is appropriate for
Reformed theology?
The answer to both questions is negative. Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s
method begins not objectively but subjectively. They impose an idiosyncratic
definition of scholasticism—a subjective norm—upon Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s
theological formulations, and then they formulate both their two-Kuypers and
two-Bavincks premises and their anti-scholastic criticisms on the basis of this
subjective norm.
Specifically, their subjective analysis proceeds as follows. First, they assert
that the history of Western thought is controlled by four ground-motives. Second,
they argue that scholasticism is defined as a synthesis of the Christian groundmotive with one of the three non-Christian ground motives. Then, upon the basis
of this definition, they allege that Thomas Aquinas is the paragon of scholastic
109. Cf. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 17, who argues a similar rejoinder
against Schilder’s attempt to separate the true Kuyper from the false Kuyper: “This is truly a
subjective undertaking, because who is to determine what is the true Kuyper—only the critic—
only Schilder!”
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“synthesis thinking.” Third, they search Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s writings for any
theological formulations that appear to be influenced by Aquinas’ synthesis
thinking. Fourth, wherever they find scholastic-looking formulations in Kuyper’s
or Bavinck’s writings they immediately allege that non-Christian synthesis
thinking has corrupted these aspects of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s formulations.
Therefore, not only the two-Kuypers and two-Bavincks premises but also the
method of Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s criticisms is subjective.
With respect to Van Til’s “double-headed-fact” criticism specifically, in light
of his subjective premise and method, Van Til’s assertion is methodologically
untenable; for, he fails to demonstrate objectively that Bavinck’s theological
formulations have been corrupted by a dialectical synthesis between Christian
and non-Christian thought. All that Van Til’s criticisms demonstrate is that—
formally considered—Bavinck recapitulates and develops theological formulations
not only from Augustine and Aquinas but also from Reformed scholastics.
Despite the fact that Van Til—according to the subjective criterion that he
appropriates from Dooyeweerd—deems all scholastic formulations to be
inherently non-Christian, he fails to demonstrate materially that in the places
where Bavinck employs scholastic formulations he does so either with specific
intent to mix Christian and non-Christian conceptions or with the specific
consequence of actually achieving such a misguided synthesis.
2.3. The historical scope is severely limited.
In addition to the subjective premise and method of Van Til’s criticisms, the
severely limited historical scope of his analysis of Reformed scholasticism leaves
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his assessment of Bavinck’s scholasticism open to the charge of reductionistic
historical abstraction; for, following Dooyeweerd, Van Til limits the scope of his
polemics exclusively to Kuyper and Bavinck.
However, even if we leave aside the question of whether or to what extent it
is historically accurate to classify nineteenth-century neo-Calvinist theology as an
expression of Reformed scholasticism,110 Van Til’s use of Bavinck’s and Kuyper’s
theology as the sole basis for his repudiation of Reformed scholasticism in
general is methodologically unsound; for, he neither analyzes any Reformed
orthodox theologian between Calvin and Kuyper nor compares the neo-Calvinist
expression of scholasticism with the scholastic formulations of Reformed
orthodox theologians, such as, Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590), Franciscus Junius
(1545–1602), Johannes Polyander (1568–1646), William Twisse (c.1577–1646),
Gijsbert Voetius (1589–1676), John Owen (1616–1683), Francis Turretin (1623–
1687), Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706), Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635–1711),
Herman Witsius (1636–1708), Campegius Vitringa (1659–1722), and Bernhard De
Moor (1710–c.1765)—to list only a few of the Reformed scholastics who Bavinck
references copiously throughout his Dogmatiek. In other words, Van Til—
following Dooyeweerd—omits the entire period of Reformed orthodoxy from his
negative assessment of neo-Calvinist scholasticism as if neo-Calvinist scholasticism
can be easily analyzed and quickly repudiated without regard for the three centuries of
Reformed orthodoxy that precedes and undergirds it. Therefore, insofar as they are
based upon an historically abstract understanding of Reformed scholasticism
110. E.g., Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, Prolegomena to
Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 84, argues that the era of Reformed
orthodoxy and its concomitant scholastic methodology came to an end in the mid-eighteenth
century with the rise of pietism and rationalistic dogmatics.
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that is limited exclusively to the early neo-Calvinist era, Van Til’s polemics
against Reformed scholasticism in general and the scholastic elements of
Bavinck’s formulations in particular are historically untenable.

CHAPTER VII.
CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapters we have analyzed the most basic presupposition
undergirding Cornelius Van Til’s formulation of Reformed apologetics—his
presupposition of Reformed dogmatics. We have examined this presupposition
from a variety of perspectives (i.e., historically-contextually, formally, materially,
polemically, dialectically), and we have found that looking at this presupposition
from each of these perspectives reveals that Van Til’s thought depends upon
Herman Bavinck’s theological formulations in salient ways, many of which have
been significantly underdeveloped in the related scholarship. The following
conclusions may be drawn from these analyses.

A. Van Til is neither a Copernicus nor a “Van Tilian” but a neoCalvinist.
Much of the scholarship pertaining to Van Til is based upon the premise that
he is a theological Copernicus who single-handedly ushered in a new era of
Christian thought. To a limited extent this line of scholarship appreciates Van
Til’s reliance upon his Reformed predecessors (especially Kuyper); however, by
focusing almost exclusively upon the ways in which Van Til allegedly goes
beyond his predecessors and purges their naive mistakes, this Copernican line of
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scholarship fails to elucidate Van Til’s thought within his historical context. The
lack of scholarly attention to Van Til’s pervasive appropriation of Herman
Bavinck’s theological formulations is a case in point.
The abstract nature of such scholarship is acutely noticeable with respect to
the topic of scholasticism; for, in the eyes of self-styled “Van Tilians,” Van Til
becomes a Copernican hero who not only saves the entire Reformed tradition
from the wiles of scholasticism but also provides Reformed theology, for the first
time ever, a truly Reformed (i.e., non-scholastic) formulation of metaphysics,
epistemology, and ethics. In short, Van Til becomes the first thinker in the history
of the church to provide the world with a Christian view of everything.
The problem with these bombastic interpretations, however, is that they are
based on an abstract reading of Van Til’s life and works, a fact that becomes
immediately apparent when one notes from whom Van Til appropriates his
theological and philosophical formulations. For example, it is beyond dispute
that Van Til pervasively appropriated theological formulations from Herman
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. Likewise, it is undeniable that Van Til
appropriated copiously from Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophical formulations,
most notably, his “ground-motives” formulation, his concomitant definition of
“scholasticism” as “synthesis thinking,” and his critiques of scholasticism in neoCalvinist theology. These two concrete contextual facts not only directly
undermine the Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s thought, but also they
elucidate the primary historical context within which Van Til’s thought ought to
be interpreted: twentieth-century Dutch neo-Calvinism.
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Moreover, if Van Til is more accurately interpreted as a neo-Calvinist than a
Copernicus, then also he is more accurately described as “Reformed” than “Van
Tilian.” For, Van Til not only frequently reflects upon his affinity for Kuyper’s
and Bavinck’s theology, especially in his formative years, but also he explains his
own life purpose in terms of upholding Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision. It could
even be said that, since Van Til views himself as the North American guardian
and champion of Kuyper’s antithesis thinking over against all forms of synthesis
thinking, he should be labeled as a “Kuyperian” rather than a “Van Tilian.” Or,
insofar as he presupposes Bavinck’s Reformed dogmatics for his Reformed
apologetics, he would more accurately be labeled a “Bavinckian” than a “Van
Tilian.” Yet, with respect to his own work, Van Til eschews all such labeling. The
only adjective that he uses to describe his own work is simply “Reformed”
(which he understood to mean “consistently Christian.”) Furthermore, Van Til is
strongly averse to theological novelty in his own apologetic formulations, he
polemicizes fiercely against the theological novelty in the writings of modern
theologians (especially neo-orthodoxy), and he consistently interprets his own
theological contributions as modest attempts to further the pioneering work of
his Reformed predecessors. Additionally, Van Til never published any article,
book, or syllabus with his own name in the title.
For all of these reasons the adjective “Van Tilian” is a non sequitur both
logically and historically, and it deserves to be retired from theological discourse
accordingly. If a replacement for this neologism is desired, then let the term that
Van Til himself preferred suffice—“Reformed.”
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In sum, Van Til’s neo-Calvinist context has been significantly
underdeveloped in the related scholarship. One major reason for this anomaly is
the ahistorical nature of the Copernican interpretations of Van Til’s thought.
However, rather than abstracting Van Til from his context in order to present him
as a Copernicus, the most appropriate and most accurate method for interpreting
Van Til’s thought is to read his work within the neo-Calvinist context in which he
lived, moved, and had his being. When due respect is paid to his historical
context, Van Til appears not as a Copernican revolutionary, but as a twentiethcentury neo-Calvinist thinker. Additionally, Van Til appears not as a founder of a
new school of so-called “Van Tilian” apologetics, but as a neo-Calvinist thinker
carrying on and developing the tradition of Reformed apologetics.

B. Van Til’s apologetics presupposes Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
With respect to Van Til’s most basic presupposition, insofar as he pervasively
appropriates Bavinck’s formulations formally, materially, and polemically, his
presupposition should be understood as follows: Van Til’s Reformed apologetics
largely presupposes Herman Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek.
Regarding Van Til’s formal appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, although
the evidence for a link between Van Til’s and Bavinck’s formulations of the
nature and function of apologetics in theological encyclopedia is more implicit
than explicit, it is nevertheless significant that Van Til’s formulation is nearly
identical to Bavinck’s. In contrast, Van Til clearly sets his view over against
Warfield’s reversal of the relationship between the two. Also, he clearly criticizes
Kuyper for allegedly underestimating the necessity of apologetics. Yet, he has
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nothing negative to say about Bavinck’s formulations, and he hints, albeit briefly,
that he aligns his own view with Bavinck’s. Moreover, Van Til’s first
presupposition itself is a summary of Bavinck’s view, namely, that dogmatics
logically precedes apologetics and provides it with its material content—the
dogmas of the Christian faith.
Regarding Van Til’s material appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, his most
significant summary of Reformed dogmatics—An Introduction to Systematic
Theology—is largely a condensation of Bavinck’s magnum opus. Throughout An
Introduction Van Til both explicitly and tacitly appropriates copious amounts of
Bavinck’s formulations, sometimes with citations yet frequently without.
Additionally, several programmatic themes in Van Til’s apologetical formulations
derive directly from Bavinck’s theological formulations. Furthermore, Van Til
repeatedly lauds Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the preeminent modern formulation of
Reformed dogmatics. Therefore, although Bavinck is certainly not the only
Reformed theologian whose work is included in Van Til’s presupposition of
Reformed dogmatics, he is nevertheless Van Til’s primary dogmatic resource.
Regarding Van Til’s polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, it is no
surprise that the theologian whose work Van Til primarily relies upon for his
positive statement of the Reformed faith is the same theologian whose
theological formulations he employs polemically against the rise of neoorthodoxy both at the former headquarters of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist movement
(De Vrije Universiteit) and at Van Til’s Alma Mater (Princeton Seminary), namely,
Herman Bavinck. Van Til’s use of Bavinck’s thought as the paragon of Reformed
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orthodoxy contra various forms of heterodox modern theology is most notable in
The New Synthesis Theology of The Netherlands, in his several polemical writings
against Karl Barth, and in The Theology of James Daane. He likewise employs
Bavinck’s dogmatics polemically, albeit only briefly, in Jerusalem and Athens.
For all of these reasons there is sufficient warrant not only to conclude that
Van Til’s presupposition of Reformed dogmatics is essentially a presupposition
of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, but also to suggest that Van Til’s thought
cannot be accurately interpreted apart from Bavinck’s. For, if, according to Van
Til himself, it is true that the apologist receives from dogmatics the very dogmas
that apologetics seeks to defend, then insofar as Van Til’s apologetic formulations
presuppose Bavinck’s dogmatic formulations, the former cannot be accurately
interpreted apart from the latter. In this regard appreciation for Van Til’s
pervasive appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s dogmatics is significantly
underdeveloped in Van Til scholarship.
To highlight the fact that Van Til’s apologetics largely presuppose Bavinck’s
dogmatics is not to say that Van Til merely parrots Bavinck’s theological
formulations at every point of his apologetic formulations. Nor is it to deny that
Van Til is a brilliant, powerful, creative, and trenchant thinker in his own right.
Rather, the implication is that, since he follows Bavinck closely on so many
points, the very points at which “Van Tilian” scholars claim that Van Til advances
beyond his predecessors and corrects their views—especially with respect to the
doctrine of God, theological metaphysics, and theological epistemology—are the
very points that need to be elucidated more clearly in relation to (1) Bavinck’s
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formulations in particular and (2) the Dutch and North American neo-Calvinist
contexts in general within which Bavinck and Van Til operated, respectively.
Specifically, Van Til scholarship needs to pay more attention to the neo-Calvinist
theology and philosophy arising out of De Vrije Universiteit during Van Til’s
lifetime; for, much of his scholarly work is directly rooted in that context.
In sum, although multiple streams of influence flow into his thought, and
although Van Til’s thought cannot be reduced exclusively to one theological,
academic, ecclesiastical, or geographical context, nevertheless, regarding his
specific presupposition of Reformed dogmatics, Van Til largely presupposes
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. This important fact has been significantly
underdeveloped in the extant scholarship.

C. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are unoriginal.
With respect to both their form and content, Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck
are direct appropriations of Herman Dooyeweerd’s earlier criticisms of the
alleged scholasticism in the neo-Calvinist thought of Kuyper, Bavinck, and
Woltjer. Van Til advances beyond Dooyeweerd only with respect to quantity
insofar as he applies Dooyeweerd’s overarching criticism against Bavinck’s socalled “critical realism” with more specificity and to more points of Bavinck’s
formulations. Nevertheless, Van Til’s criticisms are manifestly unoriginal.
This fact has been entirely overlooked both by the Copernican line of Van Til
scholarship which has recently attempted to recapitulate Van Til’s criticisms
against Bavinck’s theology and by the scholars who have offered either
rejoinders to Van Til’s criticisms or ameliorating analyses of Van Til’s criticisms.
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Hence the scholarship on both sides of this issue has failed to penetrate to the
heart of the matter, namely, the tumultuous debate at De Vrije Universiteit over
gereformeerde scholastiek. Insofar as Van Til clearly sides with Dooyeweerd’s
position in this debate and appropriates Dooyeweerd’s view of scholasticism
accordingly, Van Til’s criticisms of the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought
must be interpreted in light of that historical context. For this reason the
Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s role as the anti-scholastic hero of Reformed
theology in America is misdirected; for, if there is such an anti-scholastic
champion (which itself is a highly debatable assertion), it would have to be
Dooyeweerd, not Van Til, insofar as the latter appropriates his formulations from
the former.

D. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are methodologically unsound.
Van Til’s arguments against the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought
are subjective. Rather than engaging Bavinck’s own understanding of
scholasticism, he imposes a subjective norm (i.e., Dooyeweerd’s definition of
“scholasticism”) upon Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, and then he further posits a
bipolarity based upon this norm—the scholastic Bavinck versus the truly
Reformed Bavinck. The problem with this method is that anyone can be polarized
and dismissed as “scholastic” according to the mere whims of the one wielding
the critique. However, by merely imposing a subjective norm upon Bavinck’s
thought, Van Til does not prove that Bavinck succumbs to the alleged evil
inherent in Dooyeweerd’s definition, namely, anti-Christian synthesis thinking.
Nor does Van Til prove that Bavinck is in fact bipolar. Rather, both the two
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Bavincks supposition and the norm upon which it is based are abstractions that
are imposed upon Bavinck’s thought from without.
Furthermore, the subjectivity of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck is
illustrated most strikingly (and most perplexingly) in his attempt to dismiss
Dooyeweerd’s thought as “scholastic” using a similar argument; for, if the very
source from which Van Til appropriates his definition of scholasticism (i.e.,
Dooyeweerd’s criticisms of scholasticism) is itself beset by scholasticism, then, by
implication, the very definition of scholasticism that Van Til appropriates from
Dooyeweerd is itself scholastic, and Van Til would then be guilty of the same
charge of scholasticism that he levels against Dooyeweerd! Hence Van Til’s
subjective argument leads straight into a reductio ad absurdum.
Additionally, even if his subjective critiques were granted methodological
validity for the sake of argument, then Van Til’s conclusion would be wholly
subjective nonetheless; for, the conclusion would be that since Van Til knows
Bavinck’s thought better than Bavinck himself knows it, then Van Til may
properly grant himself the right to assert that the way to move “beyond” Bavinck
is to build upon the alleged non-scholastic Bavinck. However, what if another
scholar were to come along and argue the opposite, namely, that the way to move
beyond the non-scholastic Bavinck is to follow the scholastic Bavinck? By what
standard would the case be decided?
For all of these reasons Van Til’s criticisms proceed from a subjective terminus
a quo and lead to a subjective terminus ad quem, and thus they are
methodologically unsound.
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E. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are historically untenable.
Concomitant with the subjective form of Van Til’s criticisms is the fact that
these criticism lack objective historical material for their basis. Van Til does not
analyze in any meaningful way Bavinck’s own thoughts on the history of
scholasticism. Nor does he analyze any Reformed scholastic theologian from
Calvin to Kuyper. Rather, the historical scope of his entire analysis of
scholasticism is limited exclusively to Thomas Aquinas’ theology and to neoCalvinist theology (i.e., Kuyper and Bavinck). Hence Van Til’s use of the term
“scholasticism” is more of an ahistorical philosophical construct that he employs
merely for polemical purposes rather than an historically accurate description of
the nature and purpose of school-based theology in its medieval, Reformation, or
post-Reformation expressions. Furthermore, insofar as Van Til’s philosophical
construct imposes an anachronistic understanding of scholasticism upon
Bavinck’s thought and hence precludes an historically accurate analysis of
Bavinck’s theological formulations either in their own context or in relation to the
three centuries of Reformed scholastic theology that precedes Bavinck’s day, his
criticisms are misguided, inaccurate, and historically untenable. In this regard we
affirm Mattson’s conclusion that Van Til’s criticisms are based largely upon
cursory and uncharitable readings of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, a point which is
somewhat surprising given the copious amount of detailed theological
formulations that Van Til appropriates from Bavinck’s theology for formal,
material, and polemical purposes.
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F. Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought is dialectical.
This latter point regarding the historical untenability of Van Til’s criticisms is
closely related to the dialectical tension inherent in Van Til’s simultaneous
pervasive appropriations and stringent criticisms of Bavinck’s thought. On the
one hand, Van Til’s Reformed apologetics largely presupposes Bavinck’s
Reformed dogmatics as the source of the dogmas that Van Til seeks to defend
and vindicate vis-à-vis all forms of modern heterodoxy. Yet, on the other hand, to
speak in terms of Van Til’s own metaphors, the apologist-daughter slaps her
dogmatician-daddy in the face by leveling totalizing critiques against several
fundamental features of Bavinck’s theology. Therefore, a pressing dialectical
tension arises from Van Til’s bipolar assessment of Bavinck’s theology: If Van Til
presses his arguments against Bavinck’s scholasticism to their logical conclusion
(i.e., that Bavinck’s theology is beset by non-Christian synthesis thinking), then
he undercuts his own pervasive formal, material, and polemical appropriations
of Bavinck’s thought.
However, he clearly does not want to go all the way with such criticisms.
Hence he settles for a half-way house—the bipolar Bavinck. Such a conclusion,
however, is not only open to the charge of subjectivity, but also is inconsistent
with Van Til’s penchant for pressing the principles of his polemical interlocutors
to their logical conclusions.
This dialectical tension is the most likely root cause of the Copernican
interpretations of Van Til’s thought. For, when Van Til’s criticisms of neoCalvinist scholasticism are pressed to their logical conclusion, then the net result
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is that the only truly Reformed, non-scholastic thinker left standing in the entire
history of the church is Cornelius Van Til. Neither Kuyper, nor Bavinck, nor
Dooyeweerd, nor any of the Princeton theologians pass Van Til’s scholasticism
test; for, according to him they all fell prey to various degrees of synthesis
thinking. Hence the self-styled “Van Tilians” can claim accurately, to a limited
extent, to be following the lead of their teacher when they laud him as the
greatest theologian since Calvin or the most profound apologist since Aquinas.
For, when Van Til’s criticisms are pressed to their logical conclusion, then such
hyperbolic inferences would be warranted. Nevertheless, such claims only
represent one side of the dialectical tension.

G. Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought is more positive
than polemical.
All things considered, the Copernican interpretations remain misguided,
despite the negative side of the dialectical tension to which they can appeal; for,
Van Til’s positive appropriations of Bavinck’s thought in particular and neoCalvinist thought in general far outweigh his perplexing and, at points, selfcontradictory criticisms. For example, based solely upon his pervasive
appropriations of Bavinck’s thought and his high esteem for Bavinck’s life and
work, it is self-evident that Van Til appreciates and emulates Bavinck’s theology
more than he criticizes it. Furthermore, it is clear that Van Til knows that his own
work cannot stand without Bavinck’s. For these reasons Van Til’s writings simply
do not provide warrant for the conclusion that Van Til is a Copernicus; for,
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scholars need look no further than his most basic presupposition to see that Van
Til is wholly dependent upon his neo-Calvinist context. However, his writings do
provide sufficient warrant for inferring not only that Van Til’s criticisms of
Bavinck’s thought, despite their totalistic form, are in fact intended to be
understood as subsidiary in nature, but also that Van Til’s overall attitude toward
Bavinck is overwhelmingly positive. This attitude is well summarized by Van
Til’s conclusion to his review of R. H. Bremmer’s Herman Bavinck en zijn
tijdgenoten:
What lover of the gospel can help but be thankful to God for the life and
labor of Herman Bavinck? He, perhaps more than others has inspired
them to enter fully, and sympathetically into the problematics of modern
thinking in every sphere of human interest. Nihil humani mihi alienum est.
This motto was his. He knew he was saved by grace alone. He knew this
all his life. He knew this especially on his death-bed. It is the Christ for
whom Bavinck labored so prodigiously and in whom he died so
peaceably, in whose name alone we may and must say: ”Where are the
wise, where are the scribes, where are the disputers of this age? Hath not
God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that the world by
its wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching
to save those that believed” (I Cor. 1:19–20).1

1. Cornelius Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” International Reformed Bulletin 9, no. 27 (1966):
26.
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